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CHAPTER 4.0
SPACE MISSIONS AND PAYLOADS, 1979-1990
In this chapter man's space activities are first reviewed histori-
cally beginning in 1957 (although a period of interesting stirrings and
essential accomplishments preceded that year); next space activities of
the several nations during the 1970's as seen from the present are discussed;
then an effort is made to estimate the prospects for international cooperation
in space during the 1980's and beyond. Man's activities in space through the
1980's in terms of the various missions, payloads and traffic schedules are
delineated as provided by the NASA and the DoD for the purposes of this
study, and by the study contractors, and others up to the time of this report.
MATHEMATICA has taken the liberty of extending the activities and discuss-
ing possible changes in emphasis in several areas. The scenarios, i. e.,
variations on the mission model, that were costed represent reasonable
alternatives as seen at the present time.
4. 1 Introduction
4.1. 1 Historical Review of Space Activity
The United State Space Program as we have experienced it over
the past ten years did not really exist until our society was challenged by the
Soviet Union with Sputnik I on 4 October 1957 and we failed to orbit a grape-
fruit sized, six kilogram satellite with Vanguard TV-3 later in the same
year. A manned landing on the moon and safe return of the astronauts to
Earth was declared to be the nation's goal in space for the 1960's by Presi-
dent Kennedy in the spring of 1961. This was widely approved by the American
people and supported by the U. S. Congress.
Explorer I, the United States' first satellite, was successfully
orbited on 31 January 1958 and since then almost 200 civil spacecraft and
over 400 military payloads have been placed in orbit by the United States
with an overall success rate of about 75% and a total expenditure of approxi-
mately $50 billion.
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The Soviet program has continued actively and many notable
"firsts" have been recorded. In addition to the first successful artificial
satellite of Earth, the Russians orbited the first animal, the dog Laika,
ani the first man, Yuri Gagarin. They were also first to hit the mQon,
photograph its backside and soft-land a payload on it. They have maintained
a strong planetary program and their Cosmos Series of military and other
satellites have exceeded 450 in number. Their program has also included
weather and communications satellites as well as manned proto-space
stations.
France, England, Canada, Italy, Japan and the People's Republic
of China have successfully orbited spacecraft and the United Nations has
shown a significant interest in outer space affairs.
During the first decade the United States Space Program was the
most strikingly successful of any country, but it was also by far the most
expensive. Its impact on the people of the United States was substantial
but its remarkable achievements were offset by domestic difficulties and the
war in Southeast Asia; however, in the world community it has been a great
success and eagerly followed by people everywhere. The most impressive
accomplishment was the attainment of two Apollo manned lunar landings and
safe returns within the decade of the 1960's and within the estimated cost of
$25 billion; however, it has not been possible to sustain the established level
of overall space activity or resolve acceptable new goals as ofthe present
time. The Apollo Lunar Module shown in Figure 4.1 characterizes the
United States Space Program of the 1960's [1l].
4.1. 2 Space Activity in the i970's
United States space activities in the first half of the 1970's are
clearly seen and necessarily already programmed by the DoD and NASA.
Manned activities feature continuation of the Apollo Program through 1972
and Skylab A, a precursor space station, in 1973. The unmanned planetary
program includes: a Mariner Mars orbiter in 1971, a Venus swingby to
Mercury in 1973, Pioneer flybys of Jupiter in 1973 and 1974 (to be launched
in 1972 and 1973), and the Viking soft landings on Mars in 1975. Considerable
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Figure 4.1 Apollo Lunar Module
Reference [1]
Figure 4. 2 Lunakhod
Reference [23
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activity in near Earth orbit is programmed for the 1970's in both space
science and applications: astronomy with orbiting astronomical observatories
will be continued and earth resources test satellites will be launched in 1972
and 1973; weather satellites and comniunications satellites will be used ever
more extensively; navigation satellites will find widespread use for both
sea and air travel; and military uses will continue at near the present
level of activity.
The Soviet Space Program is expected to challenge us anew,
especially in the area of manned space stations and planetary exploration.
Their very successful unmanned lunar rover, Lunakhod, shown above in
Figure 4.2 [2] characterizes the space vehicles of the 1970's. This auto-
mated spacecraft survived six months of lunar days and nights and was
directed by commands from Earth for over five miles across the lunar
landscape. It was subsequently retired to "reduced activity". The deliberate
Soviet pace and increasing success provide a clear challenge that cannot be
ignored. On the other hand, it is to be hoped that increased cooperation
between the two leading space-faring nations will make it possible in the
near future to assure success and reduce costs of many missions and that
efforts to bring the benefits of space td the entire Earth, with the partici-
pation of other countries and through the United Nations, will prosper. The
development of the Space Shuttle System can be an important step in bringing
this ab out.
In the second half of the 1970's, although the scene is clearing in
various mission areas, much uncertainty is evident and new planning is
needed in view of changing circumstances; however, some missions can be
seen more or less definitely. There is a considerable agreement that a
continuing and "balanced" space program is desirable (although not everyone
agrees) but at any rate its balance is subject to much difference of opinion [3].
Specific planning relating to space stations and other manned
flight in Earth orbit in the last half of the 1970's is indefinite at the present
time. Continuation of the unmanned planetary program can be expected with
hope for increased activity dependent on findings and Soviet competition.
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Space science will continue and strengthen, especially astronomy from
Earth orbit. Space applications activity will be led by the communcations
satellites, especially from synchronous orbit including the direct broadcast
of television -- voice and data. Navigation satellite systems will be used
extensively and observation of the Earth's surface for weather, resources --
agricultural and mineral, mapping and other purposes will become widespread.
4. 1. 3 One World in Space
It is to be hoped that the international initiatives currently being
pursued will prosper and that during the 1980's man's space activities will
be coordinated or carried on, outside the military sphere, in a spirit of
cooperation and of equable benefit to all the peoples of the Earth. It is
hoped that the present Soviet-U. S. efforts to cooperate will develop success-
fully [4] and be sustained, and that the other nations will be included as they
may be interested. The developing countries are already being introduced
to the benefits of space through the efforts of the United Nations [5] .
In the 1980's science in space, including astronomy, physics and
solar system explorations, should provide important and exciting results
and contribute to a great surge in Man's understanding of the Universe and
his place in it. Most importantly space applications, including various
manned stations, should contribute substantially to life on Earth. Commer-
cial enterprise will find many opportunities that will contribute to space
activity in the 1980's.
4. 2 United States Space Missions 1979-1990
Although the U. S. Space Program in the period 1979-1990 will
necessarily evolve from the spacecraft and launch vehicles employed through-
out the 1970's [6J , the prospect of a new Space Transportation System, the
maturing of various space technologies and the cumulative results of space
activities can give sufficient reason to take a broader and more extensive
view of space in the 1980's. Although the mission model provided by NASA
is presented here, a broader and deeper view may more surely identify
the directions and activities of the present decade and project into the
1980's a better understanding of the worth of space activities as a continuing
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program of vital interest to the Nation.
For purposes of the economic study so far undertaken, however,
a conservative view of both the space program and traffic level has been
taken by MATHEMATICA using scenarios with numbers of flights between
300 and 900 based on the NASA "Fleming" Mission Model of Spring 1971
as presented by the Aerospace Corporation in References [7] and [8].
4. 2.1 Department of Defense Missions
The Department of Defense (DoD) is cooperating in Space Shuttle
planning and has offered several mission options. In addition to formal
committee activity highly placed Air Force officials have publicly stated
that they will use the Space Shuttle if it is developed and has the required
characteristics. The Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) program is generated
from earlier USAF research; re-entry technology is supported by the USAF
(PRIME and ASSET Programs). DoD spending equalled $4 million in
Fiscal Year 1972 to study uses and operational characteristics of the Shuttle.
However, a commitment to provide financial support during the development
and early operational phases and to undertake accommodation of payload
design for low cost and other effects within the expected DoD traffic pro-
jection has not been publicly announced.
One of the major difficulties in considering DoD missions is security
classification, but aside from that a more definite understanding of operational
and other problems in integrating spacecraft and system design and develop-
ment is needed if the overall most effective and economical space capability
is to be realized for the United States in the 1980's.
DoD missions are assigned primarily to the Air Force but the Navy
and Army have programs of particular concern; they include surveillance
and other reconnaissance, warning, communications -- strategic and tactical,
navigation, and other special space activities in addition to weapons. There
is at present no manned DoD space activity. The termination of the Manned
Orbital Laboratory (MOL) appears to be a constraining factor in DoD con-
sideration of manned flight for the future. The DoD space budgets that have
appeared in published sources during recent years range between $1 2/3
and $2 billion per year [9] and will probably be continued at the same level
through the 1970's and into the 1980's.
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Quite aside from ballistic missiles and simlilar weapons, a num-
belr of Dol) missions in thel980 's will surely require quick reation times
or orbits that demand expendable launch vehicles. Such special require-
ments may result in a Space Transportation System that is a mix of reusable
and expendable vehicles.
It would appear that a more certain understanding and mTore exten-
sive coordination are needed to establish the details of the DoD involvement
in the use of any new Space Transportation System.
4. 2.2 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Missions
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
missions in the 1980's are discussed in this section under the following
categories:
Space Science
Space Applications
Solar System Exploration
Space Shuttle Sortie
Space Station
Lunar
MATHEMATICA's primary sources of mission and payload infor-
mation are References [7]and[8] although other sources, such as National
Academy of Sciences Space Science Board publications (e. g., [10 ), and
individuals have been consulted.
4. 2. 2. 1 Space Science
Space science missions are generally of two categories -- space
astronomy and space physics. Space astronomy, freed from the atmosphere
and other disturbances over the full band of electromagnetic radiation, is
expected to yield discoveries and understandings in both the SolarSystem and
the Universe beyond that will advance man's knowledge to a major extent.
A fully developed and extensive program has been proposed and high hopes
are held for its realization.
The missions identified as Space Physics are related to man's
determination of the physical phenomena in space near the Earth and elsewhere
in the solar system especially those emanating from the Sun. Basic physical
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theories such as General Relativity, that can be studied in space, are also of
interest.
4. 2. 2.2 Space Applications
NASA space applications activity encompasses primarily Earth
observation and communications and navigation missions. The Earth
observation activity includes continuing research and development of
meteorological satellites as well as newer forms of earth observation
interest such as mapping, resources -- hydrological, plant, fish, and
mineral, crop disease, pollution, etc. Communication satellites are well
established world-wide but NASA will probably continue to handle further
development of these capabilities and the operation of NASA peculiar
systems. Navigation (and traffic control) satellites have also found opera-
tional usefulness and further development of these capabilities is being
pursued with a much broadened applicability to surface vessels, aircraft,
and even land transport.
4. 2. 2. 3 Solar System Exploration
The area of solar system exploration will become of major
importance in the future space program, but it is essentially related to
the available Space Transportation Systems because of the high energy
requirements of the missions. The extent of the solar system and the
bodies and phenomena to be explored are discussed in References [10] and [11]
and are shown on Figure 4. 3.
The NASA mission model used in the present study and shown on
Figure 4.4 recognizes the accomplishments to date and continues the program
to include all the planets except Pluto and also includes the asteroids and
comets, but is, in fact, not well conceived for the 1980's.
It is reasonable to expect that many interesting things will be
learned from solar system exploration in the 1970's that will strengthen this
area of the space program in the 1980's. In particular, solar system explora-
tion has much to gain from both the advent of the shuttle or other new Space
4-8
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Figure 4. 3 Bodies and Phenomena of the Solar System
Reference [i G]
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Transportation System capabilities and advanced space propulsion and other
technology so that the entire complexion of the missions and the overall
program in this area will be greatly strengthened.
A well developed and integrated program of solar system explora-
tion during the 1980's that recognizes fully the possibilities of exploring the
bodies and phenomena of the solar system is considered to be an essential
part of the United States Space Program during that period. A program is
foreseen that extends the present planning substantially and exploits the kinds
of missions that the Space Shuttle and other advanced systems (especially
using nuclear propulsion) can provide beyond the present mission model.
Such a program would include more substantial attention to the major planets
and their satellites using orbiters and landers, fast trips to the outermost
planets, and a number of atmospheric and surface sample return missions.
4. 2. 2. 4 Space Shuttle Sortie
The Space Shuttle Orbiter can operate in orbit in a "sortie" mode
for periods up to about two weeks. This relieves the necessity for carrying
the Space Station development in parallel and permits development of modules
with certain capabilities while attached to the orbiter (although they may be
rotated out of the payload bay) that will contribute directly to the later
establishment of the Space Station and its activities. Both manned experiment
and pallet-type sortie modules have been identified as described in Reference
[121 and presented in more detail below.
4. 2. 2. 5 Space Station Missions
One of the major regions for man's activities in space during the
1980's will be Earth orbit around 500 km altitude where manned-space opera-
tions with spacecraft and stations of several possible configurations will per-
mit the performance of a wide variety of missions. Space Station configura-
tions and systems deriving from Skylab A and also from new technology have
been studied in considerable detail under the Apollo Applications Program
(AAP), Manned Orbiting Research Laboratory (MORL) and other studies,
and at the present time, the Shuttle Orbital Applications and Requirements
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(SOAR) and Research and Application Modules (RAM's) studies. It is
believed that this will be an important and active area in the Space Pro-
gram of the United States and the Soviet Union and involve other nations
as well.
A particularly interesting concept for the 1980's is the modular
Space Station described in Reference [13] and shown on Figure 4. 5. The
station would be assembled from essentially self-sufficient modules and
would be capable of a very wide variety of missions [14] . All of the
modules and other parts of such a station would be carried into orbit in
the payload bay of the Space Shuttle Orbiter and following accomplishment
of their missions would be returned to the Earth's surface in the same
way.
The Space Station will be assembled over a period of time with
increasing capability and crew capacity from 3 to 6, 12 and eventually
24 or more persons. Vacations in Earth orbit probably lie beyond the
1980's.
In addition to near Earth missions, the Space Station can serve
in the 1980's as an orbital terminal for, spacecraft returning from inter-
planetary space, especially the unmanned-sample-return missions which
will probably be an important feature of planetary activity in the 1980's.
Samples can be quarantined in Earth orbit and given preliminary analysis
before they enter the atmosphere.
4.2.2.6 Lunar
Although no lunar missions are included in the present mission
models and it appears untimely to "sell" them, it is very likely that the 1980's
will see both unmanned and manned activity on the moon. Whether this will
be carried out on a competitive or a cooperative basis, a la Antartica,
remains to be seen. It will probably not be studied seriously until after the
results of the Apollo Program are digested.
Aside from further explorations one of the most attractive uses of
the moon would seem to be a very large radio telescope on its backside with
4-12
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Figure 4.5 Modular Space Station Concept for the 1980's
Reference [13]
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comuiunications maintained by a lunar satellite in a '"halo' orbit at the
farther quasi-stable Lagrangian point. Other important uses may be
identified.
4. 2. 3 Non-NASA Operational Missions
A considerable increase in United States space activity in the
1980's outside of NASA and the Defense Department is foreseen whether the
Space Shuttle is developed or not. This activity will come from other
government agencies who have been identifying uses of space that will be
proven during the 1970's,and fromnt commercial enterprises -- privately and
governmentally sponsored or supported. A number of payloads and a con-
siderable numnber of missions are identified in this category in the present
mission model as described below.
4. 2. 3. 1 Governmental Agencies
A number of departments of the Federal government, in particu-
lar, the Departments of Commerce, the Interior, Agriculture, and Housing
and Urban Development, and various other agencies are actively pursuing
a definition of their activities in space in the 1970's and projecting them
into the 1980's. For example, the Coast and Geodetic Survey, Department
of the Interior has produced strikingly detailed and accurate maps from
Apollo photography of the Southwest United States and are projecting mapping
of the entire Country from space which will represent the first up-to-date,
complete mapping at reasonable cost that has ever been possible.
Meteorological measurements -- not only of clouds and cloud
layers, but actual and accurate ambient temperatures, humidity, wind
velocities, etc., at various layers in the atmosphere -- will be made
routinely around the world and other Earth observations of interest to various
agencies will be made to determine new information about the Earth we live
on -- resources, especially water, plant, animal, including fish, and mineral,
population, pollution, etc. Special measurements such as snowfall, locations
of icebergs, sources of thermal energy, etc., can be made. Considerable
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governmental activity from state and local levels to national, regional and
worldwide agencies can be seen.
4. 2. 3.2 Commercial
The communications satellites are currently the greatest com-
mercial success in space and their usefulness and the variety of U. S. and
foreign domestic applications both privately supported and government
sponsored are expected to increase greatly during the 1970's and to be
exploited during the 1980's. The Communications Satellite Corporation
(COMSAT) will continue to play a significant role but competition within the
United States and from foreign nations will increase very significantly.
4. 2. 4 New Missions
Any new Space Transportation System will offer advantages that
combined with the ongoing technological and social scene will spawn new
missions. The revisit and reuse possibilities of the Space Shuttle offer
changed circumstances for prospective missions. One novel but probably
feasible mission that has not been analyzed considering the new advantages
and changed circumstances is a large solar boiler power system for
Space Station supply with local transmission of power to neighboring
spacecraft by microwave or laser with superimposed control signals or to the
Earth's surface to meet special needs.
4. 3 Foreign Missions
!
Space missions by foreign nations are expected to represent an
increasingly important activity in space throughout the 1970's and particularly
in the 1980's as space technology and applications mature and the costs of
payloads and transportation into space reduce. Retrieval, refurbishment and
reuse as offered by the Space Shuttle should emphasize this trend if it offers
realizable economies and is made available.
4. 3.1 European Missions
The prospect of coordinating space activities with the European
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community in the 1980's or sooner is of considerable interest and import-
ance to the United States. One aspect of European involvement involves
the Space Tug and other aspects include cooperative and competitive pay-
loads on missions of considerable variety as described in Reference [15.
4. 3. 2 Soviet Missions
The Soviet Space Program has continued to strengthen (in every
year except 1969) while the United States Program has declined since
1966 in level of activity [15] . The relative success of the Soviet Program
has improved although they are known -- and in some measure have admit-
ted publicly -- to have suffered major reverses. Hope is held high for
increased cooperation in space activity between the United States and the
Soviet Union and some arrangements, particularly in manned space opera-
tions, including rescue, have already been made. Some missions will
remain competitive but a general willingness to cooperate, bilaterally or
through the United Nations, in space activities, including military, has
been evident in recent years and hopefully will be strengthened.
4. 3.3 Other Foreign Missions
In the arena of space, other foreign nations are being seen
more frequently and the activity of both developed and developing countries
will surely show remarkable increases in the 1980's. Canada, Japan and
the People's Republic of China have already orbited satellites while the
developing countries have provided spacecraft or taken a role in launches
made by the space powers. As the utility of space becomes increasingly
apparent both of these kinds of activity can be expected to find further
exercise so that by the 1980's the entire world community will be truly
involved in man's space endeavors and adventures.
4.4 United States Payloads 1979-1990
In this section, United States' payloads of a new Space Transport-
ation System in the 1979-1990 period are: first, described according to
their general kinds; then, the types identified from payload effects analysis;
next, their reliability, retrieval, refurbishment/updating and reuse possi-
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bilities; and last, the individual payloads that constitute the current
mission model given to MATHEMATICA for this economic analysis.
4.4.1 Kinds of Payloads
4.4. 1. 1 Unmanned Spacecraft
By far the largest number of space payloads in prospect for
the 1979-1990 period are unmanned spacecraft. Although these space-
craft will derive from those flown in the 1960's and 1970's several new
directions are evident. They will be larger and more complex as
typified by the Large Stellar Telescope shown in Figure 4. 6. This
major spacecraft will be completely automatic in its function, while
being operated from a ground station and largely unattended during its
operating lifetime although retrieval and refurbishment will be provided
for. It will fill the very important function of probing the deepest
reaches of space and is fully described in Reference [16j.
The Synchronous Equatorial Orbiter shown in Figure 4.7 is of
Lockheed Missiles and Space Company low cost design and typifies a
number of spacecraft that will be used for Earth applications missions.
It represents a step in the standardization and modularization of classes of
spacecraft to obtain initial low development and production costs while
retaining the benefits of refurbishment and reuse. It is described in
considerable detail in Reference 17].
4. 4. 1.2 Space Tugs and Teleoperators
Although in orbit the Space Tugs and Teleoperators may be con-
sidered as propulsion stages and auxilliaries for the Space Transportation
System, they are as much payloads as the spacecraft that require their
services in the performance of a mission. A typical mission configuration
involving a Space Tug with a payload and teleoperator in orbit adjacent to a
Space Shuttle Orbiter is shown in Figure 4. 8. Space Tugs and Teleoperators
are described in more detail in Chapter 5.
4-17
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Figure 4.7 Synchronous lEquatorial Orbiter-Lockhre lw Cost Design
Reference
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Figure 4.8 Space Tug with Payload and Teleoperator in Orbit
Adjacent to Space Shuttle Orbiter
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4. 4. 1. 3 Nuclear Vehicles
One of the important kinds of payloads in the 1980's for a new
Space Transportation System is the nuclear vehicles that will be used for
high energy and deep space missions. A typical modular nuclear rocket
propelled space vehicle configured for a major solar system exploration
mission is shown in Figure 4. 9. The propulsion and propellant tank
modules are each configured to be carried in the Space Shuttle Orbiter
payload bay. A number of modular nuclear rocket vehicle configurations
are shown in Figure 4.10 and their performance with various payload
masses is given graphically in Figure 4. 11.
The integration of two nuclear-electric rocket propelled space-
craft with two typical power levels into the payload bay of the Space Shuttle
Orbiter is presented in Figure 4.12.
4.4. 1.4 Shuttle Sortie and Space Station Modules
Important kinds of payload configured for the Space Shuttle Orbiter
are the sortie modules and the space station modules. The Manned
Experimental Module delineated in Figure 4.13 is significant because it
permits use of the Space Shuttle Orbiter in the sortie mode. This and
other modules will be employed for up to two weeks in orbit attached to
the Space Shuttle Orbiter but with a capability for being rotated out of the
payload bay as shown in the figure.
The considerable variety of space station modules that can be
derived from three common modules to perform a number of missions in
presented in Figure 4.14. These modules will be attached to the space
station core modules as shown above in Figure 4.5 or may be detached
to function in orbit near the station. Details of the various modules are
given in Section 4.4. 5. 7 below. They will all fit the Space Shuttle Orbiter
payload bay.
4.4. 2 Types of Payloads
Two primary types of payloads have been identified by the Lockheed
Missiles and Space Company Payload Effects Analysis [20, 21]. Although
4-21
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further work is necessary to better define the new possibilities for payload
design the reduced costs resulting from standard spacecraft and modules
and the prospects for reuse of spacecraft offered by the Space Shuttle
represent important results from the LMSC studies.
4.4. 2. 1 Low Cost Payloads
The LMSC low cost design of a synchronous equatorial orbiter
has already been shown above in Figure 4.7 and other typical spacecraft
have been similarly designed. A further generalization of these design
principles is shown in configurations of a standard spacecraft and module
in Figures 4.15 and 4.16. Although such spacecraft will usually be larger
and more massive than conventional these factors are more than offset by
the reduction in initial cost and refurbishment costs resulting from
standardized subsystems, etc. These ideas need further development against
real designs for actual payloads and classes of payloads in the mission
model and in conjunction with the Space Transportation System before the
benefits can be certified; however, the current Design Guide for Space
Shuttle Low-Cost Payloads [i contains some interesting and important
considerations.
4.4. 2. 2 Reusable Payloads
The importance of payload reusability is closely associated with
other considerations, such as lifetime/reliability, retrieval, refurbishment/
updating and replacement of the payload in orbit. The design of payloads
for reuse has also been analyzed by LMSC and presented in References [20
and 21]. These payloads differ as a class from expendable payloads and
their feasibility for various missions and the cost savings to be realized
require further definition in an overall space program.
4. 4.3 Payload Reliability, Retrieval, Refurbishment/Updating and Reuse
The interactions between considerations of payload lifetime, re-
liability, retrieval, refurbishment/updating and reuse with other Space Trans-
portation System aspects are so complex that the ultimate cost savings re-
main to be shown. While there are strong indications that considerable
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savings will result, a definitive analysis remains to be performed and
although this may not be practicable in the ultimate sense continued efforts
will be helpful in realizing the most economical result possible.
4, 4.4 Department of Defense Payloads
Although classified data on DoD payloads have been provided no
details are available for presentation in this report. Some unclassified
information is available in Reference [9].
4. 4.5 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Payloads
The "Fleming" mission model of the Spring 1971 from NASA
Headquarters has been used as the primary source of the payload data
by The Aerospace Corporation in addition to their own detailed compila-
tions [7, 8]. The Aerospace Case A (Baseline) mission model was used
in identifying the payloads presented below with some additions. The pri-
mary source of the payload information was Reference [7] which contains
more detail, especially a computerized Payload Data Bank.
4.4.5.1 Astronomy
There are twelve astronomy payloads in the mission model.
They represent the largest and more massive and complex group of space-
craft. Payload characteristics are given in Table 4. 1.
4.4.5.2 Physics
The five space physics payloads in the mission model are char-
acterized in Table 4.2. They are small spacecraft since larger experi-
ments will be conducted in the Space Shuttle sortie manned experiment
modules or the space station modular laboratories.
4. 4. 5. 3 Earth Observation
The NASA Earth observation missions include three R&D and
four systems demonstration payloads. Their characteristics are given in
Table 4. 3.
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4. 4. 5. 4 Communications and Navigation
Nine NASA payloads are assigned to five R&D, three systems
demonstration and one operational missions. The operational mission uses
the tracking and data relay satellites for space mission control. The pay-
load characteristics for these missions are provided in Table 4.4.
4.4.5.5 Planetary
NASA currently includes 13 different payloads in the planetary
missions. Their characteristics are given in Table 4. 5.
4.4.5.6 Shuttle Sortie Modules
Four manned experiment modules and eight pallet type modules
are listed for the Space Shuttle sortie missions. The characteristics are
shown in Table 4. 6.
44. 4.5. 7 Space Station Modules
Five basic space station modules are needed to make up the
Shuttle orbited station; while four Big Gemini modules are identified if the
space station is lofted by an expendable launch vehicle. Six different exper-
iment modules are listed at the present time in support of the various
experimental undertakings in the mission model. Characteristics of these
,modules are given in Table 4. 7.
4.4.6 Non-NASA Operational Payloads
The nine non-NASA operational missions and their payloads are
also presented in the "Fleming" model. A wide variety and number of missions
are seen for these payloads whose characteristics are presented in Table 4. 8.
4.5 Foreign Payloads 1979-1990
Foreign payloads in the 1980's will be oriented toward space applica-
tions except for the Soviet Union where their Space Program will include the
widest variety of space activity. Both developed and developing countries in the
4-41
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world will be very active in attempting to realize the benefits of space.
4.5.1 European Payloads
It is hoped and expected that the European space activity will be
well coordinated with that of the United States. The primary types of activity
will include: communications, air traffic control, meteorology, Earth re-
sources, scientific-and planetary spacecraft that will provide payloads for
a new Space Transportation System if cooperative agreements can be satis-
factorily worked out.
4.5.2 Others
The developing countries will have or share payloads that are
oriented toward Earth applications especially resources, mapping, communi-
cations including education, etc. A considerable competition could develop
in providing the spacecraft and transport and in particular the associated
ground activity to the developing countries.
4. 6 Projected Traffic 1979-1990
The projected traffic for a new Space Transportation System from
all sources during the 1979-1990 period used in the MATHEMATICA economic
analysis is taken from the "Fleming" mission model of Spring 1971 as it
appears in Reference L81. Scenarios have again been used that range from
300 to 900 missions during the 12-year period as presented and discussed
briefly below. It is believed that the numbers of missions are conservative
in certain respects and that a new system with attractive performance will
itself generate new missions and traffic but no basis exists for including this
belief in the analysis.
4. 6. 1 United States Traffic 1979-1990
A summary of United States traffic -- DoD, NASA and non-NASA
operational missions as provided by The Aerospace Corporation in Reference
L8]is shown in Table 4. 9. For the MATHEMATICA economic analysis the
traffic was subsequently modified as described in Chapter 6.
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The United States traffic projection is still quite uncertain and
more work is needed to clarify the missions from both the recognized and
newer sources. Their interactions mutually and with the Space Transporta-
tion System need to be studied to better ascertain the likely traffic demand
and further effort can be spent to considerable advantage in this direction.
4. 6. 1. 1 Department of Defense Traffic
As discussed earlier the DoD missions and traffic rationale are
security classified, but'the traffic is identified with a modification of DoD
Option B and is discussed in Reference [8]. The traffic shown in Table 4.9
has been further modified for the MATHEMATICA economic analysis as
discussed in Chapter 6.
4. 6. 1.2 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Traffic
The NASA traffic in the "Fleming" model as provided by Reference
81is shown in Table 4. 9. Further modification of this mission model in
response to recent and continuing results from the Space Transportation
System alternative concepts studies and developments in other programs
should be made early in 1972 when NASA's overall program, hopefully, has
clarified somewhat.
4. 6.1. 3 Non-NASA Operational Traffic
The traffic from non-NASA operational missions both governmental
agencies and commercial institutions as currently seen is also shown in
Table 4. 9, however, a considerable amount of traffic is assigned to relatively
few spacecraft. Direct contact needs to be made with the prospective user
agencies so this traffic can be'better defined. Increased variety and numbers
of flights are anticipated in this category, but considerable effort is foreseen
to improve the accuracy of the projection and this is believed to be warranted
at the presnt time.
4. 6. 2 Foreign Traffic
It is in the important area of foreign traffic that the need for a new
4-63
United States Space Transportation System needs to be carefully defined
for both developed and developing countries as space activity is expected
to develop strongly from these sources of traffic. The United Nations is
currently engaged in identifying space applications, especially for the
developing countries, and should be quite helpful in defining the traffic
pos sibilities.
40 6. 2. 1 European Traffic
European space traffic during the period of concern as presently
identified is shown in Table 4.10 which was taken from Reference [151. Fur-
ther identification of this traffic and its possible assignment to a new United
States Space Transportation System should be studied.
4. 6.2 2 Other Foreign Traffic
This source of traffic for a new Space Transportation System as
well as the payloads and their associated ground activity in the developing
countries has had relatively little attention in preparing the mission models
or in overall projections of the Earth's space activity in the 1980t s. More
attention by all interested parties should be given to this possible traffic and
it associated concerns.
4. 6. 3 Traffic Uncertainty and Space Program Planning
It is, of course, not possible to project space traffic for almost
twenty years in the future with any real accuracy; however, it is considered
necessary to continue to project mission models with flexibility in kinds of
payloads and level of activity. This necessitates further efforts to develop
more rational space program plans and more effective leadership in con-
vincing the American people of the desirability -- even, the necessity --
of carrying them through during the next twenty years and beyond.
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CHAPTER 5.0
ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS OF SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
5.1- Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce and summarize the
various Space Transportation System concepts as they have evolved in terms
of cost, reliability and performance for the systems presently in use and
the system concepts proposed for future use. This chapter outlines the
framework within which the economic analysis was carried out. If drama.
tically new concepts of space transportation were to arise, then the economic
analysis would have to be extended to include these.
While cost may be a major factor in the selection of the most
desirable Space Transportation System for the period 1970-1990, it should
by no means be the only factor. That new systems for this period may be
conceived is a reflection of significant technological advances in materials,
thermal protection systems, propulsion systems, structures and electronic
systems. The risk associated with committing a development program to-
ward a particular system is largely related to the gap between existing and
required technologies. The payload capability of the various transportation
systems is of equal import and operational subtleties exist that can cause
significant performancedifferences between systems that have seemingly
similar capability. The reliability of the various transportation systems
can have a great effect on total program costs, particularly considering new
families of very expensive payloads. The partial or complete failure of a
payload is not to be neglected as such events may require either payload
replacement or the acceptance of a reduced payload benefit. The proposed
space shuttle systems promise a substantial reduction of these risks and
uncertainties in the 1980's.
A considerable portion of this chapter is devoted to a description of
the various Space Transportation System alternatives and their relative per-
formance capability. However, substantial attention has also been given to
the technological aspects described above. In particular, the various
5-1
technologies are reviewed in some detail to highlight the technical assumptions
underlying the economic analysis as reported in here with emphasis on ele-
ments of risk associated with further pre-programnmed developments. Also,
factors contributing to the payload capability of transportation systems are
discussed.
5. 2 Current EXcpendable Launch Vehicles
This section provides descriptions and performance data for
currently available expendable launch vehicles. These vehicles consist of
the latest versions of vehicles that have been used in the recent past to
deliver payloads to orbit, as well as some newer vehicles that have not as
yet been launched but are based on proven technology and are considered by
NASA to be part of the current fleet [1, 2, 3]. * The vehicles which com-
prise the current expendable fleet are listed in Table 5. 1 with some of their
characteristics. The Atlas family of launch vehicles has been deleted since
it received no mission assignments in the economic analysis for the period
1979-1990.
5. 2.1 Small Payload Class
Two vehicle families, namely the Scout and Thor, comprise the
current small payload class of launch vehicles. The Scout vehicle is
available in both four stage and five stage configurations for launch of
very small payloads. It has been in use since 1960 and has evolved into a
reliable and versatile launch system. The cost per flight is low; however,
because of its low payload capability, the cost per kilogram ** (kg) in orbit
is high. The basic Scout (Figure 5.1) is a multi-stage guided booster using
solid rocket motors. The ALGOL III version, introduced in 1971, increased
the performance of the Scout vehicle-to more ':han 227 kg payload into low
earth orbit, and the heat shield (payload shroud) diameter has been increased
to 0.86 meters (m).
*Numbers in brackets identify References listed at the end of
this Chapter.
**Metric units are used throughout this report. For conversion
factors from metric to English units, see Appendix 5.1
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Thor Family
The Thor family of launch vehicles was introduced in 1960 and by
1970 had successfully orbited 74 out of 80 payloads. The latest growth
configuration of the first stage is the long tank 'vehicle (THORAD) which
NASA refers to as the Thor Delta when mated with a Delta second stage.
The McDonnell. Douglas designation is DSV-2L or 3L. Another version
employed by the USAF uses an Agena second stage with the Thor. In addi-
tion, NASA utilizes the designation TAT to refer to a Thrust Augmented
Thor booster with Castor II Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) strap-ons. Third-
stage solid rocket motors are available for use of the Delta vehicles and are
designated as TE-364 and FW-4. The TE-364 and FW-4 are spin-stabilized
high reliability stages adaptable to a wide variety of missions. Also,' NASA
model number designators such as Delta 300, Delta 602, Delta 903 and Delta
904 are frequently utilized. These identify the same multi-stage Thor
Delta launch vehicle where, for example, Delta 903 is the Thor Delta vehicle
with nine Castor III Solid Rocket Motor strap-ons and a TE 364-3 third stage.
The Castor strap-ons and the third stages use solid propellants and
the Thor first stage Rocketdyne engine uses liquid oxygen as oxidizer and
kerosene as fuel (L0 2 /RP-l). The Delta second stage has used inhibited
red fuming nitric acid and unsymmetrical di-methyl hydrazine (IRFNA/UtJDMH)
propellants, whereas the latest Delta second stage uses nitrogen tetroxide as
oxidizer and a fuel mixture of 50 percent UDMH and 50 percent Hydrazine,
(N 2 04 /A- 50).
Drawings representative of the Thor family are shown in Figure
5.2 and additional characteristics'are given in Table 5.1.
The payload capabilities of -the small payload. class vehicles are
shown in Figure 5.3. This figure gives payload (kg) as a function of ideal
rocket velocity in kilometers per second (km/s). The payload mass for
these and successive vehicles includes the spacecraft mass plus necessary
adapters and accounts for a payload shroud mass, typical of that required
for the payloads associated with the respective vehicles. The shroud, the
mass of which is not included in the payload mass, is generally assumed to
be jettisoned when the vehicle is sufficiently out of the atmosphere. This
is typically taken to be at an altitude of about 120 km.
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The ideal rocket velocity is the velocity to which the rocket vehicle
could accelerate a given payload from rest assuming that the flight occurs in
a vacuum, in the absence of all gravitational forces and that the vehicle flies
in a straight line. The payload capability of -a rocket vehicle can be expressed
as a function only of the ideal rocket velocity, independent of a mission. To
relate the ideal rocket velocity to a particular mission it is necessary to
determine the ideal mission velocity -the ice,udrag free,' infinite thrus,t,
minimum velocity change required to perform a mission-- and the associated
velocity loss for the mission. Then the ideal rocket velocity required to per-
form a mission equals the ideal mission velocity plus the velocity loss. A
detailed discussion of ideal mission velocity requirements for a variety of
missions is given in Section 5. 8.1 together with a discussion on the velocity
loss. This approach is taken partly to emphasize the extreme variability in
vehicle performance due to variations in mission mode and orbital require-
ments. However, for typical missions that do not require orbital plane
changes (also referred to as dog-leg maneuvers), the ideal rocket velocity
required to achieve low earth orbit is between 9 and 10 km/s.
5.2.2 Medium Payload Class
The medium payload class of current expendable launch vehicles
that receive payload assignments for the period 1979-1990 are comprised
entirely of the Titan family. ' These vehicles were developed to satisfy
various mission requirements of the United States Air Force. Development
of the initial family vehicle, the Titan III C, began in 1962 and was followed
by the III B, III M, and III D launch vehicle systems [{ 1,5]. The above
programs progressed to the point where various "building blocks" of the
current Titan III vehicle were developed; the standard-two-stage core, the
stretched core, the solid rocket motor strap-ons, the Transtage and from
other development programs - the Agena, Centaur, and other upper stages.
Combinations of the core, strap-ons and the various upper stages permit
the building of many and varied configurations for a wide range of launch
vehicle applications. Drawings representative of the Titan family of vehicles
are shown in Figures 5.4, 5. 5 and 5. 6. The status of various building blocks
(August, 1970) is given below [- .5 - ] and the payload capability of the Titan
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family is given in Figure 5. 7.
Solid Rocket Motors, SRM Strap-ons (Stage 0)
The five-segment, three-meter diameter SRM is operational and is
being flown on the Titan III C and Titan III D vehicles. Two five-segment
motors are attached to these vehicles and provide approximately 10. 2 mega-
newtons (MN) of sea level total thrust from liftoff to separation. Development
of the seven-segment SRM, which is to be used for the Titan II M, is in
progress. At least three demonstration test firings have already been com-
pleted. The ALGOL III SRM is currently being developed and may be used
with the Titan III for some missions. Two static firings were made in 1970,
and completion of the development program is scheduled in 1971.
Cores (Stages I and II)
In general, the Titan family of launch vehicles can be grouped
according to their "core" cpnfiguration. The "standard core" group of
Titan III vehicles includes the Titan III B, Titan III C and the Titan III D.
The two stage, three meter diameter cores for these standard core vehicles
are essentially the same except that the core structures for Titan III C and
Titan III D have provisions for the attachment of solid rocket motors (SRM's).
Also, the Stage II top structure is common for the Titan III B and III D but
is unique for Titan III C due to upper-stage interface requirements. All
Titan III cores use propellants that can be stored in a launch-ready vehicle
for extended periods of time. The oxidizer is nitrogen tetroxide and the
fuel is a 50-50 mixture of hydrazine and unsymmetrical dimethylhydra&ine
(UDMH). The core propulsion systems of both stages are essentially the
same in the three vehicles and the engines (two LR-98's in Stage I and a
LR-91 in Stage II) are gimballed for thrust vector control.
Standard core propulsion for Stage I has approximately 2. 07 MN
sea level thrust for the Titan III B and 2. 33 MN vacuum thrust for the
Titan III C and Titan III D. Standard core propulsion for Stage II has
approximately 454 kilonewtons (kN) vacuum thrust for all three Titans.
Upper Stages
Although these vehicles may be launched without upper stages,
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various "building block" upper stages are available.
The Transtage is an integral stage of the Titan III C and consists of
two major components. The first is a propulsion module that uses the same
propellants as the core vehicle and the second is a control module which
includes a gimballed three-axis inertial unit, computer and guidance and
control equipment., The Transtage is specially designed to provide maximum
flexibility in delivering a wide range of payloads including those scheduled
for synchronous orbit.
The Agena vehicle is currently operational and has been integrated
with the Titan III B for military missions at WTR. This upper stage has
an improved version, the Ascent Agena, which is utilized to provide higher
altitude performance.
The Centaur upper stage is operational and is presently being inte-
grated with the Titan III D for the NASA Viking program. This will result
in integrated Titan III/Centaur launch facilities at ETR.
The standard Burner II upper stage is operational and utilizes a
TE 364-3 spherical SRM. The Growth Burner II will use a TE 364-4 SRM that
is currently under devrelopment. This motor is a growth configuration of
the TE 364-3 motor and can be integrated with Centaur to serve as a kick
stage for placing a payload into final orbit.
The Tandem Burner is a modification of the Growth Burner II giving
a two stage vehicle with increased performance. Use of the Tandem Burner
would require integration with the standard or stretched core or with a
Centaur upper stage.
The three "standard core" vehicle configurations are listed below
and additional data are presented in Table 5.1 above.
Titan III B
The Titan III B is a standard two-stage core vehicle. Third (and
fourth) stage options include Burner II, Tandem Burner, Centaur, Centaur/
TE 364-4, Centaur/Burner II and Agena. Liftoff mass (less payload) varies
from 156,038 kg for the two-stage vehicle to over 173,729 kg for the four.
stage vehicle.
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Titan III C
The Titan III C is a four stage launch vehicle consisting of three
stages with liquid propellant motors (Stages I, II, and Transtage) and an
initial stage (two SRM's, five segment) of solid propellant motors (Stage 0)o
Also, a Growth Burner II fifth stage can be used to obtain additional perfor-
mance. Liftoff mass (less payload) for the Titan III C is approximately 631
metric tons (MT).
Titan III D
The Titan III D (which has no Transtage) is a three-stage launch
vehicle with two five-segment SRM's (Stage 0) and a standard core (Stages I
and II). Optional upper stages are about the same as the Titan III B options,
except that the Tandem Burner or Growth Burner II may be used with a
Centaur upper stage to make a five stage vehicle. Liftoff mass (less payload) for the
Titan III C varies from 618'MT, with no upper stages to 637 MT for five stages.
The "stretched core" Titan series of launch vehicles include the
three stage, Titan III M and Titan III F and are similar to the Titan III D
except that Stage I is lengthened to hold about 14, 515 kg of additional propel-
lants and new Stage zero attachment points for the longer seven-segment SRM's
,.have been provided.
Titan If F
The Titan III F three stage vehicle (also referred to as the Titan III
D7 in Reference 1 may be used with or without upper stages. An optional
fourth stage is the Centaur and the Burner II may be used as a fifth stage.
The liftoff mass varies from 804 MT for no upper stage, to 822 MT for
the five stage launch vehicle.
Titan III M
The Titan III M is identical in appearance to the Titan III F, except
that it uses no upper stages and is specifically designed for use with manned
spacecraft as in the Big Gemini (Big G) configuration shown in Figure 5. 6.
The Titan III M gross liftoff mass is about 823 MT..
The Titan III M was carried well through the development stage by
5 -15
the U.S. Air Force for their Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) program.
The proposed Big Gemini capsule can carry nine men to orbit and return
and it also contains a cargo compartment. The characteristics of the Titan
III M/Big Gemini configuration are listed in Table 5.2.
5. 2. 3 Large Payload Class
The large payload class of launch vehicles consists of those vehicles
capable of placing over 20000 kg into low earth orbit. Only one vehicle of
the current expendable launch vehicles of the large payload class has been
assigned any payloads. This is the Int. 21 which is based on the Saturn
family of vehicles and can place 115000 kg into 185 km-orbit via an easterly
launch from ETR or 99000 kg into a 185 km polar orbit via a southerly
launch from WTR. Based on the very limited flexibility and applicability of
this vehicle it is quite unlikely that it will be used in the 1980's.
5. 3 Space Transportation Systems Related Technology Status
Successful development of the space shuttle depends on the status
of several technologies. This section deals with those technologies which
are most important.
5. 3.1 Materials
The development of a new Space Transportation System provides
a number of opportunities in the research and development of new materials
and their processing that will surely have wide impact on future technology.
Although the STS will cause focusing of efforts on specific materials with
concomitant shifting of interest in some directions, the problems are
sufficiently broad and essential that the directed attention and funding will
result in an overall gain to high technology.
Improvements in materials and in their availability in the following
broad categories can be expected: high temperature structural and protective
materials; composite materials including ceramics, cermets and filaments;
high performance insulations; optical materials; high and low temperature
lubricants and hydraulic fluids; and specialty materials.
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Table 5.2
Characteristics of Titan IIU M/Big Gemini Configuration
Reference 5-6
Big Gemini Spacecraft
Spacecraft Crew Size (Number aboard) 9
Spacecraft Mass Breakdown:
Crew/Passenger Module 6 000 kg
Cargo/Propulsion Module 7 000 kg
Cargo (up) 3 000 kg
Total Liftoff Mass 16 000 kg
Launch Vehicle Titan III M
Stage 0: 2 SRM's (3.05 m)
Propellant Mass, each 269 000 kg
Loaded Mass, each ' 316 000 kg
Stage I: . 2/LR-87
Propellant Mass 132 000 kg
Loaded Mass 140 000 kg
Stage II: 1/LR-91
Propellant Mass 31 000 kg
Loaded Mass 34 50.0 kg
Liftoff Mass 806 000 kg
GROSS LIFTOFF MASS 822 000 kg
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In addition, space activities will permit research and development
on classes of materials in zero gravity and hard vacuum that could never be
produced on the Earth's surface. Precise metallic shapes, especially
spheres, and very large single crystals are examples that will certainly re-
ceive early attention.
It is metal technology that will probably receive the greatest early
boost from the development of a new STS and substantial efforts should be
continued. Superalloys, dispersion-strengthened alloys (particularly
thoria dispersed nichrorpe), and refractory alloys should be strongly advanced
toward common usage. In this general category are alloys of titanium,
tantalum, niobium, beryllium, molybdenum, rhenium, tungsten and others
that are at present insufficiently developed and/or highly expensive.
Associated technology in research and development testing tech-
niques, production methods and non-destructive inspection will certainly
benefit greatly.
5. 3.2 Propulsion Systems
The development of new reliable and economical Space Transportation
Systems relies heavily on the availabilit-y of high performance and/or low cost
propulsion systems ranging from high chamber pressure 0 2 /H 2 motors
through advanced, recoverable solid or liquid propellant rocket motors.
Generally, the candidate systems reflect the present state-of-the-art adapted
to new uses with a correspondingly high confidence level in RDT&E as well
as initial fleet and operating cost estimates. However; certain concepts, for
example, large pressure fed liquid rocket motors and recoverable stages,
involve the initial usage of significantly new technologies and techniques.
The candidate propulsion systems reviewed in this section are grouped
according to task and, where applicable, comparisons are made with existing
systems.
5. 3. 2. 1 Orbiter Propulsion
Main Propulsion System
In the STS alternate concepts under consideration until November,
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1971, the orbiter main propulsion requirements cover a range of thrust
and involves both standard and high chamber pressure designs. All typical
designs in contention are based on oxygen-hydrogen technology and include
the J.-2 [7] (second and third stage propulsion for Saturn V), the J-2S [7]
(an upgraded version of the J-Z), the XLR 129 (a high chamber pressure engine
that was being developed for the Air Force [8, 9] and the SSME, a high
chamber pressure engine designed for the originally conceived orbiter (with
the possibility that it may be somewhat downrated in thrust for the present
orbiter [10] ). Figures 5.8 and 5. 9 illustrate these four candidates.
The J-2 engine, since it represents the minimum modification to
an existing design, results in the lowest RTD&E cost with the least thrust
and performance (see Table 5. 3). The J-2S raises this thrust and vacuum
effective jet velocity through an increase in chamber pressure. The several
modifications shown point to performance approaching that of the last two
candidates. The two high chamber pressure designs shown in Figure 5. 9
bring about a substantial increase in the vacuum effective jet velocity (Table
5. 3) and since each ten meters per second of exhaust velocity represents
an allowable orbiter burnout mass increase of approximately 500 kg [ 9, 10 ],
the additional cost required to develop such engines has a considerable pay-
load capability benefit in the 1980' s.
Another important cost consideration for the 1980's is the number
of reuses, and the interval between overhauls, for each of the candidates.
The choice of materials for critical components in the candidate engines
is made with reusability as a criterion. Only the SSME and the XLR 129
engines were originally conceived with the important requirement of 100-
mi s sion capability.
In addition to performance considerations, the internal envelope and
operational requirements of such orbiter designs as the 040A pose specific
problems of interfacing the engines to the vehicle. As seen in Table 5. 3
the J-2S versions have nozzle area ratios from 40 to 105 and hence size is
affected. Gimbaling requirements, feed line configurations and other details
of the interface design can result in important changes in the positioning of
the engines and thus influences such factors as the re-entry heating of the
5-19
J-2
J-2S
Figure 5.8 Schematic Diagrams of the J-2 and
J-2S Rocket Engine Systems
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nozzle [ 7, 9 ]. The nozzle designs, including both retractable - extendable
nozzles and jettisonable nozzle extensions (for low altitude abort) have been
investigated to meet performance and safety requirements [ 7, 8; 9]. De-
signing from an engine standpoint, all these factors directly influence the
vehicle engine compartment size.
Table 5.3 also compares the Pratt and Whitney XLR-129 and
Rocketdyne SSME. The former data represent a lower thrust scale than the
latter NASA specification for the SSME engine which Rocketdyne has exceeded
[ 7 ]. The choice to proceed with the high-chamber pressure engine develop-
ment has important implications for the booster as well as the orbiter per-
formance in the longer term. The availability of such an engine will permit
application to such concepts as a future high performance booster core.
Strap-on, lower performance boosters (either SRM or LRM designs) for
heavier payloads could then be added. Also, the future commitment could
readily change to the high performance completely reusable concept.
In viewing the reliability of these orbiter main propulsion candidates
the test history varies widely. The J-2 has seen some 410,000 sec. of
operation as a single engine plus 419 additional vehicle-cluster tests result-
ing in a 99. 9 percent reliability at the 50 percent confidence level [ 7 ].
J-2S and XLR-129 testing has amounted to several hundreds of seconds, where-
;as the SSME has undergone several short duration tests. The advancements
incorporated in the J-2S should eliminate some potential failure modes
resulting in still higher reliability. The higher RDT&E cost estimates used
in the economic analysis for the SSME reflect the need for a longer testing
program to gain the same expected reliabilities as the J-2, J-2S and XLR-129
engine s.
Orbit Maneuvering System COMS)
As in the APS section that follows, the STS alternate concepts have
drastically changed the OMS propulsion requirements. A prime OMS engine
candidate for the larger versions of the STS orbiter has been the RL-10.
That engine, together with its performance characteristics, is shown in
Figure 5.10. Designed to use oxygen-hydrogen propellants with resulting
high performance, this mature engine has been fired more than 9000 times,
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and 74 engines have been flown on Saturn and Centaur vehicles with 100
percent flight reliability. The RL-10 has been proposed for use in the space
shuttle orbiter in its present or a modified form [ 11 ]; however, it has
recently lost favor since almost all cryogenic propellants have been removed
from the orbiter in its current baseline concept.
The current leading choice to satisfy the revised OMS propulsion
requirements is the LM ascent engine. Table 5.4 summarizes the per-
formance of this unit for both the C and E models [ 7 ]. The propellant
combination is the earth storable nitrogen tetroxide and the 50-50 blend
of hydrazine and UDMH run at low chamber pressure. The chamber and
nozzle are of ablative design. Instability suppression devices are incorpor-
ated in the injector. As in the case of the RL-10, the LM ascent engine is
a thoroughly tested, highly reliable unit.
Reaction Control System (RCS)
Originally the plans for the reusable STS called for a large number
of gaseous oxygen and gaseous hydrogen auxiliary propulsion system units
aboard the orbiter and booster. The required number of units, the thrust,
and the propellant selection have all been changed in considering alternate
STS concepts. Typical of the present thinking on the performance require-
ments for this rocket (now termed reaction control system, RCS) are the
specifications [ 12 ] shown in Table 5. 5. A representative rocket engine
assembly is shown in Figure 5. 1 1. Technology for such designs is firmly
based on applicable past experience such as the main engine for the Mars
Mariner '71, and the RS-14 engine for the Minuteman II [ 12 ]. The beryl-
lium rocket engine has been qualified for both NASA and Air Force use,
that includes an "off limits" test history encompassing propellant flooding,
saturated propellants, cold starts, throttle down to 15 percent thrust,
and bomb rating for combustion instability. In this engine class, hundreds
of units have been produced with thousands of starts and hundreds of thousands
of seconds operation [13 ].
Because of the long service life and the number of operating cycles
required of the RCS, two competitive designs rely on columbium rather than
beryllium based on superior ductility with temperature cycling [ 14, 15 ].
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Table 5. 4
OMS Engine Data (LM Ascent) 
Model Number RS- 1801C RS- 1801E
Thrust (vacuum), N 15, 600 15,800
Chamber pressure, N/cm2 82.5 82. 5
Nozzle area ratio 45.6:1 80:1
Propellants N 2Z0 4 /50% N 2 H 4 - 50% UDMH
Exhaust jet velocity, m/s 3041 3079
Engine length, cm 132 180
Engine diameter (nozzle),cm 84 107
Engine mass (dry),kg 77.7 98. 2
Reliability 99. 8%. at 50% confidence level
Table 5. 5
Performance Requirements for the Current Baseline
Orbiter Reaction Control System Engine..
Thrust
Chamber pressure
Expansion Area ratio
Propellants
Mixture ratio (O/F)
Exhaust jet velocity
Minimum Impulse Bit
Response
No. of pulses/mission
*Total No. of pulses
Accumlative burn duration/mission
*Total service life
Backwall temp.
*Added items from References 5-14, 15.
3340.N
120 N/cm2
40:1 .
N2 04 /MMH
1.6
2,840 m/s
220 N/s
50 m-s
3, 000
100, 000
200 s
5 hours
700 K700 K
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Also being considered is a substitution of the 50-50 blend of hydrazine and
UDMH for MMH. Still another approach would utilize a monopropellant RCS
design; however, here one problem'appears to be a question as to the catalyst
life with this mission cycle. Final selection of the RCS design awaits the
conclusion of a number of studies now in progress.
Airbreathing Engine System (ABES)
In the STS alternate designs the ABES plays a lesser role than in the
all reusable shuttle where ABES axe in both the orbiter (four engines) and
booster (10 engines). In'one alternate shuttle design [ 16 ] two such engines
are suggested for use in the orbiter. Candidate engines are the GE F101/
F12B3 and the PWA STF22A-6 (Mod III). Since both engines have been
developed for military aircraft, the B-1 and Fi4B, performance is classi-
fied. The emphasis in the ABES application is the space-rating requirement
and that units be removable with low support structure mass in the orbiter.
On missions that require the ABES, the penalty for engine and propellant
mass subtracts directly from the payloa4.
5. 3. 2. 2 Booster Propulsion
Solid Rocket Motors (SRM)
The SRM family of booster designs is representative of proven and
available state of the art propulsion. Data from the four large solid rocket
propulsion companies on the performance of 3.04,and 6. 6 meter diameter
boosters has recently been assembled [17 ]. The purpose of the study
was to consider configuration and programming options that would lower
peak annual funding requirements through an interim expendable SRM
booster. SRM performance and design data assembled in the study wese in
close agreement.
A typical SRM design is shown in Figure 5.12 where the simplicity
of solid rockets is quite evident [ 181]. Mass fraction (the ratio of pro-
pellant mass to overall motor mass) averaged close to 0. 9 for the three
sizes of boosters. Effective jet velocity was approximately 2646 m/sec for
2
vacuum conditions and 688 N/cm chamber pressure. Each size booster
has been tested by one or more of the four companies, with the majority of
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experience gathered with the highly reliable three meter designs. In the
current design study'[ 17 ] PBAN (polybutadiene/acrylic acid/acrylonitrile)
type propellant was employed by three companies, whereas the fourth company
used HTPB (hydroxyl -terminated polybutadiene). The thrust vector control
approach of using a flexible seal nozzle represents one area where additional
development is necessary to optimize the final designs. One aspect of best
utilizing SRM boosters, covered only briefly in the report [I 17 '] was that
of recovery of a unit from the sea after a parachute descent. A high con-
fidence level of retrieval without damage is the conclusion of two previous
studies [ 19, 20 ]. Reference [20] predicted cost saving of 35 percent over
the cost of a new unit. One factor of importance in SRM costing is the price
of the processed propellant. This is cited as four or more dollars per kg
[ 17, 18 ], compared to the cost of raw materials (in large quantity purchases)
averaging 66 cents per kg [ 21 .]. Table 5. 6 summarizes the SRM designs
using Reference 18 data.
Liquid Rocket Motors (LRM)
Of the various LRM designs the one that most closely rivals the SRM
in simplicity is the pressure-fed booster. Shown in Figure 5. 13 design
eliminates the sophistication of many LRM units through minimum cost
design [ 22] . Number of components are minimized and simple; conservative
tive design allows maximum use of industrial fabrication methods. In con-
trast with the full thrust test history of the SRM, the LRM pressure-fed booster
to date has been fired at one-fourth of the 5. 34 mN thrust level. In those
tests no instability problems were evident.
Performance for the LRM is somewhat higher than the SRM designs
2
even though chamber pressure is designed to be only 172 N/cm (one-fourth
that of the SRM. see Table 5.6). For the liquid oxygen/liquid propane pro-
pellant combination vacuum effective jet velocity is 2770 m/s at 90 percent
efficiency [ 23, 24:] and 6.78 mN thrust. This value improves by one per-
cent when thrust is doubled or drops slightly if an ablative chamber design is
used rather than duct cooling approach. Duct cooling [22 ] provides an in-
ternal duct open at the nozzle end of the chamber to achieve chamber cooling
and downstream barrier gas protection. Such departures from the more
delicate regenerative cooling designs are deemed necessary to insure intact
5-31
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recovery from the sea of the LRM booster. As Figure 5.13 illustrates,
valving and components are minimized to make the unit better able to with-
stand impact and eliminate water damage.
Mass fraction is approximately 0. 85 in the pressure-fed LRM design,
which is less than the SRM. Propellant costs, including on,;site delivery,
are less than five cents per kg. The LRM pressure-fed concept is now in
the third month of a four month study to provide additional data on materials
and fabrication, injector scaling, dynamic combustion stability and recover-
ability.
Considering pump-fed LRM boosters, F-1 designs fit into the thrust
range demanded by the STS. The F-1 booster experience on Saturn V has
been one of high reliability and performance. Table 5.6 summarizes the,
basic data on the F-1 engine ['24 ]. The flyback version represents
approximately a 10 percent mass increase over the data listed. The engine
is also being considered by NASA for the recoverable mode of operation.
The F-1 engine has been tested approximately 3000 times with some quarter
million seconds of operation.
5. 3. 3 Structure and Thermal Protection Systems
The current space shuttle baseline orbiter has a mass in excess of
100, 000 kg, a length greater than 30 m and a total wetted surface area of
2
over 1000 square meters (n2 ). These factors coupled with a 2000 km cross
range requirement and the necessity for multiple reuse place stringent de-
mands on the orbiter's thermal protection system (TPS) and require that
careful consideration be given to this area of technology.
When contrasted with previous manned and unmanned re-entry sys-
tems, e.g., Dynasoar, X-15, Apollo, Gemini, Mercury, and strategic
warheads, it has been estimated [ 25,.] that the requirements placed on
the orbiter thermal protection system (TPS) materials and associated struc-
ture are considerably more severe than have heretofore been encountered.
Consequently the orbiter TPS represents a major area of technology which
will have a significant impact on the description of the orbiter system and
its economic viability. The purpose of this section is to document the
status of the orbiter TPS, materials, to place in perspective the various
f .
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options that are available, and to present an evaluation of the systems and
materials best suited to the overall operation of the orbiter as part of an
economically sound system.
5. 3. 3.1 General Considerations
Configuration
As shown in Figure 5. 24 the current baseline orbiter is essentially
sized by the 4.6 m dia x 18 m long payload bay and the smaller propulsion
and crew sections. With an overall length of 36. 8 m and a delta wing with
a span of 38.2 m, aspect ratio of 1.7 and a 60 ° leading edge sweep, the
2orbiter has a total surface area of ~ 1500 m and a dry mass (exclusive of
payload) of 59,100 kg [ 26' ]. In general the orbiter will be coupled with
one or more expendable hydrogen/oxygen drop tanks which accompany it
into orbit, and are later jettisoned.
A comprehensive discussion of the various booster concepts
currently under consideration is included in Section 5. 5; however, the
design of the orbiter TPS is relatively independent of the selected booster
configuration.
Because of the close coupling that exists between the character-
istics of the orbiter's entry trajectory and the thermal environment experi-
enced by the orbiter and its TPS, considerable attention has been devoted
to the analysis of the re-entry trajectory. A trajectory consisting of four
phases [ 27 J has been shown to offer a number of advantages for control
of the thermal environment of the orbiter. During the initial phase, upon
re-entering the atmosphere, a constant altitude trajectory is maintained.
This is followed by the second phase wherein the heat rate (Q) is the
controlling element. Phase three involves a transition from Q control to
control of trajectory parameters by means of the acceleration level
experienced by the orbiter (G control). Phase four of the entry trajectory
is flown under G control until a final velocity and position is attained in
the vicinity of the preselected landing field. Landing occurs at a speed
of -75 m/sec in a high approach angle energy management mode.
Significant savings in the TPS system mass can be effected by
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proper trajectory shaping [ 28 ]; for example, by employing a bank-modulated
trajectory at constant angle of attack and with a sufficient ratio of lift to drag
to satisfy performance, it is possible to restrict the maximum surface tem-
perature reached on the bottom surface. This permits a reduction to be made
in the thickness of the heat shield material, particularly if a metallic thermal
protection system is employed. The details of the type of trajectory flown
are determined in large measure by the type of TPS employed, e. g., ablative,
reusable surface insulation (RSI) or metallic.
The following comparison of various thermal protection systems is
made on the basis of the optimum trajectory for each of the materials under
consideration. This basis of evaluation results in the lightest possible system
in each case' (see Section 5. 3. 3. 5); however, current TPS requirements have
not fully allowed for this potential saving.
Aerothermodynamic Environment
The thermal environment encountered by the orbiter TPS can
be characterized by the three parameters: maximum heat rate (Q, joules/s)
to a particular area, the total heat absorbed by the area in question (Q,
joules) and the maximum temperature (T) attained by the TPS material.
These parameters vary as a function of position on the orbiter
surface (see Figures 5.14, 5.15). Heating occurs during ascent, staging,
abort and re-entry, the most severe effects being evidenced during re-entry.
While a number of heating problem areas have been identified as occurring
during the staging maneuver [ 29 ] particularly with regard to the recover-
able booster concept, these effects are overshadowed by the prolonged re-
entry phase associated with a 2000 km cross-range requirement. The same
comment is applicable to the ascent portions of the trajectory and to abort
conditions. Consequently major emphasis has been devoted to the develop-
ment of suitable computational techniques, and to the collection of pertinent
experimental data concerning conditions during hypersonic entry flight.
To provide rapid dissemination of aerothermodynamic data from re-
search programs in support of the shuttffle, a data storage and distribution
system has been established at Michoud, Louisiana. This system, denoted
SADSAC [ 30 ] (System for Analysis of Static Aerothermodynamic Criteria),
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distributes all contractor-sponsored shuttle configuration force and momentum
data, experimental thermocouple and phase-change coating heating data and
pressure distribution data, reduced to a common format.
A number of computational techniques are available for calculating
heat transfer rate for the high cross range (2000 kin) delta wing (i.e., base-
line) orbiter [31 ]. In general the methods employed by both North American
Rockwell (NAR) and McDonnell Douglas (MDAC) produce heat transfer pre-
dictions that are optimistic compared to available test data [ 32, 33 ]. Since
the TPS design for the orbiter requires a detailed knowledge of the pressure
and heat transfer distribution over the entire flight regime from hypersonic
to low subsonic, more work is needed. This is particularly true of the effects
of surface roughness arising from, for instance, variable ablation rates for
an ablator RSI or from buckling and/or creep effects associated with a
metallic TPS [31 ].
As a first step toward the solution of this problem, it has been pro-
posed that a generalized program to describe the inviscid flow field around
the orbiter be developed to be followed by a more comprehensive program
incorporating viscous effects [ 34 ]. Such a progression of programs is
needed to predict the heat load and heating rate on the payload bay due to
leeside heating by vortices, and for establishment of reliable estimates for
turbulent transition and heating effects.
The complete flow Yield about the complex orbiter geometry must
be considered when calculating the real gas effects caused by the extreme
velocities encountered during re-entry [ 35 ]. Indeed one of the principal
sources of error resulting from the direct application of ground test data
to predict flight conditions is the variation in stream-line curvature and the
alteration of the velocity gradient, Mach number and pressure fields due to
real gas phenomena [ 36 ].
While it is generally true that substantial effort still has to be de-
voted to the development of fully reliable and accurate analytical techniques
data show that existing methods are adequate for the calculation of ablator
thickness surface recession distribution in the leading edge region [ 37 ].
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One aspect-of the aerothermodynamic environment the orbiter will
encounter during operation concerns the manner in which the parameters
total heating, heating rate, temperature and pressure will vary about the
hypothetical "nominal" profile due to anticipated variations in the atmos-
phere and trajectory. In order to provide an adequate margin of safety in
the design of the TPS it is necessary to properly evaluate such variations.
Such an evaluation is currently in progress at NASA Langley Research Center
[ 38 ]. While definitive results are still in the process of being amassed
it is clear that this analysis will influence the detailed design of the EPS
currently under study to an extent that cannot be fully assessed at this time
(see Section 5. 3. 3. 5).
The thermal aspects of TPS design center primarily about the con-
ditions encountered during hypersonic flight. However, the overall design
of the TPS system is determined by conditions both during the hypersonic
and the subsonic portions of the trajectory. In general TPS materials are
selected by the maximum entry temperature and total heat input while the
panels are sized by ascent pressures [ 28, 30 ]. In addition, since the
orbiter has to exhibit reasonable handling characteristics during the final
subsonic phase of the re-entry trajectory, the TPS has to be compatible with
operation under adverse weather conditions. Therefore, consideration has
to be given to such factors as rain and hail erosion and surface characteristics,
e. g., roughness, which could alter the aerodynamic characteristics of the
vehicle. Present data support the position that no major problems are likely
to be encountered due to subsonic operational conditions for current TPS
designs.
5. 3. 3. 2 Orbiter Structure
Design and Materials
With the overall configuration of the orbiter nearing finalization
(Fig:ire 5. 24) detailed design of the structure and selection of appropriate
construction materials are still in the process of being established. A num-
ber of design studies conducted using earlier orbiter configurations having
substantial internal propellant capacity [ 39 ] have shown that integral
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propellant tanks have lower weights, development investment and total
program cost than non-integral tanks. However, if consideration is given
to simplicity of design, replaceability and maintenance, a non-integral tank
design would be superior.
Aluminum is the likely material choice if it is ultimately decided
that a "cold structure" approach (i. e., the structure is thermally protected)
is to be adopted. However, if a "hot structure" approach is selected wherein
the structure is required to act, to a certain degree, as a heat sink and sus-
tain temperatures in excess of those permissible with aluminum, titanium
is probably the appropriate construction material [ 36 -.
In comparing the relative merits of aluminum versus titanium a
number of factors are worth noting. Aluminum has the advantages of lower
design complexity, minimum analysis complexity, reduced testing and fabri-
cation complexity, and lower cost [ 36 ]. There is no clear cut weight advan-
tage of one material over the other. Studies are now in progress to define
more fully the relative advantages and disadvantages of these materials.
A number of advanced materials have been considered for use in
the orbiter structure. It has been shown [ 40 ] that considerable cost
savings can be affected by the application of advanced structural materials,
e. g., beryllium, to the orbiter. The use of such materials would result in
reduced system complexity and a reduction in launch weight. A detailed
study [ 39 ] of boron/epoxy'employed in thrust structure tubes and boron/
aluminum structural components have indicated weight and cost savings com-
pared to similar structures fabricated of conventional material. Because of
the relatively developmental nature of the advanced materials they will doubt-
lessly be incorporated slowly into the orbiter program, their initial use being
restricted to specialized applications.
Structure, TPS Interaction
Recent studies by MDAC conclude that the arrangement of primary
and support structure do not determine the type and attachment method of
the thermal protection system employed and that a properly designed primary
and support structure can accommodate a variety of approaches. Whether
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the TPS can in fact be treated independent of the structure must be considered
a moot point. There is considerable evidence [ 42 ] that the TPS and structure
in order to be efficient have to be considered as a single entity despite the
conveniences that accrue if they are treated separately. This contra view
is based on previous experience with re-entry vehicle designs where signifi-
cant coupling between the TPS and the structure occurred. At this point one
can only conclude that coupling between the TPS and structure can occur and
should be considered in the design of the structure and TPS.
A problem area. that has been recognized and will be discussed in
Section 5. 3. 3. 4 involves the limited strength levels in tension and com-
pression of RSI TPS. Such materials require the use of finite thickness
flexible adhesives for proper bonding to panels which are then attached to the
structure proper. Consequently it is necessary that proper design of the under-
lying structure and the TPS system be undertaken.
5. 3. 3. 3 Candidate TPS
Ablative
Figure 5.15 displays, in a simplified form, the general details of
an ablator TPS. Typically ablative thermal protection systems, as employed
in the manned space flight program and as proposed for the shuttle, consist
of a honeycomb, usually fiberglass, with cells -1 cm across whose axes
are aligned perpendicular to the surface of the vehicle and are filled with an
elastomeric material. During re-entry aerodynamic heating causes the
surface of the ablator to become hot leading to the formation of a char layer.
This char layer, mechanically weaker than the parent material, is restrained
from rapid erosion by the presence of the honeycomb. As a consequence the
char behaves similar to an insulator and impedes the flow of heat to the
interior. With prolonged exposure, additional ablator chars and is erosively
removed until at the end of a given mission only sufficient thickness of
material remains to prevent the thermal pulse associated with the re-entry
maneuver from causing an over temperature condition to exist in the mounting
structure.
In general, because the surface material is continually removed
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during heating, ablators have proven to be virtually insensitive to Q [ 43 ].
In addition, ablator TPS are relatively simple to design, are reliable, for-
giving of small imperfections and provide a degree of structural vibration
damping.
Ablator materials exist in a wide range of densities.,, A high density
3
phenolic-nylon and filled silicone elastomer (450 kg/m3 ) is capable of absorb-
6 2
ing ~.10-15 x 10 joule/kg at heating rates as high as 220 kW/m . By con-
.3
trast a low density ablator of the same material (240 kg/nm ) is capable of
absorbing 15-20 x 106 joule/kg at the same rate but requires the presence of
a honeycomb structure to retain the char [ 43 ].
The test results for ablator materials having small defects are
quite comparable to the results obtained from defect free ablators used in the
manned space program. This observation is consistent with experience
obtained in the Apollo program. Access holes in the Apollo heat shield having
dimensions on the order of the basic honeycomb cell size did not con-
spicuously affect the ability of the system to perform its function either in
the vicinity of the holes or overall.
The ability to tolerate defects, e.g., partially filled honeycomb
cells, permits relaxed manufacturing and in Jpection standards and, if per-
mnitted on a manned vehicle, would result in substantial cost savings as
compared to previous heat shields. This is particularly true when consider-
ation is given to the large area of thermal protection surface required.
2
Slightly in excess of 1000 m of surface area (100 percent of wetted surface)
has to be protected, an area so large by usual heat shield standards that the
descriptive term "acreage" has come into general use.
A study [ 44 ] of one of the most recent orbiter designs (the 040A)
revealed the following statistics concerning the characteristics of an
ablator TPS: Acreage, SLA-561 ablator in honeycomb (71kg/m ); Leading
2
Edges, ESA 3560 11A moulded ablator (2751g/m ); and Antennae covered
with SLA-220 ablator in honeycomb (79 kg/m ). The total TPS weight from
this study was 13, 700 kg for an average surface density of 13. 5 kg/m2 and
an average area per panel of about one square meter.
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The study showed that a total of 1028 separate ablator panels would
be required to completely cover the surface, distributed as follows: special
shape -149, doubly curved -270, singly curved -473 and flat .136. These
figures give some measure of the magnitude of the refurbishment task.
There is very little uncertainty with regard to the question of whether
an orbiter using an ablator TPS of the type described could be built and
successfully operated. The major question is one of overall economics, in
particular the costs involved in refurbishment. Currently it appears that
honeycomb ablators, bonded to their panels which are then bolted to the
primary structure, would provide ease of refurbishment. The joints between
panels would be filled with an easily applied elastomer (RTV) facilitating
panel removal and replacement. Allowance for operating cost uncertainties
were included in the economic risk analysis in both this report and Refer-
ence 5-64.
Until detailed time-motion studies of the refurbishment of actual,
full scale test sections are complete by MDAC (test currently in progress
at NASA Langley) available cost estimates of the refurbishment process
will have to suffice. Current estimates, while disparate, would indicate a
2panel (1 m 2 ) will cost in the neighborhood of $1, 000 [ 37, 44 ] for a total
replacement cost per vehicle of $1,000,000 (assuming that the defect free
requirement heretofore applied to manned vehicle heat shields will be re-
laxed). It has been estimated that complete replacement of the TPS would
require a total of ~ 8000 man hours of work per vehicle [44 ].
Historically, ablator thermal protection systems have been used
once and then discarded. It should, however, be recognized that there exists
no fundamental reason why a properly designed ablative heat shield could not
be reused a limited number of times-before its design life is attained. As
yet the reuse capability of candidate ablator RPS materials has not been
established and is the subject of continuing research [ 44 ]. If reasonable
reuse can be attained, ablator TPS can be very cost effective.
Ablators represent a well-developed technology, however, several
important questions [ 37 ] concerning their application to the shuttle remain
to be answered. These questions include: what is the effect of shape change
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and surface roughness upon aerodynamic performance; what is the differential
ablation at panel joints; what is the effect of ablation products upon adjacent
panels, and what are the effects of p15rolonged exposure to space. All require
further study and evaluation before the ablator TPS can be used. However,
the solution to the problems posed by these questions does not appear to re-
quire new technology or a prolonged and costly research program.
5. 3. 3.4 Reusable Surface Insulation (RSI)
Figure 5.16 depicts the manner in which a typical RSI panel would
be mounted on the orbiter structure. The generic term reusable surface
insulation is used to describe an approach to the requirement that the basic
orbiter structure's temperatures remain within a preselected range. This
is accomplished in the RSI system by the use of a suitable insulating material,
e. g., silica or mullite (aluminum-silicate), which is bonded to a panel,
typically titanium sheet or honeycomb, by a suitable flexible adhesive. To
prevent scouring of the insulation by the hot gas flow associated with re-
entry a suitable protective layer is applied to the outside and edge surfaces
of the insulation. It is the ability of this protective surface layer to resist
the combined action of aerodynamic forces and high temperature that permits
this system to be reused numerous times.
Generally the thickness of the insulation is determined by the temp-
erature tolerance of the adhesive used to affix the insulation to an appropriate
backing panel. A temperature of 550 K represents a practical limit [ 28, 45 ,]
(the so-called band-line temperature limit) for insulation mounted on titanium
panels.
Since most insulation materials have low strength [ 46 ], (on the
order of 70 N/cm ) finite thickness flexible adhesives such as RTU have to be
employed to secure the insulation to a backing panel. The unit weight of the
insulation used in any given panel or any given location on the orbiter, since
the band-line temperature is restricted, is a function of the total heat input
(Q) to the panel and the duration of the heat pulse.
Currently, silica and mullite rigidized fiber insulators are the two
materials which offer the most promise of satisfying the RPS requirements
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of the shuttle orbiter ["45 ]. A silica system developed by LMSC using a
chromium oxide coating has demonstrated reuse capability up to 1530°K and
mullite (developed by MDAC) has proven serviceable up to 1640 0 K [ 48 ].
The'use of a silicone coating offers the advantage of being non-catalytic and
therefore capable of operation at less than the radiative equilibrium temper-
ature of the gas flow. A major problem associated with currently developed
reusable surface insulation systems arises from the fact that the protective
surface coatings in use are not strain compatible with the insulation, the
ultimate strain capability being limited by the coating.
A number of other insulation materials have been considered. Cer-
amics and some carbon systems have exhibited severe.shortcomings as reusable
thermally and structurally efficient systems [ 45 ]. Ceramics are brittle,
have low strength and are sensitive to thermal shock whereas carbon systems
are subject to oxidation effects that are small but cannot be neglected. How-
ever, new efforts are making these systems more competitive. Oxidation
inhibited carbon laminate, a carbon cloth laminate bonded with polymeric
resin pyrolyzed to carbon, has demonstrated stability to temperatures as high
as 2500°K [ 45 ]. Indeed carbon cloth laminates diffusion coated with either
silicone or combinations of zinconium, boron or silicone perform very well;
siliconized carbon having demonstrated reuse capability at 1800°K.
Repair techniques have been developed to permit reuse of lightly
damaged RSI panels that should improve the competitive position of this TPS
approach with respect to other methods. Work is currently underway at
NASA Langley Research Center directed toward defining the costs involved
in repairing a full scale RSI TPS. The actual status of the RSI system should
be established during January 1972 when final reports are due from the three
contractors involved in this work: LSMC, MDAC and.G. E. [ 49 ].
LMSC has apparently made a major advance with the development of
an amorphous glaze silicone carbide coating. This coating is not only com-
patible with the base insulation but possesses high temperature stability and
is waterproof. The amorphous glaze coating has been shown to be capable of
retaining its waterproofing characteristics after prolonged use and to be rain
resistant at speeds up to 500 to 650 km/hr. at reasonable angles of attack
5-47
(10°> 20 ° ) [ 49 ]. Consequently there is no rain erosion problem.
The thermal shock problems with mullite, wherein the coating cracks
exposing the vulnerable mullite to anodynamic forces, does not occur with the
new coating material. Consequently, a coating material-insulation material
combination may well .be available for use on the orbiter. However, until
NASA can evaluate the work that is now in the final stages of completion, the
exact status of RSI TPS is uncertain.
Metallic
The metallic thermal protection employs a high temperature metallic
outer surface which is thermally decoupled from, and therefore shields, the
inner load carrying structure. This type of TPS was used in the highly suc-
cessful X=15 research vehicle which operated at lower velocities and therefore
lower heat loadings and temperatures than those associated with the shuttle
orbiter.
The metallic heat shield system is temperature limited and therefore
sensitive to heating rate [ 27] but insensitive to the duration of the heat
pulse and the total heat load [ 28]. The following estimates of the fraction
of orbiter surface areas below a given temperature: less than 1800 0 K, 0.95- 
0O 98; less than 1600 0 K, 0. 90-0.98; less than 1400°K, 0.85-0.95; less than
1300° 0K, 0.65-0. 90, show that a significant portion of the acreage can be
covered with superalloys. Superalloys (for which a large amount of data
exists) are useful up to a maximum temperature of 1300°K.
Above a surface temperature of 1300°K and up to 1400°K cobalt
superalloys and coated columbium (element 41, also called niobium) can be
used. Above 1400°K coated tantalum shows promise up to 1600 to 1800°K
[ 48 ]; however, coatings for tantalum are less advanced technically than are
those for columbium. Significant reuse of tantalum has been demonstrated at
the high temperatures noted but there is a question of the reliability of this
material [5-51]. Sylvania has developed a coating (R512E) under Air Force
contract that, when used with columbium, shows promise of 100 mission
reuse capability in shuttle service at temperatures up to 1600°K. General
Dynamics is conducting an extensive proof of concept evaluation of coated
columnbium employing large scale components to ascertain the detailed charac-
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teristics of this material. Preliminary data indicate that defects or cracks
in the R512E coating do not lead to catastrophic failure, are relatively easy to
detect and are amenable to rapid repair. However, insufficient data are
available to assess properly the cost of such a.TPS approach [ 51, 52 ].
A major problem has been identified with the use of metallic heat
shield materials [50, 53, 54-. ]. Such candidate materials as Rene' 41,
H5-188, TD-Hi Cr, and Hayes 25 exhibit elevated creep levels when exposed
to cyclic variations of temperature and stress similar to those anticipated
to be associated with shutttle operation. These creep levels are far in excess
of those predicted on the basis of normal continuous creep test data and
represent a new effect that was unexpected and is being studied extensively.
Once the actual creep characteristics of these metals is established appro-
priate designs can be made to take this effect into account. A computer
model has been developed [53 ] to predict creep under transient load and
temperature conditions permitting design evaluation of these materials to be
rapidly conducted.
In addition to the generation of excessive creep rates, tests repro-
ducing the cyclic conditions imposed by the orbiter!s operational requirements
have shown that TD-Ni Cr develops porosity after prolonged use. An aluminum
modified allow (TD-Ni Cr Aly) has been developed [ 32 ] which exhibits'
excellent oxidation resistance and does not become porous under cyclic
temperature/stress conditions.
Considerable development work has still to be accomplished before
metallic TPS can be judged suitable for use with the shuttle. Obviously there
exist many areas on the shuttle surface where the maximum temperature is
low enough to permit metallic rpaterials to be used (Figure 5.14). However,
even though such a system would offer the advantage of light unit weight [28 ]
(10-12 kg/m2 ), extensive proof of concept testing will have to be conducted
to establish the basic costs of such a system and to verify the basic design.
Such testing is now underway. Consequently, no firm economic analysis of
the metallic TPS can be realistically undertaken prior to the time that the
results of these tests are evaluated.
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Heat Sink
The .heat sink concept of thermal protection employs the innate thermal
capacity of the vehicle's structure to limit temperatures to safe levels. Ob-
viously such a system is sensitive to total heatloading (Q). An analysis of
a heat sink protected shuttle booster stage [ .5 -'] has shown that an aluminum
structure (alloy 2219-787) is capable of surviving entry from staging velocities
somewhat in excess of 3 km/s.
This RPS method shows considerable promise for use with the re-
coverable SRM and LRM concepts now receiving consideration (Section 5. 5. 2).
Active
The active thermal protection system employs an expendable medium,
e. g., water, to provide cooling to the highest temperature areas of the enter-
ing vehicle. Work is currently in progress at Langley on this approach so
that any evaluation of the so-called "water wick" system would be unwarranted
at this time.
LMSC [ 56 ] has conducted a study of the advantages and disadvantages
such a system would have when incorporated into adelta body orbiter. In the
study only the flat, windward, bottom of the orbiter vehicle (36 percent of the
total surface area) was actively cooled by a redundant water/glycol, water/
NH system. The analysis revealed that a small weight advantage (-2500 kg)
could be gained by use of the active system. However, LMSC concluded that
the increased cost and reduced reliability of such a system outweighed the
advantages.
While this study was essentially inconclusive it would appear that
the concept has merit and should be studied in greater depth for specialized
applications.
5. 3. 3.5 TPS Evaluation
On the basis of the comments made in Section 5. 3. 3.4 it is clear that
of the three major TPS approaches considered the ablative system is the most
well developed and therefore would represent less of a technological risk
than either the RSI or metallic approach. The technology associated with
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RSI or metallic TPS has made rapid progress but many areas of uncertainty
exist with regard to the application of these materials to the shuttle. These
uncertainties are compounded by the uncertainties that exist with regard to
the calculation of the orbiter's aerothermodynanmic state during re-entry. On
the other hand, the ablative system has considerably higher costs per flight
than those promised by a reusable TPS.
To a certain extent the success of the metallic and RSI TPS depends
on trajectory control to limit surface temperatures and heat loading to
acceptable levels. Until'the anticipated variations about the nominal tra-
jectory due to guidance and control factors and variations in the normal atmos-
phere are evaluated in detail these two systems must be designed to provide
a sufficient margin to prevent failure. The ablative system has proven to be
quite forgiving of not only small defects in fabrication but to variations in
maximum surface temperature and heat rate. Consequently, an ablative TPS
is being considered for the baseline orbiter since it represents the lowest
development cost and lowest risk.
Figure 5.17 based on data presented in Reference 5-43 represents
an attempt to evaluate the initial and operating costs of the three major TPS
candidates. The lower set of curves is the same as presented in Reference
5-43 (April 1971) while the upper set represents a more recent (November
1971) estimate. Because of the many uncertainties associated with the costs
involved in the metallic and RSI systems the data of Figure 5.17 must be
viewed as being at best qualitative and indicative of overall trends.
It is clear that, on the basis of the necessarily crude analysis
represented by Figure 5.17, the ablative system would offer overall program
savings if used as the primary TPS system for the first 20 flights or so. With
the development of limited reuse capability it may be possible to use an
ablative RIPS for a far larger number of flights and still effect a cost savings.
Again, the uncertainties associated with the development of metallic
and RSI TPS precludes any firm statement concerning their ultimate applica-
tion to the orbiter to be made at this time. It seems obvious that ablative
TPS will be applied to the earliest orbiters and possibly to a substantial
number of subsequent flights as well. The economic analysis of the alternative
5-51
0
0
~%'0 -
0
· .....i.... ______ * > .
o
0u
S~~~
I 4 J
'0 >
4--
44-4
0 0 0~~ 0 U
$.Z0
o u
-4
N i
'-4
9InP UA Ix 40 84.
I~~5-5
Space Shuttle Systems was carried out allowing to a considerable extent for
these cost uncertainties in the operating phase of the Space Shuttle System.
Thetechnical review shows that at least one TPS has an assured performance
confidence and the economic analysis has allowed for the implied increase in
operating costs. Yet if a reusable TPS proves feasible in time for the 1979
IOC date of the Space Shuttle System, it would increase correspondingly the
advantages of a reusable STS. The decision on which TPS to use is therefore
a self-contained trade-off question that does not affect the accept/reject
decision of the complete system.
5. 3.4 Integrated Electronics System
The Integrated Electronics System (IES) provides both the interface
and the intelligence linkage between the human operators in the spacecraft and
the ground and the vehicle operational systems. The IES implements guidance,
navigation, flight control, data management, and communications of the shuttle
and booster systems. Also included in the IES are the hydraulic and electric
power systems.
5. 3.4. 2 Requirements and System Organization
It should be noted that the following discussion is specifically appli-
cable to the current baseline shuttle orbiter. The applicability of the IES as
defined to the shuttle booster is a function of the yet-to-be-selected booster
configuration. Booster configurations under consideration during the study
period (July, 1971 to January, 1972) ranged from manned fully reusable to
unmanned non-reusable vehicles. At present (January, 1972) the economic
choice has narrowed to the (new) baseline orbiter with the following four
alternate booster thrust assists: (1) Parallel Burn Solid Rocket Motors, (2)
Parallel Burn Pressure Fed Boosters, (3) Series Burn Pressure Fed Booster,
and (4) Series Burn Solid Rocket Motor Booster. For the manned fully reusable
booster, the booster IES will be similar to the shuttle orbiter IES, with the
exception of the deletion of the Rendezvous and Docking Aids. As the confi-
guration moved toward an unmanned non-reusable design, the booster IES
requirements will be minimized. Other booster configurations such as
partially reusable booster or recoverable will employ scaled down versions
of the IES described in this report.
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The organization and design of the IES will be shaped by system
level requirements for crew safety, turn-around time, and equipment
commonality. For example, the requirements that "electronic systems shall
be designed to fail operational after failure of the two most critical compo-
nents and fail-safe for crew survival after the third failure" [ 57 - ] will play
a major role in establishing the requirements for redundancy and cross-
strapping in subsystem design. In a similar manner, the requirement for
vehicle turn-around in less than two weeks will establish the design require-
ment for fault isolation, accessibility, and replacement within the electronic
subsystems at the chassis or module levels. The requirement for commonality
of systems, subsystems, components, and parts between various program
elements may cause the subsystem designer to incur penalties in the areas
of size, mass, and power, but should lead to program economics through
improved procurement and logistics practices.
5. 3. 4. 2 Subsystem Characteristics
The functional organization of the IES is shown in Figure 5.18. The
IES is capable of three modes of operation:
* automatically, under control of central computer stored software
e manually, with crew control via computer stored software
e manually, via hardwire control for limited periods during atmos-
pheric flight.
During all modes of operation, the displays and associated controls provide
the crew with program decision and intervention capabilities.
Data Management Subsystem
This area and the related figures are very much undetermined at
present due to the austerity review underway. The Data Management Sub-
system (DMS) consists of the central computer and processor, associated
memories, the digital data bus, and digital interface units which provide
buffering, analog-to-digital conversion, and formatting for all data to be
processed by the DMS [58] . The central computer and processor performs
computations required for
* vehicle pre-and in-flight checkout
* navigation, guidance, and control
* payload checkout
* vehicle and payload sensor data processing
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The digital data bus and digital interface units provide for data acquisition
from subsystems and sensors, and for control signal transfer for vehicle
systems. Additionally, the digital data bus interfaces with ground support
equipment to enable the crew to monitor critical ground operations such as
fuel loading.
Guidance, Navigation and Flight Control Subsystem
The guidance, navigation and flight control subsystem (GNFCS)
enables the on-board determination of vehicle position and velocity during
all phases of booster and shuttle flight, and controls the flight path and
executes maneuvers as determined by automatic guidance programs or crew
generated commands. The major hardware elements of the GNFCS are:
* inertial measurement units
* star trackers and horizon sensors
* s-band ranging transponders
* DME and VOR receivers
* localizer, glide slope, and radar altimeter landing aids
· rate, acceleration, air speed, barometric altitude and air data
sensors
* aerodynamic and thrust vector control activators
Communication Subsystem
The communication subsystem (CS) provides voice and data links
between the shuttle and booster, and between the ground and flight vehicles,
Capabilities provided in the CS include:
* two-way voice between ground and orbiter, orbiter and space
station, and crew and passengers (via hardwired intercom)
* unified s-band tracking
* ground-to-flight vehicle data/command link
* shuttle-to-ground data link
* two-way data link shuttle-to-detached payload
* EVA voice and data transfer
Major equipment provisions include the use of VHF for ground-to-flight vehicle
voice links, s-band for data links and tracking, and hardwired intercoms for
internal communications.
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Displays and Controls Subsystem
The displays and controls subsystem (DCS) comprise the crew station
avionics necessary to enable the flight crew to interact with the vehicle sub-
systems. The DCS satisfies mission requirements for:
* vehicle checkout
* flight control and display
* computer access
* subsystem and mission monitor and control
The DCS if designed to provide for full vehicle control by either of the two
man crew. In addition to the aforementioned design requirements for
crew safety, equipment, maintainability and commonality, the DCS must
satisfy crew station functional requirements for human factors such as com-
fort and controls accessibility.
Several possible applications for television equipment can be foreseen
as a result of the successful use of TV in the Apollo missions. As in the case
of Apollo, it is readily apparent that TV can be used to broadly disseminate
mission status and events for public consumption on a world-wide basis.
As a result of the now proven development of color TV for space applications,
TV can be used for monitoring crew status and health, and for the remote
observation of potentially hazardous mission operations.
Software
The IES software consists of the programs stored in the DMS to
organize and control the functioning of the flight vehicle subsystems. Each
of the aforementioned IES subsystems, as well as the non-avionics sub-
systems, has unique software requirements.
Catagories of software to be developed include prelaunch checkout,
guidance, navigation, flight control, data management, sensor data processing,
display, system status and reconfiguration, memory access and utilization,
various computational subroutines, and executive programs for system
access and control by the crew.
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Orbiter Hydraulic and Electric Power
Shuttle power is provided by H 2 02 fuel cells and AC generators. The2 2~~~~~~~h
generators are driven by the turbine power units that provide the shuttle
hydraulic power. Fuel cells are used to provide electrical power for all
vehicle systems except the main propulsion engines, while AC turbine driven
generators provide hydraulic and electric power for functions such as engine
ignition, hydraulic and electrical system checkout (during prelaunch and re-
entry), and vehicle steering during landing.
5. 3.4. 3 Technology Appraisal
The IES makes extensive use of equipment designs embodying tech-
nology used in spacecraft and aircraft programs with spaceflight development
and flight experience. While the subsystems reflect the unique requirements
of the shuttle program, they are also identifiable derivatives of existing
designs. No major technical developmental problems are anticipated in the
IES, but it may be expected that significant effort will be expended in the
development of:
* systems engineering to satisfy mission requirements for:
* crew safety
* equipment refurbishment
· crew station displays and controls
* the DMS computer
* software
The development and verification of the software will require the extensive
use of subsystem simulators. Flight simulators using realistic crew station
mockups with operating controls and displays will be used for the dual pur-
poses of the development of the interactive software and crew training.
5.4 New Expendable Launch Vehicle Family
The new expendable launch vehicle family (sometimes referred to
as the new low cost expendables) represents a new group of related vehicles
which, as stated in Reference [ 1 ] "through suitable arrangement of a set
of stages and strap-ons, can efficiently and economically accomplish the
spectrum of projected future low earth orbit and high altitude/high energy
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missions. The selected family is based primarily on existing Titan III
components and their derivative.and growth versions. Maximum use of
common hardware and facilities results in a family of low cost launch
vehicles with payload capabilities ranging from about 2000 kg to more than
50000 kg in low earth orbit."
When taken together with derivative Scout vehicles, the new expend-
able launch vehicle family consists of three classes; the Scout vehicles, a
new family consisting of solid rocket first stages and existing liquid second
stages, the Titan HIII vehicles described in Section 5. 2.2 above and the new
Titan III L vehicles. Characteristics of the Aerospace Corporation new
expendable launch vehicle family are shown in Table 5. 7.
The new expendable launch vehicle family as constituted by Aero-
space Corporation was identified in its elements to consist of current low
cost technology based primarily on Titan III which is the present launch
vehicle family with the lowest cost per kilogram for placing payloads in
earth orbit. While a family of launch vehicles that is so constituted may
possibly represent an optimum short-term 'solution as an economically
justifiable replacement for the current expendable launch vehicle family
(either as an alternate or complement to the space shuttle in the 1980's), it
should undoubtedly include recent and advanced technology in providing a
higher performance, more flexibility and economic proposition. Such a
family has not yet been proposed although some studies are understood to
be in prospect. Any such proposed new family of expendable launch vehicles
would have to prove cost effectiveness at a suitable social rate of interest
when compared to this new expendable launch vehicle fleet.
5.4.1 Small Payload Class
The small payload class of the new expendable launch vehicles
consists of improved versions of the four and five stage Scout. In appearance,
the vehicle is very similar to the present Scout (Figure 5. 1), however,
several significant modifications are incorporated resulting in an increase
of approximately 2. 5 meters in overall length. These modifications include
an improved guidance system incorporated into the fourth stage, steerable
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I
nozzles on the first and second stages, two strap-on castor solid rocket
motors in order to allow increased launch mass. The payload volume will
also be increased from its present 107 cm to 152 cm commensurate with its
increased payload capability. The first stage is an ALGOL III and the second
stage is a short ALGOL. The third stage is an X259 manufactured by
Hercules and the fourth stage is a short 259 by UTC. The third and fourth
stages incorporate bell nozzles. The performance of the improved Scout is
shown in Figure 5. 19 and its reliability should be approximately 0.95.
5.4.2 Medium Payload Class
The medium payload class of the new expendable launch vehicles
consists of new combinations of existing elements of current launch vehicle
systems. This solid (first stage)/liquid (second stage) class of vehicles
utilizes the "building blocks" of the existing standard Titan III launch vehicles.
For a first stage, these vehicles would use various lengths or segments of
the 3 meter diameter solid rocket motor strap-ons (SRM's) employed on the
current Titan III vehicles. The second stage would consist of Stage II on the
current Titan III vehicles. Various existing upper stages such as an Agena
or Centaur would be used for high energy missions. Representative vehicles
are shown in Figure 5.20 and their performance is shown in Figure 5.21.
Various other modifications or additions would be required such as
new adapter rings for the stages and payloads, and the addition of thrust
vector control devices for pitch, roll, and yaw maneuvers. The projected
reliabilities of these new solid/liquid launch vehicles is expected to be
over 95 percent based on flight experience with similar technology.
Other vehicles in the medium payload class of the new expendable
launch vehicles are two vehicles of the current expendable group that are
compatible with the new low cost logic applied to the launch vehicles in this
Section 5.4-1. The Titan III D is currently in development and the Titan III F
needs little additional development. They have been discussed previously in
Section 5. 2 2.
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5 4.3 Large Payload Class
The large payload class of new expendable launch vehicles consists
of the Titan III derivative/growth family of large diameter core (LDC) con-
figurations, 4.58 meters diameter. These proposed Titan LDC configurations
would use four LR-87 liquid rocket engines for Stage I. The LDC Stage II,
4.58 meters diameter would use one LR-87 engine. The SRM's feratlh Titan
III L series of vehicles are the same as the seven-segment SRM's used with
the stretched core vehicles mentioned previously in Section 5.2. 2. The
Titan III LDC vehicles can be used without an upper stage; however, optional
upper stages are Transtage and Centaur. The proposed Titan III LDC vehicles
can be used without an upper stage; however, optional upper stages are
Transtage and Centaur. The proposed Titan III LDC configurations are called
the L 2, L 4 and L 6 depending on the number of solid strap-ons used. How-
ever, only the L 4 version was assigned payloads in the 1979-1990 time period.
The Titan III L 4 is a three stage launch vehicle with a 4.58 meter
diameter core (Stages I and II), and four seven segment SRM's (Stage 0).
Typical configurations showing the L*4 without an upper stage and with the
Centaur upper stage are given in Figure 5. 22. The LDC Stage I uses a
storable propellant consisting of fuel that is a 50-50 mixture of hydrazine
and UDMH, and nitrogen tetroxide as the oxidizer. The propellant loading for
Stage I is 476 metric tons. Stage II or LDC Core II uses the same propellant
with a loading of 87,430 kilograms. A bulbous payload envelope measuring
6.7 meters diameter by 9.15 meters length is proposed for the L*4; however,
later studies have shown that payload envelopes as large as 10.07 meters
diameter by 11 meters length can be used ['1 ]. The performance of the
Titan III L*4 vehicles is shown in Figure 5.23.
5.5 Space Shuttle Concepts
5. 5.1 Phase B Studies
The Space Shuttle was initially proposed as a new, reusable type,
manned Space Transportation System designed to deliver and return various
types of payloads and passengersbetween the earth's surface and low
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earth orbit. During the Phase B studies (ended June 30, 1971), the new
Space Shuttle was envisioned as..part of a Spaeoellansportation Systean Set r l
that would safely, efficiently and economically perform most future United
States space missions. Under contract to NASA, various teams of aerospace
companies conducted studies that resulted in the definition of the Space
Shuttle (as dictated by NASA Directives and Requirements) as a fully reusable,
two-stage Space Transportation System'known as the original Phase B
Baseline concept). The implications of the requirements for full reusability
and two stagesyielded launch configurations that, in a very general way,
represented two large rocket powered airplanes (a manned orbiter vehicle
and a manned booster vehicle) that were mated in a "piggy-back" fashion
and launched vertically. These Phase B configurations, offered by various
teams of aerospace companies such as McDonnell Douglas, North American
Rockwell and Grumman/Boeing, are described in numerous publications
[ 1, 57,. 5 9-'A to .65 ] that define the evolution and changes that occurred
to the original shuttle baseline design criteria as detailed by NASA and DoD
Requirements and Technical Directives [ 37 ].
It is important to note that the emerging shuttle design consisted of
a very large winged booster vehicle (essentially full of ascent propellants)
and an orbiter vehicle (usually a delta or double-delta winged configuration)
that contained large internal propellant tanks and a standard-sized internal
payload bay. The large internal propellant tanks of the orbiter
for oxygen and hydrogen) contained the additional propellant needed (after
staging from the booster) to achieve low earth orbit. However, :near the end
of the Phase B studies it became apparent that an interesting innovation could
be made in the Space Shuttle design by carrying the orbiter ascent fuel
(hydrogen) in two, expendable, external tanks (mounted to the side of the
orbiter's fuselage and above the wings) that could be ejected when
empty. Some of the proposed advantages cited for this orbiter/booster
concept design change were lower gross lift-off mass, lower cost, fewer
engines, less TPS variety and a generally more flexible system [ 62 ].
During the last few months of the Phase B studies, the major con-
tractor teams conducted studies of modified space shuttle designs (the later
Phase B Baseline concept) incorporating expendable, external, hydrogen
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fuel tanks on the orbiter and utilizing a fully reusable heat sink type booster
[5-65]. (Also, at that time, another company suggested an orbiter type
design where the expendable externally mounted drop tanks contained all
the orbiter's ascent propellants; both the oxygen and hydrogen [5-63].
The general impact (and potential advantages) of the various pro-
posed alternatives incorporating the hybrid or partially- reusable orbiter/
booster systems was sufficient to encourage further analysis of the "alternate"
Space Shuttle concepts (Phase B- Extension Studies). The economic analysis
shows that there exists a considerable latitude in trading off expected higher
costs per launch in the 1980's for lower non-recurring costs in the 1970's
(Reference 5-64, Chapters 2, 6 and 7).
New design guidelines permitted not only complete re-design of the
orbiter but also redirected the booster design to include not only the fully
reusable flyback booster but also, many-new designs incorporating re-
coverable boosters that could be refurbished and reused, and completely
expendable boosters. These alternate space shuttle-orbiter/booster designs
are discussed in the next section. 
5. 5. 2 Phase B Extension Studies
The Phase B Extension Studies were directed toward new analyses
of Space Shuttle alternate designs and program options associated with a
phased pattern of development. The direct development of the external
hydrogen tank orbiter/heat sink booster, fully reusable Space Shuttle System
(a Phase B Baseline option) revealed major areas of concern such as high
peak annual and near term funding requirements, high total R&D invest-
ment, and high technical development risk. The primary emphasis of the
Extension Studies was the determination of alternatives associated with de-
creased capability and more favorable expenditures and included evaluations
of the merits of vehicle design/configuration changes and new program options.
Among the considerations were the delay of the fully reusable booster develop-
ment and the initiation of comparison studies of different booster systems for
the shuttle orbiter. Also, there was a re-definition of the orbiter concept
that dictated the use of external propellant tanks and reduced payload capability
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with emphasis on lower non-recurring costs. The initial options associated
with low risk technology systems were studied in order to determine the
possibilities of a continued process of upgrading to achieve the desired final
capabilities later in the program. And finally, alternate development and
program schedules were analyzed with regard to reductions in peak funding
and near term expenditures (i.e., RDT&E and initial fleet investment).
The impact of the new guidelines on Space Shuttle concepts was
enormous and many new alternative configurations were analyzed. Since a
phased program could utilize an interim, expendable booster and reduced
capability orbiter for the first years of operation, the extension studies
centered on the selection of the most promising initial systems and the op-
timum paths toward the improved capability concepts.
Some of the alternative options and configurations resulting from
these studies are discussed in the following sections.
5. 5. 2. 1 Baseline Orbiter
As a result of the analyses during the final months of the Phase B
studies and initial Extension studies, NASA detailed new system requirements
,that resulted in the definition of a "Baseline Orbiter" for the alternate Space
.¥Shuttle concepts. The Baseline Orbiter, designated as the 040A, is shown
in a three view drawing in Figure 5. 24 and an inboard profile is shown in
Figure 5.25. [66, 67].
The Baseline Orbiter considered by November, 1971 is a delta wing
vehicle with three main rocket engines for ascent propulsion. There are no
internal ascent-propellant tanks since all orbiter ascent propellant (oxygen/
hydrogen) is carried externally and fed -to the orbiter main rocket engines
through a propellant interface connection on the orbiter. The combination
of the Baseline Orbiter together with its external hydrogen/oxygen propellant
tanks was frequently referred to as the "HO orbiter".
In addition to the three main rocket engines located at the aft end of
the orbiter, two orbital maneuvering system modules (OMS) are attached to
the rear fuselage section. The OMS modules contain the OMS propellant
5-71
AFT VIEW
Scale 1: 300
I~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Figure 5.24 Current Baseline Orbiter-Three View
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tanks and rocket engine assembly designed to provide the necessary large
maneuvering. velocity increments required for rendezvous circularization,
plane change, transfer and de-orbit.thrust. One candidate for-OMS-engine
selection is the Lunar Module Ascent engine'using .N204./A1'50 propellants.
If the orbiter is required to cruise-fly a long distance cross range
to a landing site after re-entry, an airbreathing engine system (ABES) would
be included in the orbiter. Normally the ABES would utilize two gas turbine
jet engines of the class JTF 22A or F101 /F12A (JP type fuel) for air-breathing
propulsiono .
The orbiter also contains a type of reaction control system (RCS) or
attitude control propulsion system (ACPS) to provide the propulsion needed
for attitude control in space or to supplement control at the higher atmos-
pheric altitudes. This type of control system typically utilizes a total of
about 34 thrusters (with N2 H4 propellant) arrayed in various pods or modules
(located in the nose section, top of fins or wing tips) [68]. The RCS provides
continuous vehicle attitude 'orientation and control in all six-degrees of-freedom
and facilitates precise control maneuvers such as terminal rendezvous,
docking in space and Te-entry attitude.
The Baseline Orbiter contains the standardized or nominal payload
bay that will accommodate any candidate payload envelope measuring up to
4o 6 meters in diameter and i8.3 meters in length.
~~~~~ . r
One important consideration of the Baseline Orbiter is selection of
the three or four main rocket engines. Several approaches were considered,
e. g. an engine whereas, the later or upgraded orbiter versions will utilize
the higher performance Hi-Pc (SSME) engines. This was consistent with the
goals of the Phase B Extension Studies and the frequently used designators
referred to the initial and upgraded Space Shuttle versions, respectively.
For example, the Mark I or initial version of the orbiter would have utilized
the J-2 type engines, a simpler thermal protection system (TPS) made up
of expendable or ablative materials, existing aircraft and spacecraft type
avionics, and have reduced capability in payload mass and flyback cross range.
The Mark II or upgraded version of the orbiter would have utilized the better per-
formance Hi-Pc main rocket engines, a more sophisticated reusable type TPS,
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an advanced integrated avionics system and have the full desired payload
mass capability as well as the longer (2,.037 kilometer) cross range fly-
back capability. The (new) Baseline Orbiter has now been defined as using
three high performance (SSME) engines.
The ascent propellant supply (LO2/LH 2 ) for the orbiter's main
rocket engines is always provided by external tanks. Among the various
concepts, the HO drop tanks tended to vary in number (orne to three), in size
(both length and diameter), in mating arrangement, and in propellant supply
or burn sequence (eithe.'parallel burn or series burn with respect to first
stage or booster). Tank dry mass varies greatly (from about 20, 000 kilograms
to about 50, 000 kilograms) depending on sizes, configurations and concepts.
All orbiter concepts must execute a tank separation sequence.and tank dis-
posal maneuver after the main engines shut down and the powered ascent
phase the trajectory is satisfactorily completed.
The typical orbiter characteristics are listed in Table 5. 8
[66 ].
5. 5. 2.2 Current Booster Concepts
The Space Shuttle program allows the use of a variety of
alternative booster concepts or interim expendable boosters that could be
updated or even improved to include manned versions, new boosters that
could be recovered and refurbished for reuse, and eventually new, flyback,
manned boosters of the fully reusable type. The Phase B extension studies
included all categories of existing boosters and their derivatives as well as
new or used designs. Some of the vehicles or systems analyzed were
Saturn S-IC or F-1 powered vehicles, Titans, SRM's (120, 156, 180, 260)
and new pressure-fed systems.
Also, similar designators such as those used for Mark I and Mark II
of the orbiter were applied to the booster concepts to distinguish between the
initial designs and the updated versions. For example, the Mark II version
of a booster, would have more sophisticated reusable TPS systems and more
advanced integrated electronics systems than that of a Mark I type booster.
Although a very wide variety of different launch configurations were
-~~~~~~ J' X
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Table 5.8
Typical Orbiter Gharacteristics
(Phase B Extension studies)
.,........ II 
89, 500
79, 000
59, 000
Gross Mass (Polar).
Landing Mass (Polar)
Dry Mass
Main Engines:
Number/Type
Thrust, vac. /each Engine
Subsonic L/D
Hypersonic L/D
Aspect Ratio
Leading Edge Sweep
Crossrange
Landing Speed
kg
kg
kg
4/Hi-Pc
1.36 mN
6. 3
1.8
1.7
0
60
Z, 130. kmn
278 km/hour
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studied, the most recent booster concepts considered in the past seven
months tend to fall into about four or five classes of manned and unmanned
booster configurations. These are discussed below.
Manned Boosters
The alternate, manned, Space Shuttle boosters suggested by the
different concepts'were generally winged versions of large SIC type or F-1
powered launch vehicles. A typical launch configuration is shown in Figure
5. 26. A Baseline Orbiter with HO tank is tank-end-loaded atop a reusable
flyback booster. This configuration designated as the "Reusable S-IC booster"
(R-SIC) or "F-1 Flyback booster" [66, 68] utilizes five F-1 type rocket
engines and SIC tankage with L0 2 /RP propellants. It is a series-burn
system since the HO tank orbiter ignites its main rocket engines after
booster staging and continues its powered ascent trajectory to low earth
orbit.
At this time, a review of certain available information on S-IC
versions seems to indicate that other contractor concepts of this particular
class and type are embodied in the general description given in the above dis-
cussion and figure. For example, another contractor's version of the reusable
S-IC configuration is called the "HO/Flyback" concept and utilizes F-1
engines and S-IC components for a winged booster that is tank-end-loaded with
an HO orbiter [66]. Generally speaking, the configurations tend to be similar.
During the Phase B Extension Studies regarding the reusable S-IC/F-1
powered booster concept, use was made of the designations "Block 1 program"
and "Block II program." These designations were utilized to indicate initial
and upgraded programs, respectively (in a similar manner as the designators
Mark I and Mark II are used) and referred to progressive technology changes
to systems and additional capability in number of launch complexes and num-
ber of operational vehicles [69]. For example, the reusable S-IC "Block I"
program relied on existing F-1 engine technology (five for the booster) and
existing J-2 engine technology (five for the orbiter) with two complete
operational vehicle systems. Also, the Block I program R-SIC vehicles
would use commercial based avionics with minimum on-board checkout.
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SIDE VIEW PLAN VIEW
Scale - 1t600
Figure 5. 26. Reusable S-IC Booster (F-1 Flyback) Concept-Launchi Configuration
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The R-SIC Block II program would make use of advanced technology (F-1A/
J-2S engines) and upgraded avionics in the form of automatic landing devices
and advanced on-board checkout equipment together with the implementation
of multiple launch complexes. Another reference discusses the R-SIC thermal
protection systems, where the Block I TPS system would utilize ablative
materials and the Block II TPS would use upgraded materials including HCF,
highly compacted fibers [70].
It should be noted that several contractors have suggested similar
unmanned and un-winged'oesign utilizing the S-IC system as an expendable
booster. These were proposed to be used for the earliest Shuttle launches
with the HO Baseline Orbiter and are called the "S-IC Booster/HO Orbiter"
concept [68].
Some of the characteristics of a typical reusable S-IC (F-1 powered)
concept are listed in the following table Table 5. 9 [66].
Unmanned Boosters
Parallel Burn Thrust Assisted Orbiter Shuttle (TAOS)
These alternate Space Shuttle concepts have been given the acronym,
TAOS, by MATHEMATICA and include all parallel-burn, thrust assisted
orbiter shuttle types. They embody all configurations using an external
HO tank-Baseline Orbiter and some type of thrust assist either in the form of
solid rocket motor boosters or liquid rocket motor boosters. Typical TAOS
designs are shown in Figures 5.27 and 5.28 [66].
In Figure 5. 27 the HO Baseline orbiter is shown mated, tank-side-
loaded, with two 3. 96 m 4 segment solid rocket motor (SRM) boosters con-
taining 1,043,000 kg total propellant. The HO tank is center mounted under-
neath the Baseline Orbiter and contains 590, 000 kg of usable ascent pro-
pellant (LO2 /LH2 ) for the orbiter's main rocket engines.
This parallel-burn concept has been variously named as "rocket
assisted takeoff" (RATO) concept and similar configurations and designations
such as "rocket assisted orbiter" (RAO) concept and thrust augmented hydro-
gen oxygen (TAHO) concept have been offered by other contractors for these
classes of orbiter/booster systems.
-. t~~~ ~5-7q9
Table 5. 9
Typical Characteristics of a Reusable S-IC Concept
Gross Lift Off Mass (GLOM)
Staging Velocity
Maximum Dynamic Pressure
Booster Dry Mass
Orbiter Dry Mass
Booster Propellant Mass
Orbiter Propellant Mass
Orbiter Tank Dry Mass
Main Engines:
Booster, Number/Type
Orbiter, Number/Type
Engine Thrust
Booster S. L. each
Orbiter S. L. each
Cruise Engines, Number/Type
Flyback Range
2, 540, 000 kg
2,140 rn/s
31,000 N/m2
284,200 kg
59,000 kg
1,765,000 kg
318,000 kg
16,000 kg
5/F-1
4/Hi-Pc
6.9 mN
1. 36 mN
9/GE 101-12-B3
42. 6 km
5-80
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SIDE VIEW PLAN VIEW
AFT VIEW
Scale- 1,600
Figure 5.27 Baseline Orbiter-with Twin Solid Rocket Motor Booster
(TSRM) Concept, Parallel-Burn-Launch Configuration
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SIDE VIEW PLAN VIEW
AFT VIEW
Scale 1: 600
Figure 5.28 Baseline Orbiter with Twin Pressure Fed Booster (TPFB)
Concept, Parallel-Burn-Launch Configuration
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In Figure 5..28 the HO baseline orbiter is shown mated, tank-side-
loaded, with two pressure-fed (LO 2PI) recoverable boosters. The propellant
mass for the booster is 1,175,000 kg and for the orbiter 590,000 kg (LO2 /LH 2 ).
It is presumed that procedures will be developed to recover the pressure-fed
boosters (after staging and splashdown) for refurbishment and reuse. The
oribter's HO tank will be expended due to re-entry.
It is proposed that both of these parallel-burn systems will rely on
the thrust vector control and aerodynamic control of the orbiter for trajectory
steering during ascent to'qrbit.
Some of the characteristics of typical parallel-burn systems are
compared in Table 5.10 [66].
Some of the characteristics of typical parallel-burn systems are
compared in Table 5.10 [66].
Series Burn Boosters
These new thrust assist booster concepts are identified not only by
the burning sequence of stages (series-burn) but also by their size and/or the
new technology they represent. In regard to burning sequence, series-burn
generally means that the booster ignites its stage (s) first (to provide the
total initial thrust required from the launching pad to the booster/orbiter
staging point) and then the HO orbiter ignites its engines (after booster staging)
to continue the powered ascent to low earth orbit. In regard to size and
technology, these new series-burn thrust assist concepts represent an inter-
esting variety of ideas and concepts. The boosters vary from single to
multiple stage systems, and consist of either liquid rocket motors or solid
rocket motors or a combination of the two. The propellants suggested for use
vary from LO2/RP, N 2 0 4 /A-50,LO21LH 2 ,LO2 /Propane and PBAN or HTPB
(solids). The liquid rocket motors may represent existing technology (Titan III
series pump-fed LR-87 systems) or the newer technology associated with
very large pressure-fed systems. Similarly, the SRM's may represent
existing technology (like the 120 SRM) or newer technology (like the 156, 180,
and 260).
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One of the more interesting aspects of the new booster concepts
is that, through the use of the proper, special, design logic and the develop-
ment of the appropriate operational techniques, the boosters can be recovered,
refurbished, and re-used. This is being considered for the entire large
pressure-fed boosters and for the solid rocket motor boosters also (or at
least some components of them).
A typical large, series-burn, pressure-fed booster/HO orbiter
launch configuration is shown in Figure 5.29 [66]. It is represented by an
HO orbiter (the baselin,- orbiter complete with its underslung HO propellant
drop tank) mounted atop (tank-end-loaded) the single (large, 10. 4 meter
diameter), pressure-fed booster.
Some of the baseline characteristics of systems typical of this
pressure-fed booster concept are given in Table 5.11 [66].
Results of some preliminary studies have revealed that high tank
pressure dominates the structural design, tank materials have been tentatively
selected and propellants could either be LO2/Propane or N204/UDMH. In-
tact ocean recovery, survival, and retrieval appear feasible and reasonable
but some small percentage (5-10 percent) loss rate might be expected.
However, certain key issues exist and are debated. Among them are [66]:
lack of engine data, aerodynamic configuration required for re-entry, water
entry loads, seaworthiness criteria, propulsion system selection, structural
configuration and materials, refurbishment costs, and development of an
operational recovery system. Each of these key issues increases in importance
as one proceeds from Twin Parallel Burn Boosters to Series Burn Boosters.
Two ocean recovery system alternatives have been studied. One is
a high angle of attack re-entry. and the other is a low angle of attack re-entry
with drag devices. Each of these permits two other alternatives for the final
descent; one is rocket braking and the other is a drogue chute deploy with
multiple main parachutes for splashdown or a combination.
Again, it should be noted that, with respect to the launch configuration
designs, other contractors have offered similar class concepts. One of these
uses the nomenclature "pressure-fed, ballistic recovered booster (BRB)"
configuration [68] and, in a general way, is similar to the aforementioned
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Booster
/Q.4m diameter
kM
SIDE VIEW
ZSm
Scale-1=600
Figure 5. 29 Baseline Orbiter with Large, Single Pressure Fed Booster
(SPFB), Series-Burn-Launch Configuration
r
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Table 5.11 
Typical Characteristics of Single, Large Pressure-Fed Booster Concepts
I! I I I I ! I!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Gross Lift Off Mass, GLOM
Staging Velocity
Maximum Dynamic Pressure
Dry Mass:
Booster
Orbiter
Propellant Mass:
Booster
Orbiter
Propellant type
Orbiter HO Tank Dry Mass
Main Engines:
Booster: Number & type
Orbiter: Number & type
Engine Thrust:
Booster; each-S. L.
Orbiter; each-Vac.
2, 350, 000 kg
1,630 m/s
31,000 N/m2
220, 000 kg
59, 000 kg
1, 588, 00C kg
372,000 kg
LO2 / Propane
19,000 kg
5/pressure-fed
4/Hi-Pc
5, 785, 000 N
1, 360,000 N
Booster Pressurant; Volume/Type 35 meters/ COLD He gas
Booster Engine Gimbal Angle 6 (square)
Booster Fin Area 71.5 m5
Booster Splashdown Mass 282, 000 kg
Booster Splashdown Velocity 45.7 m/s
* ~ ~4. m/s
5-87
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PLAN VIEW .
AFT VIEW
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Figure 5.30
r
Martin Marietta Titan III L Booster Concept-
Launch Configuration
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SIDE VIEW
315m
-Solid Rocke
Mtor tiyo
4 m diameter
SIDE VIEW PLAN VIEW
ScoleI 600 AFT VIEW
Figure 5.31 Lockheed Solid Rocket Motor Booster Concegt-
Launch Configuration
.,5-89
33.Sm
Table 5. 12
Characteristics of a Titan IM L 1207-4 Booster Concept
Gross Lift-off Mass 2 260 000 kg
Booster Lift-off Mass 1 810 000 kg
Propellant Type Liquid and Solid
SRM, Quantity and Size 4 - 3 m
LRM, Quantity and Size 1 - 5 m
Table 5.13
Characteristics of the Lockheed 5B Series-Burn Solid
Rocket Motor Booster Concept
Gross Lift-off Mass 2 345 000 kg
Booster Lift-off Mass 1 860 000 kg
Propellant Load 1 626 000 kg
Propellant Type Solid Only
SRM, Quantity and Size 4 - 4 m
,~~~~~~~~ I, , , , , I . 1 _ =......
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concept.
Another series-burn booster concept worthy of some note evolves
from the role created for the Titan launch vehicle family by DoD and NASA,
namely, the Titan III L series that utilizes both solid and liquid propellants.
The booster system comprises a storable propellant core structure (contain-
ing N 2 04 /A-50 for 'five pump-fed LR-87 engines) and various arrays of
multi-sized and multi-segmented solid rocket motor strap-ons. One such
concept is given in Figure 5. 30 and shows a baseline orbiter (with HO drop
tank) mounted atop (tank'nd-loaded) a Titan III L-1207-4.
A third series-burn booster concept has appeared in a report issued
by the Lockheed Missiles and Space Company [5. i7] which is comprised of
a single stage cluster of solid rocket motors. The cluster of four 3. 96 m
SRM's is tandem mounted (tank-end-loaded) with the orbiter hydrogen/oxygen
tank (Figure 5. 3 1.).
Some typical characteristics of the Titan III L 1207-4 (solid and
liquid system) and the Lockheed launch vehicle configuration 5B are given
in Table 5.12 and 5.13 67 and 7]. The economic tradeoff problem among all the
alternative booster concepts for the baseline orbiter are highlighted else-
where in this report.
5.6 Space Tugs
The Space Shuttle is capable of placing sizable payloads into low earth
orbit and returning these payloads to earth. However, -it is not capable of
significant orbital maneuvering beyond low earth orbit. Thus, it is necessary
to provide a reliable and usually, for economical purposes, reusable rocket
vehicle for taking payloads to orbits which the shuttle cannot achieve. This
vehicle is presently referred to as the Space Tug and it is important to
recognize the fact that the Space Tug is an integral part of Space Shuttle
Transportation System. In the early phase of Space Shuttle operations, kick
stages can be used in lieu of a Space Tug to place payloads to the derived orbiters.
The Space Tug is generally thought of as a high performance stage
using H2/O 2 propellant. However, while this is desirable for performance-
limited missions, some missions exist that are space-limited in the shuttle
cargo bay. For these missions, it is possible that a more dense propellant
5-91
might be used, for example, liquid propane/liquid oxygen.
5. 6.1 United States Tug Concepts
The baseline Space Tug and alternate configuration are shown as
presented by Lockheed Missiles and Space Company [72] in Figure 5. 32.
Characteristic parameters for a typical United States Space Tug [I] are
given in Table 5.14. A considerable number of Space Tug concepts have
been studied with various arrangements, propellant combinations, etc., and
these studies are continiring. The optimum concept and its operational per-
formance will vary depending on the payload and velocity requirements; how-
ever, it is hoped that a standardized Space Tug can be configured that will
handle practically all missions with little change in design or operation.
Some proposals have included modifications of existing stages, for
example, the Centaur [73], or development of new, multi-purpose stages,
for example, the versatile upper stage (VUS) [74]. The Centaur was originally
designed as a technology vehicle to show the feasibility of a high-performance
H 2 /O 2 stage and as such it was not designed for high reliability. Subsequently,
significant design changes must be incorporated to achieve the very high
desired tug reliability. However, General Dynamics is presently reviewing
the Centaur systems in an effort to increase its reliability. The VUS is also
being currently studied as a long-life (2000 days) propulsion system for inter-
planetary applications. However, while these designs provide useful technol-
ogies, the optimum tug design should probably be the result of an original
effort as opposed to a redesign of preconceived stages designed originally for
non-tug missions.
5. 6.2 'European Tug Concepts
Two European teams have studied the Space Tug on a preliminary
basis with interesting results [Y5; 76, 77]. Both designs are similar at
present and typical configurations of a reusable tug and an expendable tug are
shown in Figure 5. 33. The performance of the European tug system is shown
in Figure 5.34. In addition to the preliminary design studies, Delft University
of Technology [78] performed a mission analysis study for a European Space
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Table 5.14
U.S. Space Tug Characteristic Parameters
Reference 1
Alternate
..Baseline Tug Configuration
P;ropellant Mass, kg ( E 25 800 14 000
Burnout Mass, kg ( 2 ) 3 100 2 200
Total Mass, jg 28 900 16 200
Propellant Fraction(3) .881 0.841
Number of Engines One One
Total Thrust, N 106 000 106 000
Effective Jet Velocity, m/s 4 508 4 508
Expansion Ratio 250 250
Propellants LO 2 /LH 2LH2~~~~~O 2 2H 2
ii~~ ~ ., . ., .
(1) Includes Non-Usable and RCS Propellant
(2) Includes Residual Propellant
(3) Propellant Fraction = Impulsive Propellant Mass.Total Mass
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Tug. The conclusions of the Delft study are that the primary mission for
the Space Tug is the geosychronous orbit satellite placement and retrieval
and that over 97 percent of these satellites can be placed in orbit by the re-
usable tug. In addition, they expect that over half of the presently forecast
interplanetary spacecraft could be injected into interplanetary space by the
reusable tug. Whether this estimate remains correct with the possibility of
more massive, high technology, planetary explorer satellites is yet to be
seen. It appears that, to truly make use of advanced technology in exploring
the solar system, satellite masses must increase significantly, thereby
requiring advanced propulsion systems, for example, the nuclear rocket, for
earth escape. A separate economic study of the Space Tug is presently in
progress at LMSC and MATHEMATICA.
5.7 Extra-Vehicular Activity and Teleoperators
It has become increasingly apparent that the overall Space Transpor-
tation System must include consideration of the essential roles of extra-
vehicular activity (EVA) by men and the use of teleoperators as appropriate
to the various missions.
At the present time it seems that EVA will be preferred in the
immediate vicinity of the Space Shuttle or Space Station while more remote
assignments and those with unconstrained exposure requirements will be
carried out by teleoperators. The exact roles to be assigned to each need
further study on the earth and in space as they affect the STS and payload
design concepts.
Based on the EVA experience to date a number of questions re-
main to be answered and some conflicting results need resolution. It is
hoped that the remaining Apollo missions and the skylab can be used effec-
tively to explore the efficacy of EVA in the STS.
Considerable interest has been generated recently by the role of
teleoperators in the STS. Teleoperators are seen as necessary for certain
essential functions relating to payload placements, servicing, maintenance,
and retrieval. Teleoperators need to be closely coordinated with the Space
Tug design and will be surely needed in the retrieval of spinning or disabled
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space craft and also in unexpected situations. The full range of functions
and control that can be usefully-performed by Teleoperators remain to be
defined. One concept of a Teleoperator Slave Unit is shown in Figure 5. 35.
5.8 Performance Analysis
The concept of ideal rocket velocity is introduced in Section 5.2.1.
Ideal rocket velocity is a parameter that applies to expendable, recoverable,
and reusable rocket vehicles, dependent only on the configuration of the
vehicle, in terms of which payload capability can be readily determined.
Curves of payload mass versus ideal rocket velocity are presented for several
expendable vehicles in this chapter and similar curves could be constructed
for Space Shuttle System. The ideal rocket velocity required to perform a
given mission is equal to the ideal mission velocity for that mission plus the
velocity loss. The purpose of this section is to present data for determining
the ideal mission velocity for a wide variety of missions and also to estimate
the velocity losses associated with these missions in order to illustrate sources
of performance variability of various STS concepts. A second part of this
section discusses range safety and other launch constraints that might apply
to various STS's including the Space Shuttle and relates these constraints to
their corresponding performance penalties via ideal mission velocity incre-
ments. The final part of this section discusses the Space Shuttle and Space
Tug peculiar problems as they also relate to performance.
5. 8.1 Mission Velocity Requirements
The mission velocity requirements are expressed as the sum of two
quantities, the ideal mission velocity and the velocity loss. The ideal mis-
sion velocity is the minimum velocity change required to perform a mission
assuming no drag loss and no gravitational loss, and furthermore assuming
that the optimum (minimum velocity change) flight path is chosen, however,
subject to certain mission-oriented constraints. Typical mission-oriented
constraints are, for example, launch azimuth constraints (explained in
Section 5. 8. 2. 1) or the requirement for a temporary low-altitude parking
orbit rather than a direct ascent to orbit. Because of the way in which the
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ideal mission velocity is defined, it is a quantity that is dependent only on
the mission to be performed and onthe mission-oriented constraints imposed
and it is not dependent on the vehicle used to perform the mission. The
velocity loss results primarily from the effects of atmospheric drag and
gravity. It is a more difficult quantity to determine accurately and depends
on both the mission and the rocket vehicle.
5.8.1.1 Due East Launch
A rocket vehicle standing at any point on the earth (except at the
poles) already has an eastward velocity corresponding to the earth rotational
speed and latitude. A launch vehicle ascending in a due east direction takes
maximum advantage of this velocity while a vehicle ascending in a due west
direction receives the maximum penalty and must halt its eastward motion
before it can begin to obtain a westward velocity. The eastward velocity of the
earth's surface is greatest on the equator and zero at the poles. Thus, for
eastward launches, launch sites at low latitudes are preferable, however,
for westward launches additional factors enter into consideration and the best
launch site latitude is not obvious. The compass direction on which a launch
occurs is called the launch azimuth and for a due east launch is 90 degrees.
The ideal mission velocity requirements for due east launch to orbit as a
function of perigee altitude (closest approach to earth) and apogee altitude
(greatest orbital distance from earth) are given in Figure 5.36 for launch
from ETR. These velocities are computed assuming a Hohmann flight path
from the launch site to orbit with no atmospheric drag. Thus, the ideal
mission velocity for due east launch to 185 km (100 n.m. ) circular orbit is
7. 607 km/s from ETR. These numbers may be corrected for launch from
WTR by adding 0.028 km/s so that, for example, the ideal mission velocity
to 185 km circular orbit from WTR (due east launch) is 7.635 km/s. (An
ideal mission velocity increment for launch azimuths other than 90 degrees is
presented later. )
Two basic modes of attaining orbit are commonly used: the direct
ascent to orbit mode and the parking orbit mode. The direct ascent to orbit
typically requires two burn periods, the first, beginning at launch, to achieve
the desired orbital apogee altitude and the second, occurring when the vehicle
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reaches apogee, to provide the desired perigee altitudeo The parking orbit
mode typically requires three bu.rn periods the firSt, beginning at launch0
to achieve a low circular orbit (normally 185 kn) and, later a second burn
to obtain the desired apogee altitude then0 still later when the vehicle reaches
apogee, a third burn to obtain the desired perigee altitudeo The parking orb.t
mode must be used,when it is desired to place the orbital perigee point over
a different location than would be obtained from a direct launch to orbit,
although the direct ascent mode requires a slightly lower ideal mission
velocity. The ideal mission velocity increment required to transfer froms a
185 km parking orbit to a'xigher orbit is shown in Figure 50 37o To compute
the total ideal mission velocity for due east ascent to orbit via a 185 km
parking orbit the ideal mission velocity increment from Figure 5O 3r7 nxust be
added to 7. 607 km/s or 7o 635 km/ s for launches from TTR or WTR, respec-
tively.
The ideal rocket velocity requ'rd for these nissions i the sum $
the total ideal mission velocity and the velocity losso While the velocity
loss is a difficult quantity to determin accurately, foze' most large lauzwch
vehicles a value of 1o 409 km/s yields qulte accurate results for the velocity
loss to low earth orbit. To higher orbits the velocity loss is slightly higher
and, similrly, there is a small velocity loss associated with any tramsfer
from one orbit to another For moot high thrust-acceleration propulsizn
systems, such as the chemical rockets presently in use, only the velocity
loss associated with the launch is of significance and reasonably accurate
results can be obtained by neglecting all other velocity loss contibutionso
However, for more advanced propulsion systemns wit relatively low thrust
acceleration, it becomes necessary to account for all velocity loss con
tributions in order to accurately predict performance The process for
estimating the velocity loss accurately is quite complex and the results de-
pend on both the rocket vehicle and the ission and their determination in-
volves a branch of higher mathemaics known as the calculus of variationso
50 8. 1o 2 Launch Azimuth and Orbit Xmclination
When a vehicle is launched on a launch azimuth of 90 degrees0 it
goes into an orbit that is inc~led to earth's equator by an angle, called the
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orbit inclination, equal to the latitude of the launch site. Thus, a due east
launch from ETR results in an orbit.incli-nation of 280 5 degrees. An orbit
that is inclined to the equator by 28, 5 degrees passes over points on the
earth's surface that oscillate between 28. 5 degrees north latituxde and 28o 5
degrees south latitude. Thus, a satellite launched due east from ETR would
never pass over much of North America, Europe or Asia. For many purposes,
for example, to take weather pictures, it is desirable to have a satellite pass
over more northerly (and more southerly) latitudeso This m.st be accomplished
by increasing the orbit inclinationo The orbit inclination can be increased
by launching on an azimuth either greater than or less than 90 degreeso
Figure 5. 38 shows the effect of launch azimuth on orbit inclination. It is
assumed here that the ascent to orbit occurs in a plane. The effects of chang-
ing orbit plane (dog-leg maneuvers) are discussed in Section 5 8 .1. 3 and
Figure 5. 38 is further discussed in Section 50 80 2. 1. Note that a satellite
in an orbit with an inclination of leas than 90 degrees moves around the earthls
poles in the same direction as the earth rotates, thus its orbit is referred to
as a posigrade orbit, A satellite in an orbit with inclination greater than 90
degrees moves around the earth's poles in a direction opposite to the rotation
of the earth. These orbits are referred to as retrograde orbitso
When a vehicle is launched on an azimuth other than 90 degrees, it
is not taking maximum bene£it of the earths rotational speed. Thus, for
launches on azimuths other than 90 degrees, the vehicle must supply some
additional velocity to achieve orbit. This ideal mission velocity increment
is shown in Figure 5, 390 To obtain the total ideal mission velocity, the ideal
mission velocity increment from Figure 50 39 must be added to the other
components of ideal mission velocity. Thus, a due west launch from WTR
to a 185 km circular orbit reqmres an ideal mission velocity of 70 635 km/s
plus 0o 760 km/s or a total ideal mission velocity of 8o 395 km/so The ideal
rocket velocity requifedc is obtained by adding the velocity loss to the total
ideal mission velocity; 8, 395 km/s u luo .409 km/s gives 90 804 km/so Com-
paring this number to the ideal rocket velocity required to achieve a 185 km
circular orbit by due east launch from ITTR which is 90 016 km/s Shows the.
significant variability of ideal rocket velocity required to achieve similar,
but not identical, orbits,
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5.8.1.3 Orbit Plane Change
Two reasons exist which can make it- impossible to launch a payload
directly into an orbit with the desired inclination without performing a plane
change maneuver. The first reason is that the minimum orbit inclination
obtainable by a planar launch occurs for a due east (or due west) launch and
is equal to the launch site latitude, for example, 28.5 degrees from ETR. It
is often desirable to place a payload into an orbit with a lower inclination,
for example, zero degrees for a synchronous equatorial communications
satellite. This can be accomplished only by a plane change maneuver either
during ascent to orbit (if the vehicle reaches a sufficiently low latitude during
ascent) or after initial orbit insertion. The second reason involves a range
safety constraints (discussed in Section 5. 8. 2. 1) which might prohibit launch-
ing on a launch azimuth required to obtain the desired inclination. In this
case, plane change maneuvers to increase the orbital inclination are pre-
ferably performed at the lowest possible velocity, generally as soon as the
restricted areas are cleared.
The ideal mission velocity increment required for plane change
depends on the vehicle velocity at the time the plane change maneuver is
initiated, the vehicle velocity immediately after the plane change is completed
and the amount of plane change. Figure 5.40 shows the ideal mission velocity
increment for plane change as a function of these parameters. Notice that
the ideal mission velocity increment is greatest when the vehicle velocity
is the same at the end of the plane change as it is at the beginning, that is,
when the maneuver is performed solely to change the orbit plane. It is also
important to recognize that the plane change maneuver must occur at the
intersection of the initial and final orbit planes (referred to as the line of
nodes). Thus, the plane change maneuver to place a payload into an equatorial
orbit must occur as the vehicle is passing through the equatorial plane. For
a payload ascending from a low earth orbit to synchronous equatorial orbit,
some plane change is performed on departure from the low earth orbit as the
vehicle crosses the equatorial plane and the remaining plane change is per-
formed as the vehicle reaches synchronous altitude. However, since the
velocity is lowest at synchronous altitude, most of the plane change is generally
performed at that altitude.
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5.8.1.4 Earth Escape Missions
For certain missions it is-necessary to escape from the earth's
gravitational field. These missions, comprised largely of the NASA inter-
planetary program, are called earth escape missions. Earth escape is
achieved when the vehicle attains sufficient velocity that, without the influence
of the gravitational fields of other bodies, it will continue to recede from the
earth indefinitely. Initially, as a vehicle that has exceeded the escape velocity
coasts away from the earth, the earth's gravitational field will cause the
vehicle to slow somewhat. However, after some period of time the vehicle
will have receded to a distance from the earth at which the earth's gravita-
tional field has only a very small effect on the vehicle. Thereafter, the
vehicle will continue its motion away from the earth indefinitely with a nearly
constant velocity. This velocity is referred to as the hyperbolic velocity.
The magnitude and direction of the hyperbolic velocity relative to the
earth determine the ultimate destination of the payload. If the hyperbolic
velocity is directed in the direction of the earth's orbital velocity, the payload
will go to destinations outside of earth's orbit-whereas if the hyperbolic
velocity opposes the orbital velocity of earth, the payload will go to destina-
tions inside earth's orbit. The ideal mission velocity increment required to
achieve a particular hyperbolic velocity is a function of the hyperbolic velocity
and the orbit from which the vehicle departs. Figure 5.41 shows the ideal
mission velocity increment to obtain various hyperbolic velocities for departure
from two different circular orbits. Figures 5.42 and 5.43 relate both hyper-
bolic velocity and ideal mission velocity increment to the heliocentric (sun-
centered destination of the payload.
5. 8. 2 Mission Mode Restrictions
It is not always possible to fly a rocket vehicle on a flight path that
is best from a performance standpoint. Reasons why this may be the case
fall into two general categories: safety factors and operational constraints.
Safety factors, for example, influence permissible launch azimuths while
operational constraints may involve maximum allowable pitch or yaw rates
due to structural limits, limits on thrust controllability or requirements for
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recovery of components of the total rocket vehicle, for example, recoverable
boosters or, for that matter, return of the Space Shuttle to the launch site.
This section discusses the concept of hazard as it influences the allowable
launch sectors and requirements of recoverable vehicles and components
as examples of mission mode restrictions and their influence on performance.
5. 8. 2. 1 Launch Sectors and Hazard
Launch and recovery or return operations of any rocket vehicle can
be potentially dangerous to the civilian population that is overflown. All
persons, however, are exposed to certain hazards in their daily lives and if
the hazard due to rocket vehicle operations is small compared to their other
daily hazards it will probably be considered acceptable. Hazards associated
with rocket vehicle operations can be categorized as planned events or
failure modes. The nature of these hazards can be significantly different for
different launch vehicles and Space Shuttle concepts. For example, Figure
5. 44 shows a Titan/Centaur launch profile which is typical of expendable
launch vehicles. It can be seen from the figure that at various points during
the ascent of the vehicle, spent stages, insulation panels, payload shroud and
a multitude of miscellaneous parts fall off the vehicle. In fact, to some con-
siderable extent, the good performance obtainable from the expendable launch
vehicles derives from their ability to drop off parts as they become no longer
necessary. On the other hand, this conglomeration of hardware falling back
to earth at velocities too low for burnup can pose a considerable hazard. To
reduce this hazard, the vehicle must use a flight path that does not permit
the hardware to fall on populated areas. Unfortunately, much of the hardware
is released at quite high velocity and does not drop straight to earth. Rather
it follows, more or less, a ballistic path and can impact several thousand
miles downrange. The expected impact point is a function of the vehicle's
velocity and altitude at each instant in time and is referred to as the instantan-
eous impact point (IIP). Since it is possible for debris to fall anywhere in the
vicinity of the entire lIP trace, care must be taken to prevent the IIP trace from
passing over heavily populated areas. However, assuming that the vehicle
operates as planned, the impact points of the various pieces of hardware can
be predicted reasonably well in advance of the flight. Thus, it may be acceptable
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to allow the IIP to pass over certain populated areas if care is taken to pre-
vent individual pieces of hardware from falling on these areas.
The failure modes of the launch vehicle comprise the second part
of the launch hazard. It is always possible, though highly unlikely, for a
wide variety of catastrophies to occur. Thus, current expendable launch
vehicles are generally equipped with range safety destruct mechanisms
capable of destroying a vehicle at any time that the IIP poses a significant
unplanned threat to human safety, Of course, it is still possible that the
destruct mechanisms will fail and everything else will go wrong all at once,
but the probability of this happening is so low that it does not pose a significant
hazard to civilian life. Thus, this threat is acceptable. However, this con-
clusion results from the assumption of a highly reliable range safety destruct
device.
The hazard associated with a launch is a function of the population
density under the planned IIP trace, the expected variability of this trace, the
planned crash-down points of the jettisoned hardware and their relative size,
and of the possible magnitude of any catastrophic failures tempered by the
probability that such a failure could occur (i. e., the reliability of the launch
vehicle) and where it might occur [82]. The acceptable hazard is also a
variable depending on the importance of the mission to the nation and/or
the world. A reconnaisance satellite launched to survey the Gaza Strip during
a military build-up that could result in a world crisis, for example, would
probably be approved for a higher hazard than an orbiting solar observatory.
The range of all flight paths that result in hazards below the maximum accept-
able hazard for the mission determine the acceptable range of launch azimuths
from each launch site. Figure 5.38 shows the generally acceptable launch
azimuths from ETR and WTR for the current expendable system, a projected
extended launch sector for partially reusable vehicles or new launch vehicles
of high reliability and a launch sector for the fully reusable Space Shuttle.
The fully reusable Space Shuttle profile (Figure 5.45) is significantly
different from that of an expendable system. Because the system is fully
reusable, the various components cannot be jettisoned as they complete
their respective tasks. Furthermore, the reliability and controllability of a
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manned system presents a totally different picture of launch hazard. Recall
from Section 5.8. 1. 3 that if a system cannot, due to launch azimuth con-
straints, perform a planar launch to the desired orbit, subsequent plane
change maneuvers are required with a very high reduction in payload mass in
orbit. Thus, because of the launch hazard, reliability and reusability can
have profound effects on performance.
5. 8. 2. 2. Recoverable Vehicles and Components
Certain vehicle configurations include the concept of recovering
some components that would otherwise be expended, for example, drop tanks,
boosters, et cetera [ 83]. In addition to the launch hazard considerations
for these vehicle configurations, one must now also be concerned with
the recovery aspects of the recoverable hardware. Definite drop zones,
probably outside shipping lanes, must be established and provision for
returning recovered hardware must be made. It is possible that these aspects
might place additional launch azimuth constraints on particular vehicles and
that these constraints could adversely affect performance.
It is also possible to treat the downrange distance that recoverable
components travel as a variable in cost analyses as the cost of recovery is
clearly a function of the recovery distance. It may be desirable to constrain
the operations of recoverable components to minimize recovery costs.
5. 8.3 Shuttle and Tug Peculiar Mission Aspects
Because the shuttle and tug are very expensive but highly reliable
and reusable, there are certain peculiar mission aspects regarding their
use. This section touches briefly on some of these aspects.
5, 8. 3. 1 Mission Abort Requirements
To provide the desired probability of recovering the space shuttle
on any particular flight it is necessary to provide for single engine out oper-
ation. The requirement imposed on the shuttle design is that the orbiter is
to have the capability of abort to a once-around flight witha single engine
out condition at and/or after booster/orbiter separation for the design and
reference missions [57]° The mode of operation for a single engine out
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condition is to burn the OMS engines in parallel with the operating main
engine. However, in this mode the thrust acceleration is substantially reduced
and a significant additional velocity loss occurs. Thus, particularly if an
engine failure occurs shortly after booster/orbiter staging, it becomes
impossible for the orbiter to continue to fly into orbit. However, sufficient
propellant must be provided to assure abort capability. For higher orbit
missions, the mission velocity (ideal plus loss) requirements are higher than
the abort mode velocity requirements and the requirement for abort capabil-
ity poses no constraint. On the other hand, for low orbit missions, the
mission velocity requirements are lower than the abort mission velocity
requirements and additional propellant must be provided to achieve the abort
capability. Since this propellant is not used on successful flights, the
additional propellant mass that must be carried is reflected in a one-for-one
reduction in payload mass. Thus, it can be seen that the mission require-
ments do not always limit the shuttle performance.
5. 8. 3. 2 Branched Trajectories and Round Trip Missions
The optimization of flight paths (minimization of various vehicle
requirements and/or maximization of payload mass) for the Space Shuttle
and the Space TJg poses a problem which, to date, has received only a limited
amount of attention [84, 85]. This problem, referred to as a branched tra-
jectory optimization problem, occurs when the state (position and velocity
time history) of the vehicle (s) becomes a multi-valued function. For example,
consider the placement of a synchronous equatorial satellite into orbit. The
Space Shuttle orbiter, with Tug and satellite onboard, flies into earth orbit.
Then the tug and satellite separate from the orbiter and fly to synchronous
orbit. During this time the state of the system is dual-valued. At synchro-
nous orbit the tug and satellite separate and the tug returns to the Space
Shuttle. The state during this phase is triple-valued. Finally the Tug and
Shuttle return to the launch site. Because of the round trip nature of this
problem, to be properly considered it must be treated as a branched tra-
jectory.
A second shuttle-peculiar problem lies in the facts that the effects
of atmospheric lift and drag are very significant to the operation of the
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Shuttle and thermal flux and structural loading of the vehicle impose signifi-
cant constraints on the optimal flight path for a given mission. Many Shuttle
study groups are studying these problems and company-proprietary computer
programs have been written. However, in addition, the Martin Marietta
Corporation is presently under contract to NASA Langley Research Center to
provide a computer program to optimize Shuttle trajectories. This program,
called POST [86], is now in the final documentation stage.
5. 9 Operations, Maintenance, Refurbishment and other Ground Based
Considerations
This section is an attempt to delineate the Space Transportation ground
operation complex. Because of the lack of detailed and complete information
only a broad overview is possible at this time. Since ground operations can
significantly affect the cost of the Space Transportation System, the lack of
detailed plans and assessments at this time should be viewed as a major un-
certainty in system costs.
The following sections discuss'briefly the various concepts of the
ground operation complex.
5. 9.1 Requirements and Constraints
The ground operation complex will be designed to perform the functions
of:
· prelaunch assembly and checkout for the booster, orbiter, and
payloads
e launch support for the integrated vehicle systems
* orbiter landing
e booster landing and drop tank recovery, or booster (complete or
partial) and drop tank recovery, depending upon the selected
booster configuration
e maintenance and refurbishment of the orbiter, booster, and drop
tanks in preparation for subsequent flights.
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5.9. 1.1 NASA Requirements
The basic guidelines for the design of the ground operations com-
plex have been established by NASA [57]. The NASA requirements may be
sub-divided into the two general catagories of site and operations related. The
site related requirements specify that the launch sites may be located at the
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), the Western Test Range (WTR), or at an in-
land site; but that the launch facilities, landing site, and servicing facilities
must be located in the same general area.
The two significant operations related requirements are:
(1) minimal assembly and checkout at the launch pad,
(2) use of specialized facilities such as clean rooms and environ-
mental test facilities in preparation for launch shall be minimized.
The importance of requirement (1), above, is emphasized by a further re-
quirement for minimal service lines at the launch pad with the objective
of supplying only the main propulsion system propellants at the pad.
The objectives of these requirements is to shape the ground operations
of the booster and orbiter toward present day concepts of maintenance, pre-
flight checkout, and take-off operations of large military or commercial
aircraft, as opposed to present day space vehicle launch techniques.
5. 9. 1. 2 Dependency of the Ground Operations Complex on the Selected
Flight Vehicle Configuration
A review of candidate booster and orbiter configurations indicates
a large degree of dependency of the design of the ground operations complex
on the selected booster configuration, but only a small dependency on the
orbiter and payloads. Although the candidate orbiter configurations differed
in detail, all of the configurations past and the current baseline orbiter are
manned, recoverable, aerospacecraft. On the other hand, the candidate
boosters considered over the past seven months differ markedly in design
concept and operational philosophy, ranging from manned, recoverable,
aerospacecraft to unmanned expendable boosters. Other candidate booster
configurations are wholly or partially reusable, but are unmanned. This wide
range of candidate booster concepts cannot be accommodated by a single ground
operation complex design. At present, the choice of boosters has narrowed
down to four (unmanned) thrust assist booster concepts. Figure 5.46
illustrates this dependency of the ground complex costs for the two selected
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booster configurations [68]. As shown in the study, additional KSC facility
modification costs of approximately $32 million are incurred with the HO/
Ballistic configuration over the costs associated with the HO/Recoverable
configuration.
5. 9. 2 Space Shuttle Ground Operation
One important aspect of a successful Space Shuttle System will be
the ability to incorporate an efficient, airline type ground service and oper-
ations activity for the booster, orbiter and payload system. Airline-airfreight
type maintenance, refurbishment and service are regarded as vital to the
success of the Space Shuttle and necessary ground checkout and launch
preparations must be reduced to their simplest terms to achieve the rapid
turnaround times and economic, efficient ground operations. Between land-
ing and relaunch, four major phases of ground operations may occur for a
typical Space Shuttle activity. They are Post Landing Operations, Mainte-
nance and Refurbishment Operations, Pre-launch Operations and Launch
Operations. A two week turnaround cycle (between landing and relaunch is
required [57]. It is presumed that the turnaround would occur only at
a centralized operation of the booster and orbiter with the launch, recovery
and ground operations being performed at the same site.
It should be noted that significant investments in both facilities and
human resources for ground operations exist at three locations. These
resources could be used singularly, or in combination, to support Space
Shuttle ground operations. The Kennedy Space Center has both the facilities
and a proven capability to support the launch of manned space vehicles, while
the WTR has supported unmanned vehicle launches. The flight test facility
at Edwards Air Force Base has been used to support the assembly, flight
and landing of the X-series of experimental aircraft.
Figure 5.47 depects the flow of system elements to the launch pad
for a Titan booster/orbiter configuration for launch from launch complex 39
at the Kennedy Space Center. While the specific operations and facility usage
will vary with the selected booster, this flow is indicative of the operations to
be followed in the case of an unmanned expendable (or partially reusable)
5-122
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booster consisting of a liquid core augmented with solid rockets [71].
A time-line diagram for the Mark II shuttle turn-around is shown
in Figure 5.48 [87]. The turn-around is accomplished in 214 working hours,
and is within the 14 day turn-around requirement [57]. The booster portion of
this time-line is constructed for a manned recoverable booster, and will be
simplified for an unmanned vehicle; however, the major operations of booster,
drop tank, and orbiter readiness will be inherent in any plan. The operations
performed are described in the following sections.
5. 9. 2.1 Post Landing Operations
The post landing operations begin as soon as the orbiter has
accomplished its horizontal landing and is taxied or towed to a post landing
facility. The orbiter, will be subjected to a relatively long heat pulse
duration of about 2, 000 seconds and after re-entry and cruise flight back
to the landing site, this will be critical as far as post landing procedures and
the avoidance of highly heated surfaces are concerned. The crew and/or pay-
load of the vehicle will have to be removed with care and sub-system
management must be tended to, to promptly secure the vehicle safely.
Some typical required post launch activities would be removal of data packs,
vehicle "cool-down", open access doors and attach de-fueling and de-
servicing ground equipment, safe ordnance, drain and purge cryo-tanks,
remove any cargoes and cargo modules, remove ground service equipment,
close access doors and finally, tow the vehicle to maintenance and refurbish-
ment area.
Booster post landing operation will be a function of the selected
booster configuration. In the case of the unmanned reusable booster, the
liquid rocket motors and the reusable drop tanks will make a parachute
controlled descent to the ocean surface and will be located either by an
underwater sound net or by integral radio locater beacons. As shown in
Figure 5.49 these units will then either be lifted aboard a recovery ship or
towed to the recovery site for refurbishment [68]. If the fully reusable booster
configuration is employed, the booster will return to the site after separ-
ation from the orbiter at about 75, 130 m altitude and a re-entry heat pulse
5-124
Figure 5.48 Mark U Shuttle Flow-Plan
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of 400 seconds. In the case of the recoverable booster, the entire booster
and orbiter post landing operation will be completed within 12 hours after
landing. This booster,is, however, no longer considered under the present
Space Shuttle program.
5. 9. 2. 2 Maintenance and Refurbishment Operations
The maintenance and refurbishment operations activities begin as
soon as the orbiter is hangared in the facility, Figure 5. 50. Typical duties
would include opening and removal of all access doors and servicing plates
and immediate implementation of airline type preventative and corrective
maintenance. After all the required maintenance and refurbishment of the
orbiter is accomplished, a post maintenance checkout would be completed
and the cargo module would be installed. A detailed flow plan for the main-
tenance and refurbishment operations is shown in Figure 5. 48. Contractor
estimates indicate that the entire maintenance, refurbishment, and payload
installation may be completed in five days.
5. 9. 2. 3 Pre-Launch Operations
The pre-launch operations phase of ground operations includes all
the important procedures devoted to the determination that the thrust assist
motors and orbiter are made ready to be transported to the launch pad. These
procedures would be completed prior to moving the vehicle and include
vehicle and ground service equipment power-up and propulsion subsystem
checkout. Also, a complete checkout of the integrated electronics, avionics
and all mechanical subsystems would be performed.
Up to this point, -all the ground operations activities on the orbiter
have been accomplished with the vehicle in the horizontal position with the
obvious advantages of ease of service. The next step in the pre-launch
operations requires a decision on the best approaches concerning the trans-
porting and erection of the vehicle. A possible approach for mating and
erecting the orbiter, solid rocket motors, and HO tanks is shown in Figures
5. 50 and 5. 51. The solid rocket motor segments receive incoming inspection
in a separate facility and are integrated in the solid rocket motor assembly
building at the VAB. An external HO tank assembly area is provided at the VAB.
S -iJA7
i; P.,
7h Airstrip
External HO Tonk
tA$ssmbly Area
I I
'½~
T /
VTo Launch Pad
Figure 5. 50 Typical Ground Operations for TAOS
Figure 5. 51 Typical Erection and Launch Operations for TAOS
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The sequence of operations in the VAB consists of:
* mate external HO tanks to orbiter
* mate solid rocket motors to orbiter
All operations in the VAB are performed with the orbiter in a horizontal
attitude to facilitate access to the vehicle during assembly operations.
The assembled vehicle is then installed in a horizontal attitude on an erector
(which could be an integral part of the LVT) and transferred to the pad. At
the pad the vehicle is moved to a vertical position and fueled with cryogenics.
Partial checkout of the orbiter takes place in the VAB prior to
installation on the mobile erector. Final checkout takes place at the launch
pad when the vehicle is erected and fueling completed.
5. 9. 2.4 Launch Operations
The launch operations must assure a safe flight for the Space
Shuttle crew and passengers as well as safety for all persons on earth.
Adequate procedures must be implemented to preclude any unusual occur-
rence or accident.
The program goal of the launch phase of ground operations as
described for the typical case detailed in Reference [88] is to schedule the
lift-off within 24 hours from the time of leaving the vehicle assembly build-
ing. With the vehicle in the launch attitude and two hours before lift-off,
the Space Shuttle is powered up and the final mission trajectory data is loaded
into the guidance systems. The launch pad will be cleared of most personnel
and hazardous operations~such as loading and servicing the cryogenic propel-
lants will commence. After the servicing is complete the crews and passen-
gers will board the vehicles. Facilities and procedures will need to be
provided so that rapid egress (to a safe area) of all crews and passengers
may be made in the event of any emergency requiring abandonment of the
launch site. Upon successful completion of the launch, the pad area is
inspected and prepared for the next launch.
5. 9. 2. 5 Facility Safety Requirements for Pre-Launch Abort
Since the orbiter may carry a flight complement of 12 personnel
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(two crew and ten passengers), as opposed to a total of three crew members
in the Apollo mission, it is felt that facility provisions for crew and passenger
safety in the event of prelaunch abort must be enhanced. Facility require-
ments will include [58]:
* gas purge system for orbiter and booster
* leak detection and warning
* semi-free fall elevators at crew and passenger emergency egress
exist levels
* access arms which will rapidly rotate from a stowed position on
the launch tower to the emergency egress exists to provide an
enclosed passageway to the elevator for fire protection.
5. 9.3 Spacecraft (Payload) Ground Operations
The Shuttle payloads will be delivered to the VAB in hermetically
sealed shipping containers following the successful completion of flight
acceptance tests at the payload contractor's facility. Upon designation for
flight the payload will be removed from the shipping container and will be
erected in a spacecraft test area. With the expected standardization of
payload electronics for Shuttle operations, it is expected that the payload
test equipment will consist principally of interface electronics, and that
maximum use will be made of a central computer facility in the VAB for pay-
load testing. Upon successful completion of electrical testing in the space-
craft test area the payload will be moved to the Shuttle for integration. It
is not anticipated that environmental testing of the payload will be performed
at the VAB.
Upon return of a payload from orbit for maintenance or refurbish-
ment, the payload will be demated from the orbiter and returned to the space-
craft test area for post-flight electrical test. First level maintenance
consisting of module replacement will be performed in the spacecraft test
area. Payloads requiring significant rework may be returned to the contract-
ors facility.
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5. 9.4 Environmental Considerations
5. 9. 4. 1 Combustion Pollution
It should be evident that, in the present climate, every large public
or private system will receive close scrutiny regarding any possible environ-
mental issues that may be noted during the operation of the system. One
environmental aspect of the Space Shuttle or any Space Transportation System
will certainly be centered on the products of combustion resulting from the
use of the large masses of propellants. If there are any resulting contaminants,
they will become noticeable if a large traffic launch rate occurs. The most
optimistic launch rate, however, would still be essentially insignificant
conquered to commercial aviation even considering the greater masses of
fuels. Some of the combustion pollutants of the most utilized or projected
propellants are shown in Figure 5. 52. Concepts such as the proposed fully
reusable, two stage Space Shuttle with LO 2 /LH2 propellants contain quantities
of compounds that affect the respiratory tract and adjacent areas of the body.
Still others contain compounds that are asphyziant or depressant in character.
Further attention should be given to assess the importance of this particular
problem area.
5.9.4.2 Noise
Local and near-distance noise could be a problem of some conse-
quence as shown in Figure 5. 53, where noise from the Shuttle will exceed
that from the Saturn V significantly in power level across the entire frequency
range. Frequence of flight and launch site location will also be factors in
determining the basic acceptability of the noise resulting from the launch of
these massive vehicles. Although this problem is recognized and being dealt
with, only a full and candid revelation of the extent of the problem will lead to
a satisfactory solution.
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Table of Metric to English Conversions
Length
1 cm = 0.394 in
1 m = 3.281 ft
1 km = 0. 621 statute miles = 0.539 nautical miles
Area
2 21 cm = 0.155 in
2 21 m = 10.76 ft
Volume
3 3
1 cm = 0. 0610 in
3 3
1 m = 35.31 ft
Mass
1 kg = 0. 0685 slugs
1 metric ton =68. 5 slugs
Force
1 N = .2248 pounds
Pre s sure
1 n/cm = 0. 0987 atm = 1.450 psi
Speed
1 m/s = 2.237 mph = 1. 944 knots
1 slug (1 pound-sec /ft) weighs 32.1579 pounds at Princeton, N.J.,
hence, 1 kg weighs 2. 2035 pounds.
.....
1 metric ton is defined as 1000 kg and weighs 1. 102 tons (adv. ).
1 N (Newton) is defined as 1 kg-m/ s 
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CHAPTER 6.0
SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM COSTS AND UNCERTAINTIES
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we discuss the measurement and classification of
launch vehicle and payload costs for the various Space Transportation Systems
and present their costs. Undiscounted costs are reported for current and
new expendable launch systems and reusable and partially reusable Space
Shuttle concepts. Much of the following, especially the treatment of current
and new expendables and payloads, follows the format of MATHEMATICA's
May 31st report since these have undergone only evolutionary changes since
that time. However, this is not the case for the discussion of Space Shuttle
costs. Funding constraints have led to drastic changes in the conception
of the Space Shuttle concept which has rapidly evolved into several partially
reusable configurations.
Section 6.2 describes the data as to primary and secondary
sources, and discusses the evolution and present status of Space Shuttle
costing efforts. Launch vehicle and payload costs are reported for each
Space Transportation System. The NASA-DoD baseline mission model
(Scenario 1) and the other traffic models are articulated and cost savings
from the design, reuse, updating and refurbishment of payloads are dis-
cussed. Qualitative assessments of data reliability are also made.
Section 6.3 is devoted to the problem of uncertainty in cost
estimates. The use of scenarios to simulate the uncertain future environ-
ment of the space prograrh is discussed as is the problem of cost growth in
large, high technology development programs. A sample risk analysis is
also performed for Space Shuttle recurring costs.
6. 2 Data Description
6. 2.1 Space Shuttle Configurations
Aerospace Corporation was the prime source of cost and con-
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figuration data for the expendable launch systems but not for the current
partially reusable systems. Payload effects as studied by Lockheed were
reported by them, but also obtained more directly from LMSC. Costs
for the Space Shuttle configuration came from the competing contractors and
display more of a scatter than was the case with the fully reusable Phase
B Baseline. This is because there are currently many variations of at
least three different shuttle concepts, whereas in May we were dealing
with a single design -- the McDonnell Douglas high cross range shuttle as
"costed by Aerospace.
The rapid evolution in Space Shuttle designs over the past few
months was induced by funding constraints. Non-recurring costs of the
Phase B Baseline of $13. 6 billion with peak annual funding of $2. 4 billion
[2] were simply too high. Attempts to extend the program development so
as to stay below a maximum peak year funding of $1 billion were unsuccess-
ful since shuttle benefits were deferred too far into the future.
The current approach calls for a "minimum technology" design
and development effort that will trade off lower non-recurring costs for
higher operations costs. Note that this higher direct cost per launch is not
of overriding importance so long as the Shuttle is still capable of capturing
payload benefits. The majority of shuttle benefits come from the ability to
update, reuse and refurbish payloads not from lower launch costs. In
fact, a Space Shuttle does not appear to be an economic investment when
only launch costs are considered. Launch costs, though important, are
generally on the order of a third of payload costs which would tend to imply
To
that, from a purely economic standpoint, a Space Transportation System
should be designed more to maximize payload benefits than to minimize
operations costs.
The design philosophy adopted was to develop the Space Shuttle
in two phases, Mark I and Mark IIo In Mark I a lower risk, less sophisti-
cated vehicle would be developed so that benefits might be obtained earlier.
Meanwhile, a more sophisticated Mark II vehicle with significantly lower
operations cost would be in development for deployment somewhat later.
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Once the Mark II configurations were operational, the Mark I vehicles
would be retrofitted to the more sophisticated design. The situation in which
a Mark II capability was developed with no interim program was also consi-
dered.
Lower cost options considered have included orbiters with either
external liquid hydrogen tanks, external liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen
tanks, or a single tank holding both. The orbiters have either been end
loaded for series burn, mounted side by side with the booster for parallel
burn, or mounted in tandem with another orbiter, no booster, and three
lox-hydrogen tanks sandwiched between. Booster options considered have
included a modification of existing expendable liquid propellent boosters by
adding wings, modifying for reusability, and giving a flyback capability.
Also evaluated were reusable pressure fed boosters, either a large series
burn concept or two smaller boosters burning in parallel with the orbiter.
Finally, expendable solid rocket motor strap-ons were suggested although
there is some indication that these could eventually be made partially reusable
[10].
There are currently three shuttle concepts being considered, but
two of the options imply the possibility of using either pressure fed or solid
boosters so there are really five configurations of interest. All the orbiter
designs are similar in that they include a single expendable hydrogen/oxygen
drop tank.
Total Space Transportation Systems costs are summarized in
Table 6.1. Both launch.vehicle and payload costs are included for the
Current Expendable, New Expendable and reusable systems. Totals have
been rounded to the nearest billion dollars because of the inherent uncertainty
in these costs.
Non-recurring costs for the various shuttle configurations are
reported by contractor in Table 6.2 along with cost per flight. These
non-recurring costs include both RDT&E and investment for the Space
Shuttle and Tug. The cost of the Space Tug and additional investment for
Western Test Range (WTR) have raised these figures above contractor
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TABLE 6. 1
SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS COST SUMMARY ( 1 )
(Millions of Undiscounted 1970 Dollars)
Space Shuttle
Current New and
Expendable Expendable Tug
EXPECTED LAUNCH VEHICLE
COSTS
Non-recurring costs (FY 1972-87) 1,620 2,000 7,450
Recurring Costs 10,600 8,760 4, 800
(FY 1977-1990)
TOTAL LAUNCH COSTS 12, ooo 11, ooo 12, ooo
EXPECTED PAYLOAD COSTS
(Satellites)
RDT&E (FY 1975-1990) 11,000 10,600 9,880
Recurring Costs
(FY 1976 - 1990) 18,800 18,400 12,700
TOTAL PAYLOAD COSTS 30,ooo 29, ooo 23,ooo
EXPECTED TOTAL SPACE
PROGRAM COSTS 42, ooo 40, ooo 35, ooo
(1) Source: September Contractor Data
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TABLE 6.2
NON-RECURRING COSTS (INCLUDING TUG & WTR)
VERSUS COST PER FLIGHT (I )
(Millions of 1970 Dollars)
Note: Single RAO (Rocket Assisted Orbiter) is series burn, Twin RAO
is parallel burn.
(1) Source: Contractor data, all estimates rounded
(2) Tug not included in cost per flight
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shuttle estimates by about $1. 6 billion.
Space Tug cost estimates have changed only slightly from those
reported in our May 31st report. The Tug design was assumed not to differ
because of changes in the shuttle design. Also, only one Tug concept was
considered. Costs for the Tug were obtained from Aerospace's August
report [2]. It can be argued that these estimates are too low since the Tug
design in question was configured for the fully reusable baseline system.
The Space Shuttle, as originally conceived, was to have more energy
available to stage the Tug. The clear implication is that any degradation in
the first stage (Shuttle) performance will have to be made up by the second
stage (Tug). From which one can conclude that the Tug estimates involve
a lower technology and lower cost system than will eventually be needed.
This is perhaps true. However, note that not all payloads
require maximum Tug performance. Not all Tug oriented missions involve
payload delivery to synchronous equatorial orbit. Furthermore, the direct
cost per flight of the Space Tug is significantly less than the cost to fly
the Shuttle. Large percentage increases in Tug operating costs manifest
themselves as much smaller percentage increases in total operations costs.
Finally, it is not at this time clear that Tug development would
be incurred by the United States since the Europeans have expressed an
interest in the project. However, this does not mean that the Tug would be
obtained "free". The argument that shuttle users be charged only the in-
cremental cost per launch in order to maximize the benefits to society as a
whole does not apply to users from other countries. * The Europeans would
tend to charge the United States more than marginal costs for the use of the
Tug and the United States would charge more than marginal costs for the
use of the Space Shuttle. Note that fees would not necessarily include
amortized investment and RDT&E but would be "whatever the market will
bear." It is to one's advantage to sell a trip if one makes more money on
the sale than if one does not. Note that there have been no launches for
*We are speaking strictly economically, here, of course. Politically it
might even be considered advantageous to charge a foreign government less
than the marginal cost.
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foreign countries included in MATHEMATICA's analysis. Although the
European space program has not in the past been very large, it is certainly
quite probable that there will be an increase in the next two decades. Each
mission flown by the United States for the Europeans would imply an addi-
tional benefit of the Shuttle and one larger than would be the case for a mission
flown for some intra-American group. It is thus quite likely that any opti-
mism in Tug estimates is more than compensated by other considerations.
Space Tug cost estimates were:
Space Tug Costs
RDT&E $600M
Investment $180M
(non-recurring)
Total $780M
Direct Cost
per flight $. 49M
Boosters
Let us consider some of the factors involved in choosing a first
stage, this being the major area of difference among the present configurations.
Figure 6.1 illustrates some of the relevant issues involved in choosing the
Shuttle first stage. If one opts for expendable boosters, the choice would
probably be a solid. A liquid propellent booster would then be too costly
and a pressure fed would have to be developed as there are no pressure fed
engines of sufficient size currently in operation. A cost-effective solid would
also need some development, but non-recurring costs would be much lower
since the technology is better understood.
For reusable first stages, there exist two options -- ballistic
return and manned flyback. Pump fed liquid propellent engines are needed
for the flyback case since the wing structure weight requires the most
efficient engine possible. For ballistic re-entry, the pump fed would pro-
bably be excluded since its complexity would make it difficult to refurbish
after it is pulled out of the ocean. Both the solid and the pressure fed may
be optimal for this last case, there being a trade off between non-recurring
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and recurring costs. Costs for the solid are lower for the former and higher
for the latter. It is also quite possible that one might opt for a solid booster
initially and later phase into a pressure fed.
Table 6.3 gives total program costs, RDT&E costs and Mark II
costs per flight for the five configurations as reported by Grumman,
McDonnell Douglas, North American Rockwell and Lockheed in December.
Great care should be taken in interpreting it. It would be unwise to attach
too great a credence to differences between contractors for the same configura-
tions. Differences are in part due to costs being classified differently,
different assumptions as to procurement, amortization, Shuttle flights and so
on. What each contractor means by a particular configuration is not necessarily
the same. It is, however, useful to compare a single contractor's estimates
for the different Shuttle designs.
Consider the more detailed cost breakdown in Tables 6.4 and 6. 5.
These costs, are based on October contractor data which will account for any
differences from Table 6. 3. Note that the non-recurring costs reported in
Table 6.4 comprise both RDT&E and investment and cannot be directly com-
pared with the RDT&E costs in Table 6. 3.
The Twin RAO (SRM) figures were calculated by assuming that the
use of solid rockets would affect only booster related costs. This appears to
be a fairly safe assumption since the solid rocket options are generally costed
on the basis of freezing the design and sizing the booster accordingly. Non-
recurring costs were estimated by taking the difference between the pressure
fed and SRM Twin RAO options in Table 6.3 and charging it as a reduction in
both booster and flight test costs.
For estimating cost per flight using solid rocket motors, the
booster related costs were subtracted. These included booster (with engine)
amortization and booster related operations costs consisting of manpower and
materiel expenditures. To this was added $6.4 million, the cost of procurring
two 156 inch solid rocket motors. Grumman estimates of $8 million for two
SRM's [5] were not used.
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TABLE 6. 3: REPRESENTATIVE CONTRACTOR COST ESTIMATES() ( 2 )
(Millions of 1970 Dollars)
Single RAO Twin RAO
Flyback
Booster Pressure SRM Pressure SRM
Fed (3 x 156) Fed (2 x 156)
Grumman
Total Program 9,300 10,800 14, 500 10,500 11,500
RDT&E 4,900 5,000 4,100 4, 600 3,900
Cost per Flight 6.7 8. 1 22. 0 80 1 15.3
(Mark II)
McDonnell Douglas
Total Program 12, 900 10,900 13, 500 10,500 10,600
RDT&E 7,400 5,700 4,400 5,200 4,200
Cost per Flight 6.2 6.5 15.7 6.9 10.0
(Mark II)
North American
Rockwell
Total Program 10,100 9,800 --- 10,700 -
RDT&E 6,200 5, 200 - 4,300 -
Cost per Flight 5.6 7.9 --- 10.2 .
(Mark II)
LMSC
Total Program 8, 100 8,400 --- 7, 600 8,100
Cost to FMOF 4, 000 4,000 --- 3,600 3,500
Cost per Flight 7.6 8.9 --- . 9 9. 9
(Mark II) _
(1) Source: December contractor data. All estimates rounded.
(2) All Space Tug related costs excluded.
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An estimate of $4 million for each strap-on is not consistent with
other contractor estimates; therefore, the smaller figure is reported in
order to make Table 6. 5 more general. The estimate was derived from plots
of unit cost versus propellent weight. Solid booster costs are pretty much
a function of propellent weight.
Using a propellent weight of 1. 2 million pounds [5], Ref. [14] yielded
an estimate of $2. 8 million per booster based on a propellent production rate
of forty million pounds per year. Note that this rate is a bit low for Shuttle
use and could only accommodate about eighteen flights per year. Shuttle use
of SRM's would imply higher propellent production rates and thus somewhat
lower costs. McDonnell Douglas [6] predicts costs of $2. 7 million for a
similar size booster. Reference 16 estimates $3. 2 million for motors with
1. 37 million pounds of propellent. This last number was used in Table 6.5
simply because it was the largest.
Non-recurring costs for solid rocket motors are lower than for
any other booster development. The estimates for non-recurring costs are
the order of $145 million [10] to $183 million [5] . The 156 inch diameter
vehicles and estimates for the 120 inch strap-ons are even lower. Develop-
ment times are estimated to be about three and one-half years [16].
For the series burn configuration, development costs of the large
reusable pressure fed booster as estimated by Grumman [5] are $890 million.
Engine development would be an additional $180 million for a total of $1170
million. This is for a phased orbiter engine program development with a
JZS in Mark I and an SSME in Mark II. Going directly to a Space Shuttle
Main Engine (SSME) would reduce these figures to $820 million and $170
million for a total cost of about $1 billion.
Similarly, the Twin RAO program costs are estimated at $600
million for booster development plus $130 million for engine RDT&E in
the Mark I/Mark II program. Again, these figures are reduced when one
opts to go directly to advanced orbiter engines. In this case, costs would
be $520 million for the booster plus $120 million for the engines to give a
total development cost of $640 million.
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More conservative (higher) estimates for Twin RAO costs are
reported by Chrysler [17] which.estimates $1260 million for RDT&E,
$1430 million for investment and $1410 million for operations to give total
undiscounted program costs of $4.1 billion. Unamortized cost per flight
is $3. 2 million or $6. 4 million with booster amortization. Chrysler assumes
a 445 flight program and a development time of some 7 years. The study
also seems to indicate a more conservative design than those of the other con-
tractors -- weights are higher, load factors are less.
Lockheed Stage-and-One-Half Concept
Not explicitly treated in the economic analysis was the Lockheed
stage-and-one-half concept. The costs for this configuration were signifi-
cantly lower than those for any other configuration reported by any contractor.
Cost for RDT&E and investment was given as $4. 1 billion [331. This included
the procurement of five orbiters. Cost per flight was given as $5. 65 million
of which $2. 8 million is for the purchase of two drop tanks. If these values
are realistic, this concept is economically superior to all others considered.
This can be seen if one notes the location of this configuration on the trade-
off graphs in Chapter 1. The point for $5.7 billion in non-recurring costs
(includes Tug and Western Test Range) and operation costs of $5. 6 million
is farthest from the tradeoff line.
We note, however, that these costs seem somewhat more opti-
mistic than those reported by other contractors. Development costs for
the configuration are lower than those we have seen for orbiters that are
being staged by boosters. First unit cost for the Lockheed orbiter is signi-
ficantly below other contractor estimates despite the fact that it has over
twice as many engines and a higher inert weight. Nevertheless, it appears
that the concept warrants study. All booster related costs are eliminated
in the stage-and-one-half and it might be that even pessimistic assumptions
of costs may still.lead to it being the most economic system.
Drop Tanks
The viability of partially reusable Space Shuttle configurations
will in large part be dependent on drop tank costs. It was therefore deemed
useful to pursue this question in some depth.
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In 1969 an Ad Hoc Committee for drop tanks, established as part
of the DoD Space Transportation System Working Group, concluded that costs
of less than $30 per pound might be possible for tanks with dry weight fractions
of .05 to .06. Aerospace Corporation went into this question in detail and
developed cost estimating relationships based on tank dry weight for drop
tank unit and development costs [18] [19].
As there exists no comparable drop tank data base, those relation-
ships were based on body-tank structure cost experience from the Saturn
SIC, SII, SIVB and Titan III programs. It was further assumed that drop
tank development costs would be 70 percent of what the above experience
would predict for body-tank structure. Similarly, a likeness factor of 50
percent was used for predicting first unit cost. Aerospace also suggested
that a learning curve factor of 88 percent be used.
These cost estimating relationships were multiplied by a factor
chosen to account for design and manufacturing complexities. For example,
the data indicate that a tank containing liquid hydrogen or liquid oxygen will
be about twice as expensive as one containing a non-cryogenic propellent.
We have applied these relationships to two sample hydrogen/oxygen
drop tanks with structural weights of 60 and 100,000 pounds. These weights
are representative of current designs. A complexity factor of two was used
since the designs must carry both liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen. It
was further assumed in the calculation of unit cost that 445 would be built
with a learning of 88 percent. The use of an 88 percent learning curve means
that each time the number of units doubles, the average unit cost goes down
by 12 percent. Thus, after 445 drop tanks the average unit cost has gone
down nearly 70 percent.
60,000 lbs. 100,000 lbs.
Development Cost $280M $320M
First Unit Cost $ llM $ 16M
Unit Cost $ 3.5M $ 5. ZM
Per Pound Unit Cost $ 58 $ 51
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Contractor cost estimates have generally been lower than the above
would indicate.
Time Phased Costs
Appendix 6A contains two plots of time phased contractor estimates
for a Twin RAO configuration. These are broken down into categories to
illustrate the impact of the various components. Also plotted is the same
configuration but with certain assumptions of slippage and cost growth. The
large scatter in the cost data makes these sensitivity studies even more
needful than usual. However, approaches such as that depicted in Figure
6A. 3 do not eliminate the need for resolving the anomalies in the data. This
brings us to the discussion of uncertainty which is treated in Section 6. 4.
Infinite Horizon
Also included in Appendix 6A is Table 6A.o 1 which presents time
phased costs for a particular scenario using the New Expendable System.
It is reported there as an illustration of the use of the infinite horizon. All
numbers in the box become recurring costs when this is considered. The
boxed costs are repeated into the indefinite future; new orbiters are pur-
chased, new payloads are developed and procurred and so on. These dis-
counted values are then totaled to get the programs net present value using
an infinite horizon. The subject is discussed in more detail in our May 31st
report.
6. 2, 2 Expendable Configurations
The source of all cost data presented in this section on expendable
systems is the Aerospace Final Report, Volume III [2].
6. Z2 20 1 Current Expendable System
The Current Expendable (CE) fleet articulated by Aerospace in-
cludes configurations from the Scout, Thor, Atlas, Titan III, and Saturn
6o16
vehicles. Aerospace carried out cost estimates in the standard life cycle
format (RDT&E, Investment, and Operations), but a redivision of costs for
both Current Expendable and New Expendable fleets into recurring and non-
recurring costs was necessary in utilizing the SAMSO/Aerospace expendable
vehicle costing program.
The Current Expendable costing effort by Aerospace was directed
toward "off the shelf" vehicles, and thus was characterized by the compara-
tively simple task of determining where each vehicle is in its "learning curve"
production process, and how future launch rates will affect future unit costs.
The (wholly non-recurring) RDT&E costs were generated by making point
estimates of cost for each specific vehicle configuration, and prior studies
were used where possible. Non-recurring investment costs (chiefly for
extra launch facilities) were largely based on similar costs for existing
facilities.
These costs are summarized in Table 6. 6. The non-recurring
costs, however, are dominated by the high Recurring Investment and
Operations costs of expendable launch vehicle programs; consequently, Aero-
space Corporation devoted its major effort to recurring-cost estimation. It
utilized a cost model requiring two categories of input data:
1. Quantities of vehicle configurations launched by year and by
launch site (Eastern Test Range, Western Test Range).
2. Cost data as a function of quantity of vehicle hardware elements
and operations elements, for each vehicle configuration in the fleet.
The model develops (average) cost versus use-rate curves, from
which the average or unit-iecurring vehicle cost can be subsequently
extracted based on the launch rate required by the traffic model (c. f. [1]
for a discussion of how these use rates are determined). Table 6.7 presents
these costs based on use of the baseline traffic model's vehicle use rates;
Table 6.8 presents total recurring launch costs (again, based on the baseline
traffic model), broken down further into Investment, Operations, and Range
(WTR and ETR) cost components.
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TABLE 6.6: TOTAL NON-RECURRING COSTS
CURRENT EXPENDABLE FLEET*, FOR 1978-1990
U. S. SPACE PROGRAM (SCENARIO 1)(1)
(Millions of Undiscounted 1970 Dollars)
* Excluding Big G costs.
(1) Source: Table 2.3-3, reference [2]. No Non-recurring costs
are expected beyond 1982: the above costs are incurred in the
1975-1982 period.
6-18
COST CATEGORY TOTAL
RDT&E
TITAN IIIB/CENTAUR 20
TITAN IIID/CENTAUR 10
TITAN IIID (7)/CENTAUR 5
TITAN IIIM 75
OTHER (PAYLOAD/VEHICLE INTEGRATION) 50
TOTAL 160
INVESTMENT (NON-RECURRING)
ADDITIONAL TITAN III CAPABILITY, ETR 24
CENTAUR CAPABILITY, ETR 26
AGENA CAPABILITY, ETR 8
SUBTOTAL, ETR (58)
TITAN III (7) CAPABILITY, SLC-4E/W, WTR 23
CENTAUR CAPABILITY, WTR 26
SUBTOTAL, WTR (49)
TOTAL 107
TABLE 6. 7: UNIT RECURRING COSTS
CURRENT EXPENDABLE FLEET (1 )
COST PER
FLIGHT
LAUNCH TOTAL (DIRECTVEHICLE SITE NUMBER OF OPERATING
FLIGHTS COST)
$ M, 1970
SCOUT
TAT (3C)/DELTA
TAT (3C)/DELTA/TE-364
TAT (9C)/DELTA/TE-364
TITAN IIIB/AGENA
TITAN IIIB/CENTAUR
TITAN IIIC
TITAN IIID
TITAN IIID/ CENTAUR
TITAN HIIID (7 SEG)
TITAN IIID (7 SEG)/CENTAUR
TITAN IIID (7 SEG)/
BURNER II
CENTAUR/
TITAN IIIM '
INTERMEDIATE 21
WTR
ETR
WTR
ETR
ETR
WTR
ETR
WTR
ETR
WTR
ETR
WTR
WTR
ETR
WTR
ETR
WTR
ETR
ETR
ETR
4
22
80
12
8
40
71
12
77
3
88
20
66
48
60
14
9
6
65
1
* Plus 30.0 for BIG G
(1) Source: Table 2. 3-5, reference[ 2 ].
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3.4
6. 2
5.8
7.0
7.0
6.4
8. 9
10. 7
10.5
12.6
12. 6
13.4
9. 8
16. 1
10. 6
16. 6
18.9
17.6
15. 1*
240. 0
TABLE 6 8: TOTAL RECURRING COSTS
CURRENT EXPENDABLE FLEET, 1978-1990(1)
. (Mlillions of Undiscounted 1970 Dollars)
VEHICLE TOTAL
. ..... 
_
INTER *21 240 0
INVESTMENT 160.0
OPERATIONS (ETR) 80.0
SCOUT 13.5
INVESTMENT 11.0
OPERATIONS (WTR) 2.6
TAT 3 DEL 601. 1
INVESTMENT 392.3
OPERATIONS 208. 8
ETR 52.5
WTR 156.3
TAT 3 DEL 64 83.5
INVESTMENT 48.3
OPERATIONS (ETR) 35.2
T 3D 647.5
INVESTMENT 569.6
OPERATIONS (WTR) 77.9
T3D/CENT 772. 6
INVESTMENT 658.2
OPERATIONS (ETR) 114.4
T3D/7SEG 633. 7
INVESTMENT 553.8
OPERATIONS (WTR) 79.9
T3D/7 CENT 402.3
INVESTMENT 326.6
OPERATIONS 75.7
ETR 33.2
WTR 42.5
T3D7CENTB2 105.6
INVESTMENT 90. 3
OPERATIONS (ETR) 15. 3
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TABLE 6.8: (continued)
VEHICLE TOTAL
TAT9DEL364 310.0
INVESTMENT 211.1
OPERATIONS 98.9
ETR 20.7
WTR 78.2
T3B/AGENA 758.2
INVESTMENT 608. 5
OPERATIONS 149, 6
ETR 109.2
WTR 40.4
T3B/CENTAUR 847.6
INVESTMENT 701.9
OPERATIONS 145.7
ETR 134.2
WTR 11.5
T3C 1378.9
INVESTMENT 1207.9
OPERATIONS 171.0
ETR 127.6
WTR 43.3
T3M 979.6
INVESTMENT 887.4
OPERATIONS (ETR) 92.2
TOTAL 7773. 9
INVESTMENT 6427. 0
OPERATIONS 1347. 0
ETR 814.4
WTR 532.6
(1) Source: Table 2. 3.4, Reference [2]. Includes some investment
in 1977. Figures may not add to the totals shown because of rounding.
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In support of manned space flights, a modified Gemini vehicle
(Big G) was costed as the required re-entry/logistics vehicle. It consists
of two modules -- a twelve-men re-entry vehicle module and a cargo/pro-
pulsion trailer module. The costs of the Big G were developed based on
a 1969 study by MDAC, and comprise about one-fifth of the total Current
Expendable launch costs. These costs are summarized in Table 6. 9.
Also, for both Current and New Expendable fleets, additional
operating costs are .incurred for operating the launch sites. Annual range
costs of $80 million/year at ETR and $40 million/year at WTR are utilized
as being typical of the costs now attributed to space launch vehicles, exclu-
ding missile and ICBM programs, in budgeting forecasts for the late 1970's.
Reliability of Current Expendable Cost Data
The unit recurring launch costs utilized by Aerospace for Current
Expendable vehicles are in general considerably lower than current launch
costs, the predicted reduction in unit costs being due to procurement rates
generally higher than current rates. It should be kept in mind that any
reduction in total usage of a particular vehicle would result in increased
unit costs: this is an important effect if traffic volume is reduced in the
traffic model, and also accounts for higher unit costs when CE vehicles are
used during the Space Shuttle phase-in period. Given these considerations,
the Aerospace estimates for the Current Expendable recurring costs should
be quite reliable, and their results should be comparatively easy to verify
by NASA and industrial parties.
We note that the SAMSO/Aerospace Corporation model does not
actually incorporate any "learning effects" in the costing of expendable
launch vehicles; thus unit costs are in general not reduced as the program
progresses. Consequently, even though unit costs may vary from year to
year due to different procurement rates, the use of an average unit cost
for the entire program is reasonable and does not cause any significant
bias when these costs are discounted in our present value calculations.
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TABLE 6.9: BIG GEMINI PROGRAM COSTS
(Millions of Undiscounted 1970 Dollars)
Source: Table 2. 3-6, reference [ 2].
(1) Launches occur in calendar year
(2) RVM - Reentry vehicle module (12 new, 1 from RDT&E)
(3) CPM - Cargo/Propulsion Module
(4) Includes $20 million/year for indirect support
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INVESTMENT COST
NON -RECURRING RECURRING
FISCAL NO. OF (1) RDT&E OPERATIONS TOTAL
YEAR LAUNCHES COST FACILITIES RVM( 2 ) CPM ( 3 ) COST(4 ) COST
1973 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0
1974 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1975 0 50 0 0 0 0 50
1976 0 150 0 0 0 0 150
1977 0 250 0 0 0 0 250
1978 0 200 20 50 0 0 270
1979 0 100 20 125 0 0 245
1980 0 50 10 125 12 0 197
1981 1 0 0 125 72 38 235
1982. 6 0 0 75 72 128 275
1983 6 0 0 0 72 128 200
1984 6 0 0 0 72 128 200
1985 6 0 0 0 96 128 224
1986 8 0 0 0 96 164 260
1987 8 0 0 0 96 164 260
1988 8 0 0 0 96 164 260
1989 g 0 0 0 96 164 260
1990 8 0 0 0 0 164 164
TOTALS: 65 800 50 500 780 1,370 3, 500
The total Current Expendable program costs are summarized in
Table 6.10 below.
TABLE 6.10 TOTAL LAUNCH VEHICLE COSTS
CURRENT EXPENDABLE FLEET( 1 )
FOR 1978 - 1990 U. S. SPACE
PROGRAM (SCENARIO 1)
(Millions of Undiscounted 1970 Dollars)
LAUNCH
VEHICLES BIG G TOTAL
RDT&E 160 800 960
INVESTMENT 6, 534 (1,330) 7, 864
NON-RECURRING 107 550 657
RECURRING 6,427 780 7, 207
OPERATIONS 2,787 (1, 370) (4,157)'
DIRECT 1, 347 1,170 2,517
INDIRECT 1,440 200 1,640
TOTAL PROGRAM 9,481 3,500 12,981
(1) Source: page 2-20, reference [2].
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6. 2. 2.2 New Expendable System
The objective of defining a new expendable vehicle fleet is to show
the full potential of the expendable vehicle concept in comparing it with
reusable launch vehicle concepts. The Aerospace Corporation approach to
the definition effort was to employ a vehicle family concept based on the
current Titan III family. This use of a family concept was felt to minimize
non-recurring costs and to provide a high degree of commonality to gain
the desirable effects associated with increased production.
The total Non-recurring costs (RDT&E and Non-recurring Invest-
ment) for the New Expendable program are shown in Table 6. 11. RDT&E
costs include all engineering, hardware, and test activities required to
make each configuration operational; completion of the 7 segment SRM
development is charged to the Titan III M, which would use that SRMas a
strap on. No flight tests are required for the 5 segment SRM/Core II
vehicle, but one Titan III M flight test and two Titan III L2, L4 flight tests
are included in their costs. The Non-recurring Investment costs are due
to additional facilities and equipment needed to launch the vehicles at rates
required by the New Expendable baseline traffic model.
Unit recurring costs were predicted using the same cost model
as for the Current Expendable fleet and are shown in Table 6.12. The input
cost data for the new vehicle elements were estimated on a judgmental and
past experience basis by Aerospace.
Total program Recurring costs for the New Expendable STS, based
upon the predicted unit recurring costs and upon the New Expendable base-
line traffic model, are shown in Table 6. 13. The (recurring) Investment
costs include all hardware costs and supporting in-plant functions; the
Operations costs include all launch operation, propellants, transportation
and other on-site support functions. The costing effort assumed single
government agency procurement of all hardware of each vehicle family,
with hardware costs based on total annual concurrent production of common
elements.
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TABLE 6.11: TOTAL NON-RECURRING COSTS
NEW EXPENDABLE FLEET*:,
FOR 1978-1990 U. S. SPACE PROGRAM (SCENARIO 1)( 1 )
(Millions of Undiscounted 1970 Dollars)
COST CATEGORY TOTAL
RDT&E
3 SEG SRM/CORE II 25
5 SEG SRM/CORE II 10
7 SEG SRM/CORE II 10
UPPER STAGE INTEGRATION 3, 5, 7 25
TITAN IIID / CENTAUR 10
TITAN IIID (7)/ CENTAUR 5
TITAN IIIM 75
TITAN IIIM L2, L4 175
OTHER (PAYLOAD/VEHICLE INTEGRATION) 50
TOTAL 385
INVESTMENT (NON-RECURRING)
5 SEG SRM/CORE II AT ETR 36,
INCLUDING CENTAUR Z8
ADDITIONAL T-III AT ETR 40 41,
INCLUDING UPPER STAGES 50
T-III L2, L4 AT ETR 37, INCLUDING
CENTAUR 81
SUBTOTAL, ETR (159)
5 SEG SRM/CORE II AT WTR SLC-4W,
INCLUDING CENTAUR 26
CENTAUR CAPABILITY WTR SLC-4E 26
T-IIID (7 SEG) AT WTR SLC-6, INCLUDING
CENTAUR 51
SUBTOTAL, WTR (103)
TOTAL 262
* Excluding Big G costs.
(1) Source: Table 2. 4-4, reference r 2 ].
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TABLE 6. 12 UNIT RECURRING COSTS, NEW EXPENDABLE FLEET ( 1 )
COST PER
FLIGHT
LAUNCH TOTAL (DIRECTVEIHSICLTE NUMBER OF (ETSITE OPERATINGFLIGHTS COT
COST)$ M, 1970
SCOUT WTR 4 3.4
5,SEG SRM/CORE II/TE-364 ETR 16 4. 6
WTR 48 4.5
5 SEG SRM/CORE II/CENTAUR ETR 56 10.0
WTR 35 10.4
5 SEG SRM/CORE II/CENTAUR/TE ETR 41 10.3
TITAN IIID ETR 0 0
WTR 60 9.8
TITAN IIID/BURNER II ETR 17 10.4
WTR 22 10.3
TITAN IIID/CENTAUR ETR 38 15.5
WTR 12 15.9
TITAN IIID (7 SEG) ETR 0 0
WTR 60 10.2
TITAN IIID (7 SEG)/BURNER II ETR 7 11.0
WTR 6 10.9
TITAN IIID (7 SEG)/CENTAUR ETR 33 16.0
WTR 9 16.3
TITAN IIID (7 SEG)/CENTAUR/B-II ETR 6 16.8
TITAN IIIM ETR 65 15. 0
TITAN III L2/CENTAUR ETR 0 0
TITAN II L4 ETR 2 35.8
TITAN III L4/CENTAUR ETR 1 40.8
* Plus 30.0 for Big G
(1) Source: Table 2.4-6, reference [2] . "B2" denotes Burner-2,
"SEG" denotes segments of a Solid Rocket Motor (SRM). The AKM
used is the TE-364.
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TABLE 6.13: TOTAL RECURRING COSTS, NEW EXPENDABLE FLEET
FOR 1978-1990 U. S. SPACE PROGRAM (SCENARIO I)(1)
(Millions of Undiscounted 1970 Dollars)
VEHICLE TOTAL
SCOUT 13.5
INVESTMENT 11.0
OPERATIONS (WTR) 2.6
CORE 2*364 290. 2
INVESTMENT 251.5
OPERATIONS 38.7
ETR 10.2
WTR 28.5
CORE2*CENT 923. 9
INVESTMENT 765.0
OPERATIONS 159.0
ETR 89.4
WTR 69.6
CORE2*C*TE 422.4
INVESTMENT 353.0
OPERATIONS (ETR) - 69.5
T3D 586.8
INVESTMENT 520.9
OPERATIONS (WTR) 65.8
T3D BURN II 401.5
INVESTMENT 354.7
OPERATIONS 46.8
ETR 21.4
WTR 25.5
T3D/CENT 779.7
INVESTMENT 662.9
OPERATIONS 116.8
ETR 84.9
WTR 31.8
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TABLE 6.13: (continued)
VEHICLE TOTAL
I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
T3D/7 SEG 613.2
INVESTMENT 547.4
OPERATIONS (WTR) 65.8
T3D/7/B2 142.1
INVESTMENT 126.2
OPERATIONS 15.9
ETR 8.7
WTR 7.2
T3D/7/CENT 675.2
INVESTMENT 575.9
OPERATIONS 99.3
ETR 76.0
WTR 23.3
T3D7 CENT B2 100.7
INVESTMENT 86.4
OPERATIONS (ETR) 14.3
TCM 975.2
INVESTMENT 873.8
OPERATIONS (ETR) 101. 4
T3L4 71.6
INVESTMENT 56.7
OPERATIONS (ETR) 14.9
T3L4/CENT 40.8
INVESTMENT 32. 2
OPERATIONS (ETR) 8.6
TOTALS 6036. 8
INVESTMENT 5217.3
OPERATIONS 819.5
ETR 499..4
WTR 320. 1
(1) Source: Table 2.4-5, reference [ 2 ]. Includes some
investment in 1977.
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Big G costs (for manned reentry) and range costs were assumed
to be identical to those presented for the Current Expendable fleet. The
total New Expendable program costs are summarized below.
TABLE 6.14 TOTAL LAUNCH VEHICLE PROGRAM
COSTS FOR NEW EXPENDABLE (1)
FLEET FOR 1978-1990 U. S. SPACE
PROGRAM (SCENARIO 1)
(Millions of Undiscounted 1970 Dollars)
(COSTS IN MILLIONS OF 1970 DOLLARS)
LAUNCH
VEHICLE BIG G TOTAL
RDT. E 385 800 1,185
INVESTMENT (5, 479) (1, 330) (6,809)
NON-RECURRING 262 550 812
RECURRING 5, 217 780 5,997
OPERATIONS (2, 259) (1, 370) (3,629)
DIRECT 819 1,170 1,989
INDIRECT 1,440 200 1,640
TOTAL PROGRAM 8,123 3,500 11,623
(1) Source: Page 2-39, reference [2].
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6. 3 Payloads
An extensive study of payload effects was conducted by Lockheed
Missiles and Space Corporation (LMSC) from September, 1970 to June, 1971
*
and the results used by MATHEMATICA in the present analysis. Although
we have been continuously informed of the study's progress, Lockheed was
not the direct source of data. Aerospace Corporation's payload cost data
was the direct source, although its direct source for the payload information
was LMSC.
This section briefly summarizes some of the results of the payload
effects studies and is primarily an updating of Section 6. 2. 3.2 of MATHEMA-
TICA's May 31st Report. For an in-depth treatment of the subject and a
more complete data description, the reader is directed to Aerospace's Inte-
grated Operations/Payloads/Fleet Analysis Final Report, especially Volumes
II, III, IIIA and VI. Lockheed's reports are, of course, also important as
the original source of payload savings from low cost design and reuse.
One of Aerospace's basic tasks in its payload costing effort was
the description of the baseline (current design principles) payloads to be flown
in the NASA-DoD baseline mission model. This effort, reported in [2],
describes the NASA-OSSA, NASA-OMSF, non-NASA application and DoD
payloads by their preferred orbit, IOC date, lifetime, dimensions, weight of
mission equipment, and total weight. These parameters were utilized in a
spacecraft cost-estimating model (developed by Aerospace for SAMSO) to
determine baseline payload costs for the entire set of missions.
The LMSC parametric and "bottoms up" analyses were used for
all payloads in the model that Aerospace believed was applicable to provide
the low-cost expendable and (low-cost) reusable payload weight and volume
data for the capture analysis; this subsequent capture analysis assigned
payloads to launch vehicles for each of the current expendable, new expendable
LMSC's effort is continuing with emphasis being given to the economic
benefits associated with standardized spacecraft.
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and reusable Space Transportation Systems, and was necessary in costing
the launch operations and determining whether low-cost designs resulted in
a net cost reduction (in many cases they do not, since payload weight increase
results in higher launch costs).
Aggregate payload costs as estimated for their baseline space
programs in Aerospace's August Report [2] are shown in Table 6. 15. Note
that reuse and refurbishment of payloads causes the greatest benefits. The
major part of the savings due to the relaxation of mass and volume constraints
can be realized with the new expendable system as well as a Space Shuttle.
These cost reductions are evidenced by the differences between the current
and new expendable payload costs. The larger savings from reuse and re-
furbishment are partially implied by the differences between new expendable
and new Shuttle payload costs, although this does not include payload refur-
bishment (contained in operations costs) which is, on the average, 39 percent
of new unit costs.
LMSC provided Aerospace Corporation with the subsystem costs
reported in Tables 6. 16 and 6. 17 . These estimates were used to calculate
the cost factors in Tables 6. 18 and 6. 19 . These factors were calculated
from the following relationship:
"Low Cost" Payload Cost Estimate
Cost Factor = ,,,Cost Factor "Baseline" Historical Payload Cost
The low cost payload cost estimate comes from the Lockheed payload effects
study. The baseline historical payload cost in the denominator, though
essentially the same as.historical cost figures, is not exactly the same. The
baseline costs were estimated by recosting the baseline payloads using the
estimating techniques developed and following NASA ground rules. This was
done to improve the compatibility between the two figures.
Aerospace reviewed the factors reported in Tables 6.18 and 6. 19
and found the OAO communication and stability subsystem factors were not
well suited for use with the Mission Model. These factors as well as the
total OAO satellite factors were therefore not used by them. Propulsion
factors were established by Aerospace on a judgemental basis since the
payloads investigated did not contain propulsion systems. These were:
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Table 6.15
Payload System Cost Summary For
Baseline Traffic Models (1) Scenario 1
(Billions of Undiscounted 1970 Dollars)
Current New
Expendable Expendable Shuttle
NASA
RDT&E 9.00 8.60 7. 58
Investment 8.49 8.28 3.11
Operations 1.01 .96 3.93
Total (18.50) (17.83) (14.62)
Non NASA
RDT&E .37 .34 .35
Investment 1.80 1.66 .55
Operations .32 .29 .75
Total (2.49) (2.29) (1.65)
DoD
RDT&E 1.64 1.59 1.43
Investment 4.47 4.42 2.01
Operations .97 .94 1.95
Total (7. 08) (6. 96) (5. 38)
Total
RDT&E 11.01 10.53 9.36
Investment 14.76 14.36 5.67
Operations 2.30 2.19 6.63
Total 28.07 27.08 21.65
Note: Payload refurbishment and maintenance is carried as an investment
cost.
(1) Source: Reference [ 2 ], Table 3. 32
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The formulation of non-dimensional cost factors enables one to
extrapolate the cost reductions estimated for the Orbiting Astonomical
Observatory (OAO) and the Synchronous Equatorial Orbiter (SEO) to all
the satellites in the mission model.
A refurbishment factor was also estimated for those payloads
brought back from orbit and later reused. These factors were developed by
LMSC on a subsystem level, but the overall average was judged sufficiently
accurate since thevariation from it was small. Two average rates were
produced, 39 percent for SEO type satellites and 32.5 percent for payloads
similar to the OAO. This means that a satellite can be refurbished for that
percent of its unit cost.
6. 4 Uncertainty
A decision on a system as technologically complex, long in
development, and expensive as the Space Shuttle cannot ignore the
effects of uncertainties. These uncertainties will include those in cost, te ch-
nology, schedule, the number and types of missions flown, and strategic
and tactical considerations. The concern of this section is with the effect
of uncertainties upon eventual costs and benefits and thus their implications
of the economic portion of the Space Shuttle decision. A tabulatire of
some relevant uncertainties is reported in Table 6.19 of Reference [1].
Any cost estimate must be considered as representing a range of
possible values, the distribution of which will vary as a function of such
parameters as technological complexity, program length, or even man-
agerial skill. The choice among any set of systems thus cannot be made
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solely on the basis of predicted costs since each prediction may have a
different probability associated with it. This is illustrated by Figure 6.2
which might represent the choice between a more expensive but lower
technology expendable solid rocket booster and the reusable but riskier
pressure-fed system.
Some economists have suggested that risks inherent in particular
programs should be taken into account either by adding a risk premium to
the discount rate, or by adding to future costs and/or subtracting from
future benefits. Such adjustments do not seem appropriate in our evaluation
of alternative STS's. It is most unlikely that any simple index (such as the
net present value) adequately assesses relative performanace of one project
over another; rather, whichever indices we use must implicitly be qualified
by our knowledge of the program's future environment and of its various
uncertainties.
1.
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Figure 6.2
The Choice Between Two Alternatives with Different
Associated Risks and Expected Values
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If we rely on an NPV measure plus some strictly numerical
"uncertainty" information such as the standard deviation, skewness, con-
fidence limits, etc. , we still have not accounted for the environment in
which the program selection decision must be made. However, this,
combined with the extra information from scenario analyses, can come
close to providing all of the economic information which we can use
concisely in advising on what we think is the best choice. The different
scenarios are discussed in detail in the next section.
There are different questions involved in the uncertainties in
non-recurring and recurring cost estimates. In the former, RDT&E
phase uncertainties in cost, scheduling, technological readiness, etc.,
have high impact on risk. In the latter case, future cost streams (par-
ticularly for pay load and launch operation costs) are somewhat repetitive,
correlated from year to year and the risk is of exceeding the costs of
equally effective, competing systems.
It is desirable for several reasons to separate the uncertainty
analysis of recurring costs from that on non-recurring costs:
(a) Non-recurring costs are severaly affected and
constrained by budgetary, scheduling and develop -
ment-phasing alternatives; recurring costs are less
affected by these factors.
(b) Due to the above constraints, non-recurring costs
are correlated in a fashion that is very difficult to
simulate. For example, higher than expected cost for
a particular development item early in the hardware
program may mean that the development is in trouble
and further annual and total cost overruns are likely or,
it may mean that the program manager is accelerating
development of this item and hence costs in later years
may be lower than budgeted.
(c) Development time is an essential output factor
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and cost driver in the Space Shuttle development
program; time is not a critical factor in examining
cost streams which begin some ten years from now.
The rest of this chapter will be divided into three sections. First,
there will be a discussion of the uncertainties in the environment of the
eighties and scenario analysis. This will be followed by a discussion of
the uncertainties implicit in a research and development effort. Finally,
the question of Space Shuttle recurring costs will be considered by
taking a 'snapshot' of a one year interval starting with about the fiftieth
launching.
6. 4.1 Uncertainty in Demand: Scenario Analysis
In analyzing the benefits and the cost-effectiveness of a new Space
Transportation System, a very fundamental question is how much space
activity can one expect the United States to perform in the 1980's and beyond.
Advocates of a Space Shuttle System intuitively believe and claim that, once
a reusable Space Transportation System with a low cost per launch is
developed, the demand for space transportation will increase beyond anything
done in the past or at present, since completely new uses of space can and
will be found, for the direct benefit of the United States in commercial,
civilian and defense applications: as well as for the benefit of other nations.
These intuitive feelings may well prove correct, as history has shown so
often in the past when a new field of technology was opened up.
Opponents and critics of a Space Shuttle System feel that many
of the expenditures that went into space exploration and particularly
manned space flight programs, were and are a "waste" of money, and the
development of a Space Shuttle System am-ounts to "throwing good money
after bad money." Yet, even the most severe critics of the U. S. space
program grant that the unmanned space program of the United States, and
other countries, is of great value and benefit.
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R~e pr Oaduc~edliromnL Best avialaIlecoy
Tha crucial question regarding a decision on a Space Shuttle
Syster. development, therefore, is what level of space activity justifies the
.development of a reusable Space Transportation System and are the space
activities that would justify -- economically -- such a development
::.c.d'..ately high and how do these activity levels compare with historical
-.c<:i¼r:,.ies cf the United States and other countries. One has to keep in
noi.-. d, thereby, that payloads have to be delivered, over time, to very
differerat orbits, requiring at times additional stages or a Space Tug, and
<-he mere fact of a payload bay of 60 x 15 feet and a 40K pound capability to
ca r orbit of 100 miles altitude does not mean that the actual, or even
o?:ional use of the Space Shuttle System will ever approach these payload
weights in each and every flight.
A very detailed analysis of the loading and scheduling of Space
,:':tt2.e .flighS it. the 1978-1990 and, again, the 1979 to 1990 period was
^. ":.ed by A-erospace Corporation in support of this study effort. The
.- 'si,:.! ty_ .-¥5 aNPnd DoD baseline mission model was taken as the basis,
and it wac this miission model that the Space Shuttle System -- of whatever
cC?.o. ........* ~ - d sto meet. As it turns ;out, the actual loading of the
- .....e Shc: _,t m ? -.. in terms of satellite payload weight comes to about
! COO pou:nds or the average (not the 40, 000 pounds theoretically
'vail;ab..e) This. r.ef.ects some of the conservative operating assumptions
::_.osed on I'.. Grace Shuttle System, and these are fully reflected in the
',ie r.* Fo.tr te;.ams of the economic analysis. Certainly, in the 1980's
' . ....rE,'::,g a:. edge gained on the new Space Transportation System
: ' -:-': and more efficient use of the Space Shuttle. But such
'..': ' ;'' ''' ., '''  then only help the economic analysis in favor of a
',-,.-- :'a..-(: :-a,.. 'r. Since operating difficulties will certainly arise,
e;, '' i. '. "I.'. zarly period of Space Shuttle operations, such improve-
'.-.e: :. n, -n. .t allowed for in this analysis. It is also wrong, however, to
.ir..'! n >>:-^, .:>- ..o the number of Space Shuttle flights, a very large amount
of satell. r- i'ari.o o weight in Earth orbit, the Space Shuttle. Some very
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enormous and misleading statements have been and can be made in this
connection.
What matters are the actual space missions performed in the
1980's and used in the economic analysis when comparing Space Shuttle
Systems to expendable modes of operations. What matters most, in the
economic analysis, is rhe cost of payloads and of space missions in the
1979 - 1990 period. Since no certainty exists as to these requirements, we
created the scenario approach to determine the limits within which a Space
Shuttle System makes economic sense.
In order to subject the candidate Space Transportation System
to economic analysis across a broad spectrum of possible future events and
levels of activity, a number of scenarios, i. e., alternative models of
future space activity, were constructed and presented in MATHEMATICA's
May 1971 report, incorporating variations in the mix, rate of traffic
build-up, phasing-in of the Space Shuttle, as well as the actual level of
future space activity, a working framework for a broadened evaluation of
the Space Shuttle decision. Nineteen scenarios were analyzed in the
May, 1971 report, of which Scenario 1 was the NASA-DoD baseline mission
model provided to MATHEMATICA. The remaining were formulated by
MATHEMATICA and were essentially parametric variations from the
baseline model. Each Space Program for the 1980's can be understood to
consist of a set of space missions that will be performed -- (e. g., those
described in Chapter 4 of this report for NASA) and are independent of the
question of whether or not we will have a Space Shuttle System or not. These
space programs are taken as the baseline requirements that any Space
Transportation System hasto meet on an equal capability basis. Table 6. 20
describes such a space program in summary form, by year, in the case of
the Space Shuttle System. In Table 6. 20 we use the Space Shuttle System
to meet the NASA-DoD baseline mission model of 736 Space Shuttle flights
for 1978 to 1990, the baseline mission model of the May 31, 1971 report.
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A similar mission model, now, however, reduced to 624 Space Shuttle
flights was taken as a baseline for the economic analysis since then.
What matters most, however, to the economic analysis of
alternative Space Transportation Systems, is the costs associated with
these payloads, over time, and their breakdown mission by mission.
Table 6. 20 gives such a breakdown, again for the old NASA-DoD baseline
mission model of 736 Space Shuttle flights. In Table 6. 20 the payload costs
are shown for the Space Shuttle System and the exactly equivalent costs for
the Current Expendable System for the OSSA (unmanned) part of the NASA
space program. Similarly detailed breakdowns exist for the non-NASA
applications, the DoD (unmanned) space program, as well as for OMSF.
Also shown in Table 6. 21 are the relative (percentage) cost distribution
Space Transportation Systems. In similar fashion, we could also show the
expendable payload costs. Figure 6. 3 shows the results of Table 6. 21 in
diagrammatic form. The overall effects of a Space Shuttle System are a
relative reduction of expected payload unit costs (as shown here), as well
as payload RDT&E costs, and, through'refurbishment and updating, of the
costs of space missions over an extended time period. These alternative
cost streams are all described, in detail, in Chapter 8.
The important aspect of the scenario approach is that, by
reducing the number of space missions, and satellites to be deployed,
one reduces also the overall costs of the portions affected (NASA, DoD,
commercial applications), and not just the number of Space Shuttle flights.
Furthermore, since the composition of new satellites deployed, refurbished
satellites, etc., between agencies is very different, one can also assess the
effects of these different contributions to the economics of the Space Shuttle
System by substantially changing the NASA, DoD or commercial component
in these space programs. The purpose of the scenario approach was there-
fore twofold: to measure the economic effects of substantially reducing or
expanding the overall level of space program activity in the 1980's and to
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Table 6.21
Distribution of OSSA Payload Costs, (Scenario 1)
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Range of Payload
Unit Costs Space Shuttle Current Expendable
(Millions of 1970 Dollars) # Payloads % of Total # Payloads %o of Total
0 - 19.9 162 36 17 4
20 - 39.9 181 40 242 61
40 - 59.9 62 13 46 12
60 - 79.9 13 3 17 4
80 - 99.9 22 5 1 < 1
100 - 119.9 22 6
120- 139.9 12 2 22 6
140 - 159.9 11 3
160 and over J 20 5
Totals 452 100 3981 100
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TABLE 6.22
DISTRIBUTION OF OSSA SPACE SHUTTLE
PAYLOAD COSTS, SCENARIOS 1 AND 3 (1)
Range of Payload Scenax
Unit Costs
lions of 1970 Dollars # Payloads
0 - 19.9 162
20 - 39 .9 181
40 - 59.9 62
60 - 79.9 13
80 - - 99.9 22
00 - 119.9
20 - 139.9 12
40 - 159.9
rio 1
%of
Total
36
40
13
3
5
Scenario 3
% of
# Payloads Total
81 36
90 40
31 13
7 3
11 5
2 6 2
160 and over
Totals 452 100 226 100
1 based upon the 736 flight mission model
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1
1,
assess the effects of a substantially different mix of space programs between
NASA, DoD and commercial space activities.
In doing so, however, the relative cost distribution of satellite
payloads within each agency was held constant. That is, we still use
13 percent of satellites in the $40 million to $60 million cost class, 36
percent of satellites in the cost class of up to $20 million, etc. What
changes is the absolute budget of each agency, but not the relative cost
distribution of its space program by satellite cost class. The changes
in the number of satellites, and their distribution by cost class, is shown
in Table 6. 23 for the first 3 scenarios (for the OSSA component.)
Had the economic analysis been biased in the adjustment of
space activities either toward expensive (but fewer) or inexpensive (but
more) satellite payloads, then the economic results would have been degraded
or improved respectively. This is shown in Figure 6. 4 in a general way.
At this point no clear statement as to the actual situation in the 1980's can
be made, with assurance, by anybody. The important economic parameter
remains, however, the overall budget level of space activities actually
implied in the 1980's and this component was changed dramatically over the
range of interest in the scenario approach. (see Chapter 8).
Scenario 3, referred to in the May 1971 report as the MATHEMATICA
baseline, was derived from the NASA-DoD baseline by reducing all identified
OSSA costs by 50 percent. The reason for choosing this new baseline was
that the average annual budget requirement of $1,750 million resulting for
the OSSA under the NASA-DoD baseline for current expendable costs is four
times the OSSA's average 1963-1971 budget ($450M), and two and one-half
times the guideline of $750M set by the Bureau of the Budget for the First
Interim Report.
For Scenario 3 and all other scenarios, MATHEMATICA did not
request that the Aerospace Corporation attempt to perform new mission
and traffic capture analyses based on the deletion of specific flights.
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Rather, the 50 percent decrease in OSSA costs for Scenario 3, for
example, was obtained for the STS by halving the activity level dependent
(incremental) costs for OSSA, with the simplifying assumption that the
number of OSSA flights for each year was also halved. This is illustrated
by Table 6. 24. Additionally, the RDT&E costs for OSSA payload develop-
ment were also halved.
As is demonstrated in Table 6. 24, the basic assumption made in
developing each scehario is the following: a percentage variation away
from the "baseline" costs for any mission category (NASA-OSSA, DoD,
non-NASA applications) entails the same percentage variation in the number
of flights for that category, and the relative frequency of mission costs
within the category remains unchanged.
The nature of this underlying assumption for cost mission
activity variations can be illustrated adequately by considering Scenario 3,
in which only OSSA flights have been varied from the baseline, Scenario 1.
For Scenario 1, the payload costs of OSSA flights for the Space Shuttle
and Current Expendable systems have the distributions shown in Table 6. 24
below.
Scenario 3 is derived by assuming in effect that half a S many
OSSA payloads are flown from each cost group indicated in Table 6. 24
for the Space Shuttle and the NE and CE systems; the frequency of payloads
from each cost interval, indicated by the "percentage of total" column
remains unchanged. Thus, for Scenario 3 of the May 1971 Report 81 OSSA
payloads in the $0-19. 9 million range are to be flown by the Space Shuttle.
The reduced numbers are of course approximate, representing the
expected number of payloads in each cost interval if the "constant
frequency" rule were imposed literally.
A summary of the nineteen scenarios performed for the May 1971
Report is presented in Table 6. 24. The scenarios performed for this
current report are presented in Chapter 8. Essentially, they include the
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TABLE 6.24: SCENARIOS OF FUTURE SPACE ACTIVITY
BASED UPON THE 736 SHUTTLE FLIGHT
MISSION MODEL
Total Shuttle
Flights
) Description 1978 - 1990
NASA-DoD Baseline Model 736
OSSA flights reduced to 75% 666
OSSA flights reduced to 50% -- MATHEMATICA
BASE LINE 600
Mathematica Baseline with DoD flights increased
.50% 753
Mathematica Baseline with DoD flights doubled 912
Mathematica Baseline with DoD flights reduced to
75% 516
Mathematica Baseline with non-NASA applications
increased 50% 645
Mathematica Baseline with non-NASA applications
doubled 697
Mathematica Baseline with non-NASA applications
tripled 794
Mathematica Baseline with the Shuttle phased in
over the period 1978-1979 585
Mathematica Baseline with the Shuttle phased in
over the period 1978-1981 547
Mathematica Baseline with the Shuttle phased in
over the period 1978-1983 494
The Mathematica Baseline flight rate is reached
in 1980 584
The BathermAatica Baseline flight rate is reached
in 1982 561
The Mathematica Baseline flight rate is reached
in 1984 537
Flights based on average FY1963-FY1971 payload
and launch vehicle funding of NASA (unmanned),
DoD, and non-NASA applications flights
Similar to 23, but with flights based on FY1970-
FY1971 average funding levels
NASA-DoD Baseline Model plus Lunar Option 1
Mathematica Baseline plus Lunar Option
678
562
1221
1085
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Scenaric
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
23
24
25
26
baseline case, now 624 Shuttle flights, and scenarios 2 through 9 of the May
1971 report. As shown in the above-mentioned table, the activity level of
the NASA-DoD mission model is 736 Shuttle flights over the period 1978-
1990. The activity level of the MATHEMATICA Baseline was 598 Shuttle
flights, and over the seventeen scenarios, the variation around this activ-
ity ranged from 494 to 910 flights. While in Table 6. 24 only the number of
Shuttle launches for each scenario has been indicated, the variation in the
number of Current and New Expendable STS flights was incorporated into
the economic models.
In the case of Scenarios 2 through 9, the number of Space Shuttle
flights and the corresponding budget requirements for each agency were
determined by adjusting the NASA-DoD Baseline mission and budget models
by the factors given in Table 6. 24. These factors have been applied uni-
formly to all activity level dependent (incremental) launch vehicle costs
associated with each agency and to all payload costs, i. e., RDT&E,
Investment and Operations. Estimated launch vehicle activity level
independent operations costs were not changed.
Based upon the new MATHEMATICA Baseline (Scenario 3),
Scenarios 10, 11 and 12 were formulated by adjusting the activity level
dependent costs for the Space Shuttle to simulate its phasing in over two
years (1978-1979), four years (1978-1981), and six years (1978-1983). The
assumption was made that total space activity in each year is unchanged,
and only the mix between Space Shuttle and Current Expendable flights
varies with the Shuttle capturing an increasing proportion of the traffic
over the course of the phase-in period.
Scenarios 13 through 15 simulated alternate patterns of the rate
of space traffic build-up for NASA and non- NASA Applications. The
mission and traffic model for the DoD, however, is unaltered.
Of several subsequent analyses, Scenarios 23 and 24 were of
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particular interest. For Scenario 23, the historical yearly average
funding for payloads and launch vehicles in the four categories (NASA-OSSA,
NASA-OMSF, DoD, and non-NASA Applications) for the Fiscal Year 1963-
1971 period were used as the projected yearly funding level of the Current
Expendable system; under the equal capability analysis, total Space Shuttle
funding levels are somewhat lower. For the OSSA and non-NASA cate-
gories, RDT&E costs were uniformly reduced from the corresponding
(Current Expendable) NASA-DoD baseline costs (Scenario 1) by a factor
approximately equal to the total percentage reduction for all costs in each
category; Activity Level Dependent (ALD) costs were then computed for
each year to give total costs by year equal to the desired average 1963-1971
cost being imposed. For OMSF and the DoD, RDT&E costs were not changed;
but for DoD, a rather large increase in ALD costs at the end of the
program was required to offset the truncation of the RDT&E costs in
the NASA-DoD baseline. Having used the Current Expendable costs to
thus adjust program costs in Scenario 1 to agree with the historic average
funding, identical adjustments were made in each category to determine
New Expendable and Space Shuttle activity levels and costs.
Scenario 24 was developed in identical fashion, but based on the
lower Fiscal. Year 1970-1971 average funding levels for each category.
Scenario 25 is the NASA-DoD baseline (Scenario 1) plus Lunar
Option 1. For Lunar Option 1, only launch cost data were available;
however, the lack of payload data did not affect the economic analysis
since these'payloads are assumed to be identical for each Space 'Trans-
portation System. Scenario 26 is the MATHEMATICA baseline (Scenario
3) plus Lunar Option 1.
The major result of the scenario analyses performed in the May
1971 Report is that the exact composition of the mission model is of second-
ary importance to the scale of the mission model; i. e., the activity level.
As was shown in the Summary (Chapter O) of the Report, 99 percent of
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the variation in the Allowable Non-Recurring Costs evaluated at the 10
percent discount rate is associated with changes in the level of activity
over the 1978-1990 period. It is on the strength of this result that for the
analyses of the two-stage fully reusable and alternative shuttle configur-
ations within this report a reduced number of scenarios is used. A broad
range of activity has been covered and results appear within Chapter 8.
6. 4. 2 Non-Recurring Costs
Although the problem of non-recurring cost uncertainties was
addressed by MATHEMATICA, it proved impossible to reach explicit
quantitative conclusions. Two parametric models for predicting cost
growth were considered, but for reasons to be discussed, were not useful.
Qualitative observations of some significance can, however, be made.
Consider the evolution of a large, technologically difficult,
design and development program. Initially, conception of the end product
is by necessity incomplete and ill-defined. This is followed by rapid
evolution of the concept normally accompanied by large changes in cost
estimates as the designers become more aware of the problems and, per-
haps more important, better able to define the objective. The uncertain-
ties inherent in this phase of a program are thus very large and probably
should not be subject to too much quantitative scrutiny. With time, the
rate of increase in knowledge slows down and development becomes
primarily the refinement of a conception. Most knowns have been quanti-
fied and educated guesses about known unknowns have been made.
Somewhat later in the development process, slippages may
occur. Any large development is comprised of many smaller interdepen-
dent development efforts, so that a delay in one can mean a delay in many
and even in the entire project. Deviations from schedule will lead to a
higher probability of increasing time or costs than of decreasing them.
This will hold even if there is as much chance of finishing a subprogram
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ahead of schedule as behind schedule. Since communication is imperfect,
the manager of any part of the development will not always know the status
of all the other subprograms that are important to him. If someone else
finishes ahead of schedule, he may or may not be able to capitalize on it.
However, if there is a delay in one of these other subprograms, it will
always affect him since some part of his development may be delayed or
some corrective action necessary.
The above would seem to indicate that if one were to plot cost
estimates versus time, errors in the early stages would be due to flaws
in the estimating technique; errors in the later stages would be due to
poor management. Note that it will be difficult to distinguish the effect
of good or bad estimating techniques from those of good or bad manage-
ment.
Initially, it was hoped that some parametric means of predicting
cost growth might be found. Although this proved impossible on the pro-
gram level, it is commonly employed on the subsystem level where there is
a clearer functional relationship between dollars and some independent
variable like weight.
In references [21] and [22], examples of attempts to parametrical-
ly quantify the evolution of program cost estimates, were considered as to
their applicability to the Space Shuttle program. Reference [22] employs
an empirical least-squares fit of an exponential form to estimate cost data,
in which the time to initial operational capability was used as the independent
variable; Reference [21], in a somewhat more complicated approach, uses
length of the development program, fraction of the program so-far elapsed,
technological complexity, and calendar year of the estimate. The results of
applying these methodologies to the Space Shuttle program are contradictory,
with the result that one can prove whatever one wants by the adroit choice
of very plausible assumptions.
For example, in Reference [21], Summers postulates that cost
estimating techniques have been improving with time. (Note that this
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would be functionally equivalent to assuming management techniques have
been improving with time). Direct application of his model to the Phase B
Baseline, fully reusable Space Shuttle, will predict a significant cost under-
run. However, Summers' assumption of an exponential improvement in
cost estimating implies that estimates made today will be twice as good as
those made when Summers first published his work in 1962. It is possible to
modify this assumption without violating the fit of the data by assuming some
different functional form for later years. But this will lead to predicting
overruns whose magnitude is a function of the assumption.
Reference [22] suggests that cost histories of the 1960's show an
improvement over those of the 1950's. Although it is quite probably true
that costs are better understood and controlled today than in the past, it is
not clear that Reference [22] supports this thesis. Examination of the data
suggests that the difference between the fifties and sixties data sets may
not be time. It would appear that the difference could also be the degree
of technical difficulty relative to the state of the art of the day.
Consideration of price indices for various fabrication techniques,
materials and subsystems shows that cost changes have not been the same
for all categories. As the programs used in the data bases for References
[21] and [22] will involve different mixes of these components, the use.of
the models defined to predict cost growth becomes more questionable.
The problem would appear to be one of finding a clear functional
(not correlative) relationship between cost and some independent vari-
able(s). Thus, it is difficult to predict the overall costs of a program by
analogy to the aggregate costs of historical systems since with a new
development they will probably be more dissimilar than similar. One can
expect to be wrong and, if right, it will probably be for the wrong reasons.
Let us consider what can be said about non-recurring costs on a
more specific level. There are in general use several methods for pre-
dicting subsystem costs, the two most common being the so-called
"bottoms up" approach and the use of parametric cost estimating relation-
ships (CER's). The first consists of adding up the costs of every com-
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ponent and every hour spent. Its primary flaw is that some items tend to
be left out, especially when a system is only partially designed. The
second also suffers from uncertainty. Cost estimating relationships are
developed by plotting historical costs versus some independent variable
like weight or thrust. The data used to develop these relationships will
include some errors and will not perfectly reflect the costs incurred.
There is a second, more subtle, area of uncertainty that involves the
degree of analog between historical data and the system in question. In
a development program there will be much that differs from past experi-
ence. The degree of comparability between the shuttle and past programs
will be good in some areas (e. g. engines) and poor in other (e. g. thermal
protection systems). I'he degree of confidence in an estimate will depend
significantly on this comparability.
Inflation has not yet been discussed. Since it is fairly difficult to'"
predict it, most estimates are made in constant dollars which will gen-
erally be satisfactory on a program level, but can lead to difficulties on
the subsystem level. For example, in developing its cost estimating
relationships, Aerospace Corporation used price index data for various
component parts. Historical data was related to 1969 dollars on a more
specific level than the inflation rate of the entire economy. Component
costs have been inflating (or deflating as in the case of titanium fabrication)
at different rates, the effects of which were included. It then becomes
clear that today's constant dollars cannot necessarily be related to future
buying power by a single factor, but rather by a spectrum of factors whose
aggregate impact may be larger or smaller than the inflation rate of the
entire economy.
What is the likelihood that development of the Space Shuttle will
cost significantly more than anticipated? This question cannot be satis-
factorily answered by going to historical data for precedents that can be
parametrized and applied. However, consider that where a program
maintains flexibility and where concurrency has been minimized, there
will be less chance of cost growth since slippages in one part will be less
catastrophic to the whole. Where the design and state of the art are not
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far apart, uncertainties will be less.
The current conception of a Space Transportation System is sig-
nificantly "safer" than the original fully reuseable Phase B Baseline.
Performance slippages in the engines can, in part, be made up by
increasing the size of the fuel tanks. Whereas this could lead to very
costly orbiter redesign were the tanks internal, the external drop tank can
be modified with relative ease. Risks in the development of reuseable
pressure fed boosters are not critical to the overall program since solid
rocket motors are satisfactory. In fact it is not presently clear that solids
would be worse than pressure feds. Ihis is the old trade-off between
high operations and low development cost and low operations and high develop-
ment cost. Finally, consider that NASA's development of the Space Shuttle
is a different "game" than that of a military development project.
One of the many reasons for cost overruns has been changes in the
engineering design once development is well underway. Such design changes
have been responsible for some of the more spectacular cost increases.
Althor.gh one might argue that this cost growth is not an overrun as such,
the fact remains that costs have increased and we, in attempting to
evaluate the Space Shuttle, cannot ignore this situation. As non-recurring
cost growth of this sort has generally been positively correlated with
higher operations cost, this becomes especially significant. (Note that this
is to be distinguished from the situation portrayed by the trade off graphs in
Chapters 2 and 8. There, higher non-recurring costs imply lower
recurring costs and vice versa. This, however, compares different
configurations, not different evolutions of the same conception.)
By far the great majority of high technology projects conceived in
this country have been in the province of the military. Military planners
have a more difficult task than we do in defining a "pay-off" function. The
problem of quantifying the "value" of a life saved or an additional enemy
killed is more difficult than that faced by the designer of a transportation
system where benefits may be measured by dollars saved. Thus there is a
heavy bias towards increased capability which in turn implies higher
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complexity and costs. Because of this we would argue that a Space Transpor-
tation System, if developed with an eye to economic considerations, will be
less prone to incorporate new technology into its design.
A Space Shuttle has a clearly defined function: to deliver a
payload into earth orbit. There is no "opponent" set to degrade its
capabilities. Certainly there will be an evolution from today' s conception,
but the drivers should be towards performance of a specific mission at
minimum cost. In areas of rapid technological evolution one can expect
component costs to go down since one will be able to do the same thing
cheaper. In a military development there is a strong bias towards the use
of any new technology for increased capability (usually at higher cost), but
the shuttle design (presuming rationality!) should evolve towards lower cost
for the same mission. We again stress that this hypothesis assumes that
the project is managed with an eye to maximizing dollar quantifiable
benefits -- as would be the case for a private company competing for
profits.
6. 4. 3 Uncertainty in Recurring Costs
To a large extent uncertainties in technology, schedule, and
missions flown can be reflected as cost uncertainties. Since the Space
Transportation Systems under evaluation utilize different technologies and
are in various stages of planning, research, design and development,
different levels of uncertainty and hence risk exist. The comparison and
selection of the alternative Space Transportation System should consider
the different levels of risk which can be described as the possible
variability of net present value. Because of the uncertainties which exist,
net present value will not be single valued but probablistic in nature and
must therefore be represented by a probability distribution characterized
possibly by an expected value and standard deviation. Even if development
and operating costs could be predicted with certainty, net present value
would still be probabilistic. This results from the fact that it is not
possible to achieve systems having perfect (unity) reliability. Boosters,
orbiters, payloads, et cetera, will undoubtedly achieve reliabilities near,
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but less than, unity. A reliability less than unity introduces uncertainty and
hence risk. Reliability considerations will affect fleet size (boosters and
orbiters), number of payloads, number of launch attempts, number of
refurbishmnents, et cetera.
Reference [1] describes the various areas of uncertainty which
affect costs and which make it impossible to consider costs as being well
defined, single valued functions. Costs must be described as illustrated
in Figure 6.5 where annual costs are shown as ranges of possible values
with different probabilities of falling into different parts of the range. The
probabilistic recurring costs are the result of (a) uncertainties associated
with predicting mission requirements, booster cost, orbiter cost, payload
cost, et cetera, (b) less than unity reliability of launch success, orbiter
payload injection, orbiter recovery, et cetera, and (c) payload failure
(Mean-Time-Before-Failure, MTBF) characteristics. Since net present
value is the result of considering a time dependent stream of probabilistic
costs, it must also be categorized by a probability distribution. The
probability distribution represents the chance of achieving each of the
possible levels of net present value. The probability of net present value
exceeding a specified level may be determined by obtaining the area under
the probability distribution curve for all values greater than the specified
level. This is normally referred to as the cumulative probability
distribution (henceforth referred to as a risk profile). A typical risk
profile of net present value is shown in Figure 6. 6 where the vertical scale
represents the probability or chance, p, of exceeding the various levels of
net present value, NPV, indicated by the horizontal scale. In general, the
steeper the curve the lower the risk (or variability). When comparing
alternatives it is important to compare the expected or most likely net
present values. It is equally or perhaps more important to also compare
risk levels. In the certainty situation, it is generally desirable to select
the alternative which yields the minimum net present value of costs when all
alternatives are evaluated on an equal capability basis. The selection process
becomes more difficult when uncertainties are considered; tradeoffs must be
made between alternatives possessing different expected net present values
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and associated levels of risk. This is discussed in more detail in Section 6. 4. 3. 7.
lo date, primary concern has been with trying to establish reason-
able cost levels [2, 19, 24]. For example, the Aerospace Corporation [19]
has developed a cost estimating methodology based on the concept that the
cost of the shuttle and its parts can be shown to be a function of one or more
design, performance, or program paramenters in suitable equation form
(the CER's--cost estimating relationships). The credibility and the
accuracy of the overall system estimate is a function of the number and type
of individual estimates, the quality of the data on which the individual
estimates are based, and the correlations of cost to the independent
variables. The cost estimating relationships are single valued cost functions
which provide little or no indication of the variability or uncertainty involved
in establishing the relationships. Thus, the use of CER's leads to a single
valued STS cost estimate with no insight into the associated risk.
Since reliability and cost uncertainties can significantly affect risk,
a methodology has been developed .for explicitly considering and evaluating
their effects. In order to demonstrate the importance of considering
reliability and cost uncertainties a typical mission was postulated and
resultant recurring costs evaluated for both a typical expendable launch
vehicle system and a typical space shuttle system consisting of an
expendable booster and recoverable orbiter. The following paragraphs
describe the methodology. Typical results are presented and should be
considered only as a demonstration of the type of analysis which should be
part of future evaluation efforts. The analysis is motivated by the shortcoming
of any formal consideration of uncertainties and reliability effects up until
now, by the expectation that Space Shuttle operation costs will vary much more
widely than has been allowed for over the 1978-1990 period and by the ready
applicability of simulation and risk analysis techniques to this situation.
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6. 4. 3.1 General Procedure for Evaluating Effects of Reliability
and Cost Uncertainties
The basic starting point of the procedure is to face up to the fact,
from the very beginning, that reliabilities will not be equal to 1.0 and that
significant cost uncertainties exist. With this in mind the general evalu-
ation procedure shown in Figure 6.7 was established. The procedure
consists of establishing a mission simulation model and a mission cost
model. The mission simulation model represents the many possible
sequences of events which may take place in the process of performing the
desired space mission. The space mission may be a single space flight
or an interrelated group of space flights. The mission simulation model
is concerned with establishing the number of events (for example, launch
attempts) in terms of the various pertinent reliability factors.
The mission cost model establishes the mission recurring costs
including replacement and refurbishment costs for boosters, orbiters and
payloads. The mission cost model conmbines the results of the mission
events with the appropriate cost per event. The costs are considered as
uncertainty variables where ranges of possible values are specified as well
as subjective estimates of the form of the uncertainty (the probability
density function--pdf-4henceforth referred to as the uncertainty profile).
The simulation uses Monte-Carlo* techniques to establish the
probability distributions (risk profiles) of the different events, their
associated costs, and total mission cost. In order to demonstrate the
technique a typical mission was postulated, i. e., the establishment and
maintenance of a low altitude satellite system.
*Monte-Carlo implies the repetition of a modeled experiment,
sequence of events, physical process, etc. whose component outcomes are
probabilistic, a sufficient number of times to generate a "smooth" profile
or histogram of all possible outcomes. This resulting profile of predicted
outcomes for the model is then normalized to a relative frequency profile
which represents the probability density function for the experiment's outcome.
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IFigure 6. 7: General Procedure for Evaluating Effect of Reliability and
Cost Uncertainties
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Mission Simulation Model
The mission simulation model considers a wide range of possible
situations within the framework of the establishment and maintenance
mission. In general, a two-stage launch vehicle is considered. Each
stage may be reusable, recoverable, or expendable or consist of a reusable
and expendable portion. Table 6. 25 summarizes the various reliability
aspects considered. It should be noted that the representative shuttle
system is based upon a non-recoverable booster. Figure 6.8 depicts the
various possible sequences of events which might occur in the process of
performing the establishment and maintenance mission. Each of the
diamond shaped boxes represents one of the reliability aspects considered.
The particular path through the network is probabilistic and depends on the
various reliability components. The simulation (experiment) is repeated
a large number of times for each mission in order to establish a histogram
of outcomes. The particular path taken through the network represents or
simulates a particular sequence of events which might occur. For example,
a booster might be launched successfully and thence recovered successfully.
This necessitates a refurbishment of the booster. The orbiter might abort
and not be recovered necessitating the acquisition of another orbiter and
payload and requiring another launch attempt. Thus the path through the
network determines the number of launch attempts, the number of
additional boosters, orbiters and payloads required in order to satisfy the
mission requirements. It also determines the number of booster, orbiter
and payload refurbishments and the number of payloads which fail in orbit
and must be replaced. The probability of a payload failing in orbit depends
upon the payload mean-time-before-failure (MTBF).
The number of times through the simulation model depends on the
number of payloads required by the mission definition and the number of
payloads which fail and must be replaced. Upon placing the desired number
of payloads into orbit the mission cost model is entered. At this point the
computations represent a set of events and their associated costs which
result from satisfying the mission requirements. This process is then
6-68
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Figure 6. 8 Mission Simulation Model-Establishriment and Maintenance of
a Low Altitude Satellite System
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repeated a large number of times (1000 or more) so that a histogram of all
possible outcomes can be established.
Mission Cost Model
The concept of the mission cost model is shown in Figure 6. 9.
The mission cost model utilizes the computed number of events and the
uncertainty profiles of the appropriate costs to establish the total mission
cost and the associated component costs. The cost model treats the fol-
lowing costs as uncertainty variables:
o Booster cost (reusable portion)
o Booster cost (expendable portion)
o Orbiter cost (reusable portion)
o Orbiter cost (expendable portion)
o Booster refurbishment cost
o Orbiter refurbishment cost
o Payload cost
o Payload refurbishment cost
o Operations cost per launch
Each of the uncertainty variables is characterized by a range of uncertainty
and the probability distribution of cost within the range. A method for
establishing the uncertainty profiles is discussed in Section 6. 4. 3. 4.
Monte-Carlo sampling techniques are used to establish values of the cost
elements used in each of the 1000 or more sets of cost computations which
result in the histograms of possible costs.
6. 4. 3.2 Effects of Reliability
The various reliability aspects considered are summarized in
Table 6. 25. In order to demonstrate the type of results to be expected
when reliability is explicitly considered, reliability estimates have been
made for "typical" expendable launch vehicle and Space Shuttle systems.
These reliability estimates should be considered as being only repre-
sentative. At the time of this writing little data is available to substantiate
these or other estimates. The criticality of reliability will become read-
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ily apparent in the following paragraphs. The Space Shuttle reliability
estimates are based on a system having an expendable booster and reus-
able orbiter (for example, Twin SRM Boosters, Parallel Burn Orbiter
with External Single HO Tank) and the expendable launch vehicle system
is characterized by the Titan III M.
The specific parameters assumed for the establishment and
replacement mission are illustrated in Table 6. 26. A one-year snapshot
in time is considered during which new payloads are added to the system
and payloads which fail are replaced. The snapshot in time is considered
to start with approximately the fiftieth launching.
Figure 6.-10 illustrates the effect of reliability on the number of
launch attempts for a typical expendable launch vehicle system and the
effect of payload mean-time-before failure on the number of payloads
which fail and have to be replaced. For example, there is a 25 percent
chance that more than three payloads will fail and about a three percent 
chance that more than five payloads will fail. The number of launch
attempts (a minimum of five for the assumed mission) is a function of
launch vehicle reliability and number of payload failures. There is
approximately a 40 percent chance that more than eight launch attempts
and a ten percent chance that more than ten launch attempts would be
required to establish and maintain the postulated system of payloads.
Similar data have been established for the typical Space Shuttle
system. Figure 6. 11 illustrates the probability density functions (pdf)
of a number of important events. For example, referring to the first
column, there is a small chance (four percent) of having only five launch
attempts and a large chance (24 percent) of having eight launch attempts.
On the other hand, because of the ability of the shuttle system to reclaim
payloads which fail, there is a 97 percent chance that only six new payloads
(five required by the mission specification plus one standby spare) will be
required and a three percent chance that seven payloads will be required.
These data are illustrated in the risk profile format in Figures 6.12 and
6. 13. The effect of reliability on risk is clearly evident.
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Typical Mission Parameters
6-74
o Time Period Considered .................. l. 1year
o Number of Satellites Operating at Start of Time Period . . 10
o Number of Additional Satellites Added During Time Period . 5
o Replacement of Satellites Which Fail is Required ....... . As req'd
o Satellite Life (MTBF) .................... . 5 years
Table 6.26
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The results of a sensitivity analysis are shown in Figure 6. 14 and 6.15
where the sensitivity of launch attempts to reliability and payload MTBF are
illustrated. Specifically, the sensitivity of the expected number and standard
deviation of launch attempts is shown about two nominal values indicated as
points "A" and "B". Point A (Figure 6.14) is based on all reliabilities being
1.0 and a payload MTBF of five years. Point B (Figure 6. 15) is based on all
reliabilities being .95 and a payload MTBF of five years. The thick bands
represent the range .of variability of the expected number and standard deviation
of launch attempts as each of the reliabilities is varied (one at a time) from
. 9 to 1. 0. This establishes the sensitivity of launch attempts to changes
in probability of booster success, orbiter success and the payload operating
successfully when initially placed in orbit. The sensitivity of launch attempts
is approximately the same for each of these parameters. The dashed curves
represent the sensitivity of launch attempts to variations in payload MTBF.
Point "A", representing a perfect launch system and a payload with
an MTBF of 5 years indicates, for the mission described in Table 6. 26,
approximately 7. 5 launch attempts are to be expected with a standard deviation
of 1. 3 launch attempts. Since Point "A" represents a perfect launch system
the significance of payload MTBF becomes clear. It can be seen that if an
;MTBF of 3 yrears is achieved, approximately 9.3 launch attempts should be
expected. On the other hand, extremely large MTBF' s will reduce the
number of expected launch attempts to 5 (the number of new satellites to be
added to the system) as indicated by the dotted line in Figure 6.14. Also
from Figure 6.14, it canbe seen that if one of the reliability components
is reduced from 1.0 to . 95, the expected number of launch attempts in-
creases from 7. 5 to 8. 0 and the standard deviation of launch attempts in-
creases from 1. 3 to 1. 6. Point "B" (Figure 6. 15) illustrates the consequences
if all three reliability components are reduced simultaneously from 1. 0 to
. 95. It can be seen that the expected number of launch attempts increases
from 7. 5 to 9. 2 and the standard deviation of launch attempts increases from
1. 3 to 2.2.
The magnitude of the effects of achieving less than unity reliability
and less than infinite MTBF have been illustrated. The effects of reliability
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on mission cost will be discussed in Section 6. 4. 3. 5.
6. 4. 3. 3 Cost Uncertainties and the Development Cycle
The magnitude of cost uncertainties is related to the time in the
development cycle that the estimates are made -- early in the cycle implies
large uncertainties, late in the cycle implies small uncertainties. This is
particularly true when new technologies and/or concepts are utilized. Thus
it is anticipated that. cost uncertainties associated with employing the cur-
rent expendable fleet will be less than those associated with a new expend-
able fleet which will in turn be less than those associated with a new reus-
able Space Shuttle System.
Cost uncertainties are the result of uncertainties in the basic cost
estimating relationships, lack of detailed understanding or appreciation of
problems encountered in achieving desired technical solutions, variability
of design goals, mission traffic estimates, et cetera. Uncertainties exist
and should be considered as part of the evaluation process. Consideration
of only the most likely or expected costs implies that the future is known
with certainty. Cost uncertainties are admittedly difficult to quantify.
However, it might be inferred that the more difficult it is to quantify cost
uncertainties the greater is the uncertainty.
6. 4. 3. 4 Estimation of Cost Uncertainties
General Problem of Quantifying Uncertainties
The basic problem is how can uncertainty be quantified. The
quantification of uncertainty requires that informed estimates be made of
ranges of uncertainty of key cost variables and their probability distri-
This is analogous to the following: A man standing on a street
corner is faced with a decision as to whether or not he should cross the
street. He decides not to make a decision and remains standing on the corner.
He has in fact made the decision not to cross the street. Thus the lack of
explicit consideration of uncertainty would imply a condition of certainty.
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butions within the range. The estimates of uncertainty might be made, for
excample, at the CER level or they might be made at the unit cost (payload,
orbiter, etc.) level. The uncertainty assessments should be made by an
experienced group of individuals using Delphi type techniques. The
estimates are very subjective in nature and quantitatively express the
consensus of a group of well informed persons. The estimates reflect
past experience with similar efforts, problems which have been encountered
in the past, insights into problem areas which might develop, et cetera.
They are the best estimates possible at any given time. An example might
serve to illustrate how subjective estimates of uncertainty might be arrived
at. In a recent discussion a propulsion system manufacturer outlined a
development schedule for his proposed new propulsion system. It was stated
that there was little chance of reducing the schedule and that based upon past
experience delays of up to two years might be encountered. This implies
at least a two-year range of uncertainty with a very large chance of the
schedule being exceeded (in fact, it might be inferred that the uncertainty
profile is exponential in nature).
Cost uncertainties can be quantified. Most large corporations use
risk analysis techniques employing uncertainty assessments as standard
procedure in the evaluation and comparison of new business alternatives
[25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30].
A Methodology for Quantifying Uncertainties
A methodology is now described for establishing the shape of the
cost uncertainty profiles. This methodology has been employed in risk
analyses performed for numerous industrial corporations. The method-
ology is illustrated in Figure 6.16.
The first step is to establish the range of uncertainty. The range
is based upon knowledgeable persons assessing what can go right and what
can go wrong. The range is thence divided into five equal intervals (it has
been found that it is difficult to "think" in terms of more than five or six
intervals). The second step is to perform a relative ranking of the liklihood
of the cost variable falling into each of the intervals. Once this has been
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accomplished, the general shape (skewed left, skewed right, central, etc.)
of the uncertainty profile has been established. The third step is to esta-
blish relative values of the chance of falling into each of the intervals (for
example, in the illustration, the chance of falling into the first interval is
estimated to be half as likely as falling into the second interval). The last
step is to solve the illustrated equation for the quantitative values by sub-
stituting the data of the previous step.
6. 4. 3. 5 Effects of Cost Uncertainties
In order to demonstrate the effect that cost uncertainties coupled
with reliability effects might have upon the comparison and evaluation of
alternatives, the typical cost uncertainty profiles illustrated in Figure 6. 17
have been used. Only recurring costs are considered. Replacement of
elements of the fleet due to failures are considered as recurring costs.
It should be noted that the uncertainty variables are at a relatively "gross"
level. In the future it would be more meaningful to establish uncertainty
profiles at the CER level.
Different Space Transportation System configurations will result
in different uncertainty profiles. It should be noted that the uncertainty
profiles immediately make apparent the degree of optimism or pessimism
associated with the cost estimate.
As mentioned previously the cost model combines the uncertainty
assessments with the outputs of the mission simulation model and esta-
blishes the probability distributions of booster cost, orbiter cost, payload
cost, booster and orbiter and payload refurbishment cost, and total mission
cost. Also as mentioned previously, both reliability and cost uncertainties
affect the risk associated with total mission cost. Figure 6. 18 illustrates
the risk profiles (probability of exceeding indicated cost) associated with a
typical expendable launch vehicle system and a typical Shuttle system for
performing the previously defined (Table 6. 26) mission. It should be noted
that the most likely cost of the Shuttle System is less than the most likely
cost of the expendable launch vehicle system. It should also be noted that
the risk (variability) or standard deviation of the Shuttle System is greater
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than that of the expendable launch vehicle system.
In order to bring this into perspective, the probability that the
Shuttle System cost exceeds the expendable launch vehicle system costs by
various amounts was computed and is illustrated in Figure 6. 19. It can be
seen, that for the case considered, there is a 60 percent chance that the
Shuttle System cost will exceed the expendable system cost even though the
most likely Shuttle System cost is less than the most likely expendable
system cost. There is a 20% chance that the Shuttle System cost will exceed
the expendable system cost by more than $200 million.
6. 4. 3.6 Extensions of Techniques
A method of explicitly considering the effects of reliability and
cost uncertainties has been demonstrated by considering a- single time
period of a single mission. The consideration of a single mission and
typical reliability and cost uncertainties has demonstrated the importance
of risk analysis. Before conclusions can be drawn regarding the compari-
son and selection of Space Transportation Systems the simulation and risk
analysis techniques should be extended to consider and include the following:
o multiple missions and payload types
o multiple time periods
o effect of multiple launch sites upon fleet size
o effect of refurbishment and checkout time upon
fleet size in terms of mission requirements
o multiple payloads per flight
o space tug
o et cetera
Reliability and cost uncertainties must be considered when evalu-
ating and comparing alternatives. They should also be considered when
performing a capture analysis.
Risk analyses leads to variations in costs year by year. In the
above analysis, no attention was paid to a fixed budget constraint. This
*p(AB + Z) where Z is the amountp( >B + Z) here Z is the a ount
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situation should be considered in extensions of the risk techniques. If the
budget is fixed, then uncertainties and risk can be reflected back into the
number of allowable flights. Thus, risk analysis comparison with a fixed
budget constraint might be more meaningful if performed on a payload or
number of allowed flight basis. If this is done, risk profiles of payloads
per year and their "value" become important for comparison purposes.
The illustrated analysis considered an expendable STS and a typical
Space Shuttle configuration. The same techniques should be used to evaluate
and compare the many possible Space Shuttle configuration.
6. 4. 3. 7 General Problem of Decision Making Under Uncertainty
Using Monte-Carlo techniques the probability distribution of net
present value associated with alternate Space Transportation Systems can
be determined in much the same manner as the mission cost distributions..
This requires an expansion of the concept to include multiple missions,
multiple time periods and non-recurring costs. When choosing from
amongst several alternatives where costs are known with certainty, the
alternative having the minimum present value of cost should be selected.
When uncertainties exist, net present value will be a probabilistic quantity.
Typical probability density functions of net present value for two alternative
systems are illustrated at the top of Figure 6. 20. The most likely NPV of
System A is less than that of System B. The risk, as measured by the
standard deviation, associated with System A is greater than that of System
B. The choice of alternative depends upon the decision maker's aversion
to risk. That is, if the pJossibility of high costs occurring is not tolerable,
System B is preferable. If the possibility of high cost is tolerable when
considering the low cost potential, then System A is preferable.
Another way of illustrating this is shown in the bottom illustration
of Figure 6. 20. The vertical scale represents the risk as measured by the
standard deviation of net present value and the horizontal scale represents
the expected (mean) net present value. Each alternative (three are illus-
trated) is represented as a point. A conservative decision maker will
select alternative B rather than C since the risk associated with B is less
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than that of C and both alternatives have the same expected net present
value. Similarly, alternative A will be selected rather than C since A and
C have the same level of risk but the expected net present value of cost of
A is less than that of alternative C. Thus the problem boils down to a
selection between Alternatives A and B which have different levels of risk
and different expected NPV' s. At this point the analyst has provided all
possible information, including quantitative assessments of risk, to the
decision maker. The decision maker now must make choice considering
his attitudes toward risk [31, 32].
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APPENDIX 6A
PHASED COSTS: TWIN RAO AND NEW EXPENDABLE SYSTEMS
6-95
0 0o o o a x u o N a _ _ n 0 o -
0s _4 ND _N M N n W 'D x W t M ur sDM N %D _4 N 90 %O -,O '4 c> 7 a, ai o4 _ 
-4 nenN )MM N N N 
0000 0 o
0000
00 00 
OOOO 
00000
.0
-4 OD m m _ m a, a, 0 0 vSo w s 
o 0 _O -4 N 0 V .0 00 u' x D NC
M 0 -4_ Mm tD -D 4- U -D -4 - N -
_4 _ -_ _ - _ _4 _4 _I _4 _
oC .- 0 O N0 _t A Na ' OD,4 m a
c uI N Xo00.0o - n'D"-0 ' c 0
M " _1 x -4 M No _ - n' 0 Lra0 N N t
M qA r0 N \,.00. 0 o 0 !'  'I 0 d'.0
_' t -4_ _4 N N N -.. - Rt .- N
_4 _ -4 -
0 0,C4MMLAUn00 00000000 0. a, MN N
-4 -4 -4 -4
0 Ln L 0 u I 00 o000 oO000
' Ln -_ a o
_-- Of ) -_
_ N M M IV Ln .0C C0 a -o _ LA n O . X N0 0
t- r- t- tb r - N r-C oo 0 x o o x w o o X oO a,'
0' o ' a, ao o a, 'a, 'a, 6% a'a a  'ao a, aa
-4 -4 - 4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 - -4 -4
0,M
-
- ,
Of
Co
00
-4
-4
%o
t-
oo
-4
-4
00
Hf
6-96
w
-4
,4
0
0
a
o.=
-4
'1:
4)
.4.
0
0
O
.4-4
-4
,-4
H En
¢ >
* W;>-Ii
-44
. [-Q
En A
W r4
4o 
U{.)
r,/3
O
'44
H
0H
r J
Lz
0n
uo ¢ 
P4 >
X
U¢o
Z$
0o i~~~o
r. u) 
04 a
"0 Q -
~ -
.
0
+ - -
0 0
0
-~x C \ @0\( (
V) a) 
~o Z 11..
-.k4
u U +~~~(~V~O 06 OSNIlG
0~~~~ S0 _
t 0
,U_
~U
44
-.
(SIVI"10O O161 A0 SNOIlIlG)
SlSO0 9Nlt f l38-NON
6-97
4
z
w
-J
4.
C)
N
I-6
0N
d
0
.4
0
oo
o' 0
u
0
44 0~~~~~~~~~~~~
i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i
14 0 IJw
84 -4 (w c
-4 ~~~~~~~~~~z- o w
z
o 0 4 
o ou 
C-)
w w
0'
u- -
0 ~~~~~~~~~~0
0 
in
uZW
(SHV'1-100 L61 JO SNOITlIS)
S.LSOD ONIh~bl338 -NON
6-98
0O ~~no ~. mr' 0 W Ad 0 / "
WY<
. C .
C aWu 
O
00 z
w
CHC) C^.)
A> _ ,
0
C)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C
* 0~~~~~~~~~~~4 
0
N
I I I I as
_ o d O. 
(SlV'lOa OL61 J0 SNOIlrIS)
SISOO ON188In38-NON
GPO 930-324
A- 99
